HKSAR V . Salim Majed and Another
|
DCCC 646/2012 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CRIMINAL CASE NO 646 OF 2012 ----------------------
--------------------- Reasons for Verdict --------------------- 1.Salim Majed (D2) and Dadhal Hafez (D3) appear before me facing 7 counts of “Dealing with property known or reasonably believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence”, commonly known as money laundering. Charges 4 to 7 are against D2 and Charges 8 to 10 against D3. 2.The Prosecution case alleges that this is a case of money laundering which stemmed from international email and mail fraud. Victims were lured to deposit monies into designated bank accounts in Hong Kong. The bank accounts were related either to D2 or D3. D2 and D3 were arrested when they came to Hong Kong from the UK to deal with the accounts. 3.The Defence case is that D2 and D3 were in fact victims of deception. They set up companies in Hong Kong for bona fide reasons. They opened some bank accounts according to the advice of a Hong Kong accountant, who was in fact a fraudster. After they returned to the UK, the bank accounts of their companies had been used by others and they had no knowledge of the bank transactions under complaint. When they spotted there might be something wrong with the bank accounts, they came to Hong Kong to sort out the matters but were arrested by the police. 4.D2 and D3 pleaded not guilty to the charges. 5.All 7 charges are similarly worded, each charge alleges that the defendant concerned, during the period of time alleged, dealt with the monies in various bank accounts. 6.Charge 4 concerned HK$8,609.72 in a bank account no. 012-676-1-017725-8 held with the Bank of China (Hong Kong)(“BOC”). 7.Charge 5 concerned US$1,998.52 in a bank account no. 012-676-9-212860-1, also held with the BOC. 8.Charge 6 concerned HK$266,495.22, €30,566.10, GBP 25,750 and US$677,578.30 in a bank account held with the Hang Seng Bank Limited (“Hang Seng”). 9.Charge 7 concerned HK$141,153.98, US$219,278.36 in a bank account no. 817-524218-838 held with The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”). 10.All 4 counts were maintained by a Day Leader Limited (“Day Leader”). Day Leader was incorporated in Hong Kong on 19th May 2011. 11.Day Leader also maintained a HSBC account no. 817-524218-001. 12.According to the account opening application forms of BOC, Hang Seng and HSBC, the registered address of Day Leader was an address in Sheung Wan, Hong Kong (hereinafter referred to as the “Sheung Wan” address); its business address was one in Cuthbert Street, London. An email address and a mobile phone number were provided. 13.D2 is an Iraqi gentleman, he holds a Dutch passport. D2 became the sole director and shareholder of Day Leader since 29th November 2011. He opened the aforesaid 5 bank accounts on 1st and 2nd December 2011 and he was the sole signatory of all 5 accounts. 14.D2 has a clear criminal record in Hong Kong. 15.Charge 4 and 5 allege that D2 laundered the monies particularized between 2nd December 2011 and 21st February 2012; Charge 6 and 7: between 1st December 2011 and 22nd February 2012. 16.Details of the transactions of Day Leader’s bank accounts are contained in the bankers’ affirmations produced. 17.Amongst the withdrawals from Day Leader’s bank accounts, a total of around HK$408,000 was withdrawn by way of cash withdrawals by D2 over the counter on 21st February 2012. 18.Charge 8 concerned HK$2,000 in a bank account no. 012-676-1-017720-3 held with the BOC. 19.Charge 9 concerned HK$1,548.80 and US$109,146.26 in a bank account no. 228-423554-883 held with the Hang Seng. 20.Charge 10 concerned HK$186,664.50 and US$277,103.84 in a bank account no. 817-524192-838 held with the HSBC. 21.These 3 accounts were maintained by a Charmsky Rich Limited (“Charmsky”). Charmsky was incorporated in Hong Kong on 20th May 2011. 22.Charmsky also maintained a HSBC account no. 817-524192-001. 23.According to the account opening application forms of Charmsky, the registered address of Charmsky was the Sheung Wan address; the business address was one in Baker Street, Portman Square, London. An email address was provided. 24.D3, a Syrian gentleman and holder of British passport, became the sole director and shareholder of Charmsky since 29th November 2011. He opened the aforesaid 4 bank accounts in Hong Kong on 1st and 2nd December 2011 and was the sole signatory of all four accounts. 25.D3 has a clear criminal record in Hong Kong. 26.Charge 8 alleges that D3 laundered the monies particularized between 2nd December 2011 and 21st February 2012; Charge 9: between 1st December 2011 and 22nd February 2012; and Charge 10: between 1st December 2011 and 21st February 2012. 27.Details of the transactions of Charmsky’s bank accounts are contained in the bankers’ affirmation produced. 28.Amongst the withdrawals from Charmsky’s bank accounts, a total of around HK$19,117.60 (in Hong Kong dollars and US dollars) was withdrawn by D3 over the counter on 21st and 22nd February 2012. 29.Shortly after 11 pm on 22nd February 2012, police officers arrested D2 and D3 for Conspiracy to Defraud inside a hotel room in Mong Kok. 30.D3 had in his possession the following cash:
