Yao Yue Rong v. Chan Kwong Ming
Read the full judgment text of HCAP 35/2012 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 June 2013.
1. This is an application for summary judgment.
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HCAP 35/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PROBATE ACTION NO. 35 OF 2012
BETWEEN
_____________ D E C I S I O N _____________ Application 1.This is an application for summary judgment. Background 2.On 21 December 2012, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings against the Defendant. The Plaintiff said that she was the lawful widow of Mr. Chan Shu Hok (陳樹鶴) (“the Deceased’) who died intestate on 17 September 2011. She thereafter applied for the letters of administration in respect of the estate (‘the Estate”) of the Deceased. However, she could not do so because of entering of 2 caveats (1173/2012 and 3976/2012) by the Defendant, one of the nephews of the Deceased. 3.The matter could not be resolved by the parties themselves and as such, the Plaintiff asked the Court to direct that the 2 caveats should cease to have effect. Further, she was to be appointed as the administratrix of the Estate and that the Defendant would be required to pay her costs. 4.The Defendant filed his acknowledgment of service on 9 January 2013 indicating that he would be contesting the proceedings. 5.The Plaintiff then took out her application for summary judgment on 21 January 2013. Briefly, she explained that she enjoyed the highest priority to obtain the letters of administration. However, the Defendant entered the caveats. Although she had agreed to include all nephews and nieces to share in the Estate according to the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance (Cap 73) (“IEO”), the Defendant had an argument with her on the size of the Estate. She further needed the letters of administration as quickly as possible because a tenant of the Deceased’s property had failed to pay rent from 10 October 2010. 6.The Defendant opposed the order 14 application. He said that he was the adopted son of the Deceased. The Plaintiff was plainly grossly negligent in taking of the Deceased. She had applied to the Court hoping that she would be appointed as a committee upon the ground that the Deceased was a mentally incapacitated person (“MIP”). He opposed to it but the Deceased passed away before the Court could hear the arguments. Anyway, the conduct of the Plaintiff was very problematic, including making up wills/attorneys and misappropriating funds of the Deceased before his death. She could not be a suitable person to act as administratrix. An independent person and/or institution should be appointed instead. 7.The Plaintiff disagreed. She maintained that the Defendant was only a nephew but never adopted son of the Deceased. She treated the Deceased well. It was always her stance that the Deceased did not execute a proper Will. It was not difficult to understand as the Deceased was an old man and suffered various diseases. The Deceased signed an attorney to her because the tenant was not paying the rent. Last but not least, the Plaintiff also questioned the credibility of the Defendant. 8.Parties appeared before me on 26 April 2013. Mr. P. Lo of counsel acted for the Plaintiff and Mr. M. Ho of counsel, acted for the Defendant. Having heard from them, I adjourned the decision to be handed down. I now do so. Discussion 9.Sum Wan Piu v Lau Siu Hong HCAP 3/2004, 12 January 2005, Deputy Judge J. Poon (as he then was) is the authority supporting that order 14 summons applies in probate application. 10.The principles relating to summary judgment is clear. In short, the underlying policy of it aims at preventing the defendant from delaying the plaintiff to obtain judgment in case where the latter clearly has no defence. Facing such application, the Court asks 2 questions: -
11.Applying the above principles in the present context, should judgment be granted to the Plaintiff?
12.I now move to each and every grounds raised by the Defendant to see if there is any triable issue or some other reason for a trial. Dishonesty? 13.The Defendant said that the Plaintiff had been dishonest. In the MIP proceedings, she produced a hand-written note, purporting to suggest that the Deceased would bequeath all his estate to her. The Defendant doubted the authenticity of the note. 14.The Plaintiff denied any dishonesty. It was always her case that the Deceased had not left any proper Will. She merely produced the notes written by the Deceased. Anyway, she had nothing to hide and supplied the Court with the whole of the note book. 15.Upon thought, I am afraid that the Defendant’s worry amount only to a mere allegation without any supporting evidence. In further consideration of the contemporaneous documents produced by the Plaintiff, I am afraid that the Defendant has not been able to persuade that it will raise a triable issue. Destruction of a Will? 16.The Defendant deposed that between 2009 and 2010, the Deceased mentioned to him that he had made his Will for a number of times, and “On one occasion, Yao [the Plaintiff] even torn one of the DECEASED’s wills into pieces in my presence.” 17.With respect, such ground not only lacks particulars, but also goes against reality in the sense that: how did the Deceased know that it was a Will? Why did he not pick up any of the pieces? Why did he not report to the matter to the relevant authority? 18.Hence, such allegation is simply not believable. Misappropriation of fund? 19.In the MIP proceedings, the Defendant questioned that a total sum of $356,000 was withdrawn from the joint account of the Deceased and the Plaintiff from 6 September 2010 to 24 January 2011. He asked for an explanation. The Plaintiff then answered in the followings.
20.In the present proceedings, the Defendant repeated the question and further queried a total of withdrawals of $722,971 from the Deceased’s bank account. 21.The Plaintiff explained that they were all done by the Deceased himself in his own bank account and they were all withdrawn before his stroke. 22.At the hearing before me, both counsel and I took time to go through the said bank account of the Deceased. However, other than showing money being paid in and taken out (by cash or transfer), nothing could be made out of it. 23.With respect, I do not consider the complaint of the Defendant can even get off the ground. Signing of attorney under duress? 24.The Defendant also said that the Plaintiff had produced a power of attorney in the MIP proceedings and he “…verily believe that the same must be executed and/or drafted by the Deceased under duress or during the time when he was not sound in mind”. 25.The Plaintiff explained she had provided an answer in the MIP proceedings. At that time, the Deceased had a difficult time in collecting rent from a tenant. As his health was deteriorating, he wanted the Plaintiff to do it for him. Due to his sickness, he could not write properly. Anyway, he drafted it first and asked someone to re-write for him to execute. All these two attorneys were placed before the Court. 26.Upon consideration, one of course cannot refrain from questioning the basis of the belief of the Defendant. He provided no particulars and evidence to support the same. After hearing from the Plaintiff, he made no reply. I take the view, again, that the Defendant has not been able to raise a reason for a trial. Conduct of the parties 27.In considering the argument between the parties, I do not forget to remind myself that no mini-trial on affidavit shall be conducted by me. However, I am entitled to consider the contemporaneous documents produced before me, including in particular the following:
From the above, it is clear that the Defendant is not arguing the Plaintiff’s right to administer the Estate. Instead, it is the size and sharing of the Estate being disputed. Conclusion 28.To conclude, the Defendant has failed to establish any triable issue or reason for a trial. Summary judgment is therefore to be awarded to the Plaintiff. I will order that:
Mr Paulinus Lo, instructed by Messrs H H Lau, for the Plaintiff. Mr Matthew Ho, instructed by Messrs Wong & Tang, for the Defendant. |
Cases cited in this judgment