31.A police officer searched the room and seized the following items belonging to D2:
32.Police officers searched the room and found in D3’s possession the following cash:
33.The following bank documents belong to D3 were also seized during the search:
34.Under caution at the scene of arrest, D3 remained silent. In a subsequent video-recorded interview, D3 said the following voluntarily:
35.D2 and D3 were in Hong Kong between 28th November 2011 and 3rd December 2011. They arrived in Hong Kong again on 21st February 2012. 36.A CCTV security system operated by the BOC, recorded the opening of the bank accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky on 2nd December 2011. The recordings were prepared onto five DVDs and produced as ND-8. 37.A CCTV security system operated by the HSBC, of the branch situated at HSBC Business Centre, 2nd Floor, 673 Nathan Road, Mong Kok, recorded events that happened at Counter 11, and the main door of the branch between 1.30 pm and 2.30 pm on 21st February 2012. A copy of the recordings was prepared onto a DVD and produced as ND-7. 38.A CCTV camera at Hang Seng Bank, 677 Nathan Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, captured D3 entering the bank on his own at about 11.32 am and leaving the bank at about 11.35 am, on 21st February 2012. 39.Apart from the Admitted Facts made under section 65C of Cap 221, I received into evidence 8 witness statements produced under section 65B (PW1 to 7 and Mr. IP Lau-chuen). 40.PW1 to 7 are overseas witnesses. They are:
41.Mr. Xian runs a family owned company in China. His company was the victim of an email fraud. Someone had used Mr. Xian’s email address to contact his Indian business counterpart and falsely requested the latter to make payment to Mr. Xian through other bank accounts. Mr. Xian’s client remitted US$40,000 into Day Leader’s HSBC account no. 838 on 14th February 2012. (Charge 7) 42.Ms. Wang worked for a company in Ningbo, China. A Malaysian client of Ms. Wang’s company received a false email purportedly sent by Ms. Wang’s company asking the former to settle the remaining balance of a transaction by depositing the same into Charmsky’s HSBC account no. 838. On 6th January 2012, the Malaysian company remitted US$29,000 to the designated account. (Charge 10) 43.Ms. Tang worked for a company in Changsha, China. Ms. Shearer’s company was a customer of Ms. Tang’s company. The two companies had a business transaction in October 2011. In early 2011, a hacker hacked into the email accounts of Ms. Tang and Ms. Shearer’s company. Ms Shearer. received an email from the hacker, pretending to be Ms. Tang and asked Ms. Shearer to settle payment for the goods ordered by remitting US$48,313 into Charmsky’s HSBC account no. 838. On 9th January 2012, Ms. Shearer made a wire transfer as requested. (Charge 10) 44.Mr. Ashikhmin was a buyer of a trading company, his company purchased furniture from a Chinese company in October 2012. On 9th January 2012, he received an email purportedly sent by his business counterpart and asked that payment be made to Charmsky’s HSBC account no. 838. On 12th January 2012, Mr. Ashikhmin paid the sum into the designated account as requested. (Charge 10) 45.Mr. Watanabe was the victim of an inheritance fraud. He was deceived into thinking that he was the beneficiary of a huge inheritance left by an unknown distant clansman. On 3rd January 2012, Mr. Watanabe paid US$105,391.55 into Day Leader’s Hang Seng account as fees to obtain letters of administration. (Charge 6) 46.Ms. Rabanes worked for a company in Doha State of Qata. Ms. Rabanes’ company placed an order with a Chinese company in late 2011. Ms. Rabanes received emails purportedly sent by the supplier requesting payment be made by T/T with Day Leader as the beneficiary and Day Leader’s Hang Seng account as the designated account. Ms. Rabanes’ company paid US$72,409.47 into the said Hang Seng account via T/T on 4th January 2012. (Charge 6) 47.Mr. IP Lau-chuen, Senior Audit Manager of the BOC states in his statement that the BOC’s accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky were opened on 12th December 2012 at the Sheung Wan Branch by D2 and D3 respectively. E-banking facilities were applied for. 48.On 13th December 2011, the BOC assigned a unique e-banking PIN number to Day Leader. Another PIN number was assigned to Charmsky on the same day. 49.On 14th December 2011, BOC sent by registered mail a standard package of e-banking operation document together with the assigned e-banking PIN number and first login password to the correspondence address of Day Leader, i.e., the Sheung Wan address. A similar package was also sent to the correspondence address of Charmsky, i.e. also to the Sheung Wan address. 50.It was stated in both mailing packages that the client should sign and return the acknowledged receipt within 15 days. Both receipts were stamped with the date 14th December 2011. 51.According to the records of the BOC, on 9th January 2012, BOC received two acknowledged receipts. Staff of the BOC checked the signatures of the receipts against the authorized signatures. It turned out that the signatures of the two receipts did not match with the authorized signatures of Day Leader and Charmsky. The BOC did not activate the e-banking facilities for both Day Leader and Charmsky. 52.Day Leader and Charmsky could still conduct banking transactions in person at any of the BOC’s branches. 53.I heard live evidence from 4 prosecution witnesses, they are:
54.It is not in dispute that PW8, Ms Lai, features in the CCTV recording of the BOC (ND-8). Ms Lai opened the BOC bank accounts for Day Leader and Charmsky on 2nd December 2011. A Ms. Rainbow WONG of a secretariat company had made an appointment with Ms. LAI for the purpose of opening the accounts; Rainbow WONG also provided Ms. LAI with the corporate documents required by the bank. On 2nd December 2011, D2, the director of Day Leader, and D3, the director of Charmsky, turned up at the bank and they were assisted by Rainbow WONG. 55.Ms. LAI filled in application forms with the information provided to her. The details shown in the application forms of Day Leader and Charmsky, i.e. the correspondence address, business address and email were provided by the respective company directors. 56.The application forms were signed by D2 and D3 for Day Leader and Charmsky respectively. Both D2 and D3 had produced their passports for verification. 57.Ms. LAI gave some brochures to D2 and D3 related to online banking services on that occasion. She asked the respective directors some questions about the nature of the business, the business turnover and the clientele of the company concerned. 58.After the application was processed and approved by the back office, a PIN number and a security device for online banking were mailed to the correspondence address of Day Leader and Charmsky. 59.Ms. LAI was aware that Rainbow worked with her boyfriend, a Pakistani male. 60.Ms. LEE worked as an Assistant Personal Banking Officer of the BOC in December 2011. She had business dealings with Rainbow WONG, Rainbow WONG had on occasions liaised with Ms. LEE and brought people to LEE’s office to open bank accounts. Rainbow WONG worked for a secretariat company and she had a foreign boyfriend who looks like the gentleman in photograph D1. In Rainbow WONG’s dealings with the BOC, she would ask all banking documents, including the security numbers, passwords and security devices be sent to the correspondence address. 61.Since Rainbow WONG said she worked for a secretariat company, the fact that Rainbow WONG and her South Asian boyfriend had brought many people to the BOC to open bank accounts did not make Ms. LEE suspicious that there might be some money laundering activities behind. 62.Mr. KWOK was an Assistant Customer Marketing Officer of the Hang Seng in December 2011 and he received D2, D3 on 1st December 2011. An appointment had been made by a secretariat company, TY Registration, and D2, D3 turned up with a Mr. Yaser. 63.The corporate documents required for opening of bank account were brought by the directors. Yaser was present when Mr. KWOK dealt with D2 for Day Leader and D3 for Charmsky. Mr. KWOK completed the account opening application form with the information provided by the directors concerned. Mr. KWOK spoke to D2 and D3 in English, the answers were given by D2 and D3; but sometimes Yaser would help to explain the questions or provide some information. 64.Since D2 and D3 were foreign clients, before approval for opening of the accounts was given, Mr. KWOK provided the following items to D2 for Day Leader and D3 for Charmsky respectively: one ATM card, one debit card, password for E-banking, password for telephone banking, password for ATM card and a device for E-banking. The approval normally would take one week. The account holder could operate the accounts with the passwords and devices provided after Hang Seng informed its client by email of the approval. 65.Mr. KWOK opines that Yaser looks like the gentleman in photograph D1. 66.He saw nothing suspicious in his dealings with Day Leader and Charmsky. 67.Ms. LEE Kit-ying was an Assistant Manager of the HSBC in December 2011, she was then responsible for opening new accounts for corporate clients. 68.On 1st December 2011, she opened accounts for Day Leader and Charmsky, represented by D2 and D3 respectively, as director cum shareholder. Apart from D2 and D3, a male called Ah Shing, a non-Chinese who speaks fluent Chinese and English, accompanied D2 and D3. Ah Shing looks like the gentleman in photograph D1. Ah Shing worked for a secretariat company. Ms. LEE inspected the passports produced by D2 and D3 and obtained the necessary information from D2 and D3. She also asked some questions of Day Leader and Charmsky and they were answered by D2 and D3 respectively. 69.Ms. LEE approved the opening of the accounts for Day Leader and Charmsky on the same day. She handed the ATM cards, passwords, banking security devices to D2 for Day Leader and D3 for Charmsky. 70.Ms. LEE had seen Rainbow WONG appearing with Ah Shing at HSBC’s office with their clients for the purpose of opening accounts. On occasions, Rainbow WONG would also accompany Ah Shing’s clients and Ms. LEE did not find their activities suspicious. 71.The Prosecution case as put to the defendants is that before D2 and D3 came to Hong Kong in December 2011, they were approached in the U.K. about opening some bank accounts in Hong Kong for reward. That was the reason why D2 and D3 came to Hong Kong on 28th November 2011. 72.It is the Prosecution’s case that D2 had no intention to trade with China via Day Leader. D2 opened Day Leader as he needed a company to open bank accounts in Hong Kong. D2 knew all along he would not use the accounts personally and he would not receive the bank paraphernalia, ie PINs, security devices, ATM cards and passwords, thus the Sheung Wan address, ie Yaser’s address, was used as the correspondence address of Day Leader in all application forms. It is the Prosecution’s case that D2 never expected to receive any correspondence related to Day Leader or the bank accounts at his U.K.’s address as D2 knew they would all go to the Sheung Wan address. 73.It is the Prosecution’s case that D2 must have believed that the monies that went through the accounts came from illegal transactions otherwise D2 would not have taken all the trouble to fly to Hong Kong from the U.K. to open the bank accounts in question. 74.It is the Prosecution’s case that the real reason why D2 came to Hong Kong in February 2012 was to get more money for himself out of the arrangement, i.e. to raid the accounts, thus he withdrew a total of around HK$408,000 over the counter on 21st February 2012, knowing full well the money in the accounts did not belong to him. 75.The Prosecution’s case against D3 is similar to its case against the 2nd defendant. 76.At the conclusion of the Prosecution’s case, I ruled that D2 had a case to answer on Charge 4 to 7; D3 had a case to answer on Charge 8 to 10. 77.D2 elected to give evidence. He testified that he worked and lived in London with his wife and seven children. He owned two coffee chops cum shisha bars in London. He sold one and made a profit. He intended to renovate the other one and sell it. D2 wanted to buy furniture from China for his shop. A Mr. ABUJUDA, a Palestinian gentleman who helped D2 with account works in London, suggested that D2 should set up a company in Hong Kong in order to buy things from China. Through ABUJUDA, D2 came to know a Mr. Yaser, a Hong Kong accountant. 78.For that purpose, D2 came to Hong Kong on 28th November 2011. Yaser, together with his wife, Rainbow, received D2 at the airport. Apart from D2, Yaser also received D1 and D3 at the airport. Yaser took D1, D2 and D3 to a hotel in Kowloon. On the following day, Yaser took D1 to D3 to his office. D2 signed some documents there. D2 was given to understand that the documents he was asked to sign concerned the company he wanted to set up, i.e. Day Leader. D2 paid £1,000 to Yaser for the opening of the company but no receipt was given. D2 became the sole director and shareholder of Day Leader. D2 did not keep any copy of the documents he signed as Yaser said the same would be sent to D2’s London address. 79.D2 went to Macau with D1 and D3 after their visit to Yaser’s office and the three returned to Hong Kong in the small hours on 30th November 2011. 80.D2 testified that he only wanted to open a company in Hong Kong. For the bank accounts in question, Yaser came in the morning on 1st December 2011 and suggested that D2 should open a bank account at HSBC; the bank manager was a friend of Yaser and there would not be any problem. 81.Yaser took D2, D1 and D3 to HSBC and Hang Seng on 1st December 2011. D2 produced his passport as proof of identity and a British Gas bill as proof of address at the three banks. Yaser spoke to the bank staff in Chinese and D2 was asked to sign on various documents. D2 asked Yaser through D1 why they should go to Hang Seng after their visit to HSBC. Yaser said D2 should leave the matter to him; they went to Hang Seng just in case HSBC declined to open an account for Day Leader. 82.On 2nd December 2011, Rainbow took D1 to D3 to the BOC and similar things happened, i.e. production of passport and address proof, signing of documents at designated places as directed. Rainbow and the bank staff talked to each other in Chinese. 83.D2 had not provided any Hong Kong address when he opened the bank accounts. He received no bank paraphernalia, i.e. ATM cards, passwords, PINs and security devices from HSBC, Hang Seng and BOC. 84.Yaser told D2 that he should pay HK$6,000 as deposit for each bank account. D2 paid HK$17,000 to Yaser as deposits, HK$1,000 short of the amount required as that was what he had at the time. 85.D2 left Hong Kong with D1 and D3 on 3rd December 2011. 86.After his return to London, D2 could not contact Yaser. By January 2012, D2 had not received any documents from the banks, he decided to come to Hong Kong so that he could contact Yaser and asked the bank about the various items that he failed to receive from the banks. 87.D2 said he originally planned to travel to Hong Kong by himself. However, on 19th February 2012, D1 contacted him and said he knew of a travel agency who would offer better discounted price if more than one ticket was bought; D2 acceded to D1’s suggestion and he flew to Hong Kong with D1 and D3 on the same plane. 88.D2 arrived in Hong Kong in the small hours on 21st February 2012, he called Yaser a few times in the morning but the latter did not answer. D2 went to the Mong Kok branch of Hang Seng Bank and spoke to a female staff member. He showed his passport and gave the name of his company to the female staff member, he asked why he had not received anything from the bank, he also asked for the bank statement of the account. He was told everything had been sent to his address. He was then given a printout showing there was a balance of HK$266,000 in the account. D2 told the female staff member that he had no idea where the money came from. The female staff member asked D2 to come back at 3.30 pm. 89.D2 then went to the Mong Kok branch of the HSBC. At the reception counter, he told a female staff member that he had not received anything from the bank and he wanted to know the details about his bank account. The female staff member asked for D2’s passport and the name of the company. After checking, she told D2 the account had a balance of €14. D2 indicated that he wanted to close the account or change the address as he had not received anything sent to his address. The bank staff gave D2 a form. As D2 did not know English, he left the bank and looked for D3. 90.After D2 had found D3, the two went to another branch of Hang Seng Bank in Mong Kok. D3 acted as an interpreter for D2 in that other branch. D2 spoke to a staff member and told the latter that he had not received anything from Hang Seng. The bank staff asked for D2’s passport and asked D2 to come back in an hour’s time. D2 left that other branch at about 11.30 am. 91.D2 and D3 went back to that other branch at 12.30 pm. The bank staff told D2 that he had checked with the Head office and confirmed that there had been no complaint about the money in the account. D2 asked if he could withdraw the money and was given a positive reply. D2 then withdrew HK$260,000 leaving a balance of HK$6,000 in the account; he wanted to ask Yaser where the money came from and who was playing with the account. 92.Shortly thereafter, D2 returned to the Mong Kok branch of the HSBC with D3 acting as his interpreter. Eventually, D2 was told there was HK$141,000 in the account and there was no problem with the money. D2 told the bank manager that he did not know the origin of the money and he wanted to close the account. The manager said D2 could not close the account unless he had withdrawn all the money. D2 then withdrew HK$140,000 leaving HK$1,000 in the account. D2 withdrew the money as he wanted to contact Yaser and find out the origin of the money. 93.At 3 p.m., D2 went to the Mong Kok branch of BOC. He showed his passport and made enquiries about the account of Day Leader there. A female bank staff member checked the balance for D2 and informed him that the account had a balance of HK$8,000. D2 reckoned that he had given Yaser HK$6,000 as deposit during his last visit. D2 then withdrew HK$8,000 from the account. 94.D2 then went to the Mong Kok branch of Hang Seng Bank at 3.30 pm, the appointed time. He was told there was €22,000 in the account. D2 told a female staff member that he had no idea where the money came from. As D2 was speaking to the female staff member, the latter noticed that someone was changing the Euros in the account into US dollars. D2 then complained to a bank manager that someone was playing with his account, no one else knew about his account except his accountant Yaser. 95.D2 provided the manager with the telephone number of Yaser. The manager then left D2, when he returned, he told D2 that he had called the number but the person who answered the call claimed himself to be Mr SALIM. The manager told D2 there was nothing he could do for D2. D2 asked the manager to either call the police or the consulate but the manager would do neither. D2 left the Mong Kok branch of Hang Seng at 5.30 pm. 96.D2 then went to the Mong Kok Police Station by himself. He had difficulties in communicating with the police officers there as the English standard of D2 and the officers was not good. D2 failed to get the police to open a file for him. He was only given a piece of paper on which a telephone number was written, and he was told to contact the Hong Kong Police Station. 97.After D2 left the police station, he did some shopping for his children, then he took a taxi to Jordan. He went to the night market and entered a casino. He gambled and lost around US$5,000. 98.D2 then returned to the hotel, i.e. the Langham Place. Previously he stayed at the Victoria Hotel for a night and as Victoria was too noisy, he moved to the Langham Place. 99.On 22nd February 2012, D2 went to the Tsim Sha Tsui branch of Hang Seng Bank and he spoke to Mr. KWOK there. D2 made no request for internet banking, ATM card, change of correspondence address nor did he make a report for loss of the cheque book. He only complained that Mr. KWOK had caused him trouble by using Yaser’s address as the address for Day Leader. D2 told Mr. KWOK he wanted to close the account and Mr. KWOK sent D2 to another counter. D2 left the bank as he could not communicate with the bank staff and he did not have an interpreter with him. 100.D2 was arrested in his hotel room later that day. For the money found on D2: US$35,455, £11.01, HK$4,751.20 and €201, D2 said when he withdrew the monies from the banks, the monies were in Hong Kong currency. He changed the monies into US dollars in Tsim Sha Tsui. 101.When the police spoke to D2, D2 told the police about his failed attempt to make a report at the Mong Kok Police Station. The piece of paper given to him by the police officer at Mong Kok Police Station was seized by the police and its whereabouts is unknown. 102.D2 said apart from the three withdrawals, he had not conducted any other transactions with the HSBC, Hang Seng and BOC accounts of Day Leader. No one paid him to come to Hong Kong to open Day Leader and the bank accounts in question. 103.D3 testified that he is now 37 years old. Born in Syria, D3 settled in England in year 2000. Since 2003, he has been engaged in construction, renovation and interior design works of buildings, office and residential premises. Since 2011, he has been helping his brother-in-law in a project for the renovation of two hotels in the U.K. They had to deal with various aspects of works: electricity, decoration, plumbing and woodwork. The last item involved purchase of furniture for the hotels. 104.D3 said he came to Hong Kong in late November 2011 to open a company so that he could use that company to import furniture from China for the hotel project. He chose Hong Kong as it is an international trading city. 105.On the subject of opening a company in Hong Kong, D3 had received some advice from his friend, Mr. HASSAN, and a Pakistani accountant in the U.K. They provided D3 with a Hong Kong contact, i.e. Mr. Mohammed Yaser Arafat. D3 called Yaser by phone and the latter advised D3 that he needed to bring with him his passport as identity proof and proof of residential or office address on his visit to Hong Kong. 106.In November 2011, D3 contacted Yaser as D3 was free to make a 7 to 10 days’ visit to Hong Kong. He contacted Yaser again. D3 then bought the air ticket and informed Yaser of his arrival time. 107.When D3 arrived at the airport in Hong Kong, he saw Yaser holding a banner with D3’s name written on it. A lady called Rainbow was also present. The three were joined by D1 and D2 at the airport. Yaser then took D1 to D3 to a hotel. 108.On the following morning, Yaser came and took D1 to D3 to his office. Yaser explained the procedure of opening a company to D3. D3 chose a ready-made company instead of setting up a new company from scrap. Yaser asked for HK$8,500 for the costs of opening a company for D3. He also suggested D3 should open a bank account in order to facilitate the running of the new company. Yaser also suggested a company should at least have one bank account. D3 agreed with what Yaser said. 109.As to why D3 ended up opening bank accounts with three banks, D3 said he first chose to open a bank account at the HSBC as the latter is an international bank. As Yaser advised that the HSBC would not necessarily accept D3 opening a new account with them, Yaser suggested D3 should choose three banks, at the end of the day, at least one of them would agree to open a new account for D3. If more than one account could be opened, the better for the new company. 110.When D3 opened the bank accounts at the banks, he answered the questions with Yaser’s help. 111.D3 said the Sheung Wan address, i.e. the registered address of Charmsky, was in fact the office address of Yaser. As for the London address, i.e. No. 1 Baker Street, Portman Square, London W1U 8ED, U.K., that was the business and residential address of D3 when the documents were filled in. 112.He had since then moved to live at a flat at Willsden Lane London and used No. 1 Baker Street as his business address only, both were rented premises. 113.D3 said when he was at the HSBC and Hang Seng he did not receive any bank paraphernalia from the banks. He received nothing from the BOC by mail or otherwise either. 114.During D3’s first visit to Hong Kong, he went to Macau with D1 and D2 on 29th November 2011 and spent a few hours there. On the day Charmsky was set up, Yaser took D3 to Lamma Island for dinner. Rainbow and her brother, Alex, were also present. D3 stayed with D1 and D2 in a room at Langham Place Hotel for the last few days of their visit. The three occupied one room as there was no single room available. 115.D3 paid a total sum of ₤1,000 to Yaser: HK$8,500 for setting up Charmsky; HK$2,000 for company registration and HK$2,000 for helping D3 to open the accounts at the HSBC, Hang Seng and the BOC. D3 also paid HK$17,000 to HK$18,000 as deposits to be put into the accounts: HK$6,000 each for the HSBC and Hang Seng and HK$5,000 for the BOC. 116.Before D3 returned to the UK, Yaser had once mentioned he could help D3 to open an office in Hong Kong. D3 found Yaser a nice and trustworthy man. 117.On the day D3 returned to the U.K., he was somewhat surprised when he saw D1 and D2 at the airport. The three flew back to the U.K. on board the same aeroplane. Upon arrival at Heathrow, D1 exchanged telephone number with D3 before they parted. 118.After D3 returned to the U.K., he received nothing from the banks, he made many attempts to contact Yaser by phone but he could not reach Yaser. He wanted to ask about the bank paraphernalia that the bank should have sent to him. Finally, D3 called D1 and asked the latter if he had received anything from Yaser. The two arranged to meet and at the meeting, D3 learnt that D1 had received nothing from Yaser and he too had lost contact with Yaser. Eventually, a decision was made by D1 and D3 that they should travel to Hong Kong to sort out the matters. 119.Another reason for D3’s visit to Hong Kong in February was that he also wanted to buy or source some T-shirts and Syrian flags to be used in the protest to be held by the Syrian community in the U.K. 120.In Hong Kong, D3 tried to contact Yaser but in vain. 121.For the cash withdrawals he made in Hong Kong, D3 said the money was his money, i.e. the initial deposits that he had paid Yaser during the first visit. The Law 122.Both D2 and D3 have a clear record and both elected to give evidence. I directed myself in terms of Berrada; that they are less likely to commit the offence of money laundering and more likely to tell the truth in their evidence in court. In the case of D3, he is also more likely to tell the truth in his explanations to the police under caution. 123.It is for the Prosecution to prove all elements of each offence beyond reasonable doubt. Any benefit of doubt must go to the defendant. 124.The Prosecution needs to prove the defendants dealt with the property that is the subject matter of the charge. “Dealing” is defined in section 2(1) of Cap 455, it includes receiving, concealing, disposing or converting property. 125.It is trite law that the Prosecution does not have to prove that the property in question (i.e. the money in bank accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky) is in fact proceeds of an indictable offence. However, in the present case, the Prosecution has adduced evidence by way of 65B statements that part of the money in Day Leader and Charmsky’s respective accounts of HSBC and Hang Seng were proceeds of email fraud. See the statements of PW1 to 7 and paragraph 24 of the Prosecution’s closing. 126.Apart from proving the act of dealing with the property in question, the Prosecution needs to prove that D2 and D3 knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the property represented the proceeds of an indictable offence. 127.On the question of knowledge, it is not the Prosecution’s case that either of the defendants was involved in the commission of the underlying indictable offences. However, the Prosecution draws my attention to the judgment of Lord Bridge in Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd [1986] and argues that does not mean that D2 and D3 can “turn a blind eye to the obvious” or “shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from enquiry because he suspected the truth but did not want to have his suspicion confirmed.” 128.It is well settled that having “reasonable grounds to believe” has both “objective” and “subjective” elements. Objectively, the Prosecution needs to prove that there are grounds that a common sense, right-thinking member of the community would consider sufficient to lead a person to believe that the property in whole or in part represented proceeds of an indictable offence. Subjectively, it requires proof that those grounds were known to the defendant. 129.Section 25(2) of Cap 455 provides a defendant with a defence: it is a defence to the offence of money laundering that a defendant intended to disclose his suspicions about the money laundering to an “authorized officer”, which includes any police officer. Section 25(2) requires proof on the balance of probabilities. Issues at trial 130.For the element of “dealing with”, it is not in dispute that D2 and D3, during their second visit to Hong Kong, had presented themselves at the bank counters and made cash withdrawals. In short, HK$408,000 by D2 and around HK$19,116.60 by D3. 131.In paragraph 28 of D2’s closing, Mr. PIERCE for D2, submits that this court can convict D2 in respect of each of the sums of money involved in the over-the-counter cash withdrawals made by D2. 132.Mr. LOFTUS submits that D3 only withdrew money that he had previously given to Yaser during his first visit as money to open the accounts. He had given HK$17,000 to HK$18,000 to Yaser for that purpose. 133.In respect of the remaining sums of money in the bank accounts, the stance of D2 and D3 is that they did not have any knowledge of the transactions which were effected in relation to these banks accounts. The credits and withdrawals that were made of all the accounts were mostly conducted through internet banking facilities. Apart from the cash withdrawals at the counters on 21st and 22nd February 2012, the accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky at all relevant times were being remotely controlled by others. D2 and D3 at no time possessed the bank items; they were unaware of the transactions under complaint, they did nothing to effect any of them and did not “deal” with the monies in the accounts. 134.In short, other than the cash withdrawals made by D2 and D3, ie the ones referred to in paragraph 11 and 15 of P252, the Admitted Facts, it is in dispute whether in law and in fact D2 and D3 had dealt with the money involved in the transactions in the respective bank accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky. 135.The Prosecution’s case, in a nutshell, is that D2 and D3 came all the way to Hong Kong from the U.K. for one purpose: to open bank accounts at HSBC, Hang Seng and BOC. D2 and D3 passed all the bank items to other people as soon as they received them from HSBC and Hang Seng. They were effectively allowing others to use the accounts with their permission, hence, they had dealt with the proceeds when the accounts were used to receive monies, including those from the victims, PW1 to 7. 136.On the issue of knowledge, D2 and D3’s case is that they had no knowledge that the money in the accounts represented proceeds of an indictable offence. 137.For D2, in relation to the monies involved in the transactions other than the cash withdrawals made by D2 during his second visit, D2’s case is that objectively and subjectively, no reasonable grounds existed. 138.In the case of D3, it is his case that no reasonable grounds existed objectively and subjectively, both in terms of the cash withdrawals made by D3 and the transactions remotely conducted by others. 139.The Prosecution contends that, “Considering all the evidence adduced at trial, including the nature and method of setting up the Company and Bank accounts, defendants flying from England to Hong Kong to open these accounts, handing over, or permitting all controlling devices of the accounts (i.e. Bank cards, security devices, internet passwords, etc) to be used by a third party, being aware of the balances in the accounts (being greater than what they claim to have provided for opening the accounts), making withdrawals from the accounts knowing it was not their money…” The Prosecution contends that the mens rea of the offence is proven. D2 and D3 had ‘shut their eyes to the obvious’ or there were reasonable grounds to believe and those grounds were known to D2 and D3. Discussion and Analysis 140.I have considered all the evidence and counsel submissions. I am grateful to Mr. PARRY for the prosecution, Mr. PIERCE for D2 and Mr. LOFTUS for D3 for their assistance throughout the proceedings. 141.I have considered all the section 65B statements. I attach full weight to the statements of PW1 to PW7. I am aware that to some extents, the statements contain hearsay, for example, what the victims were told by their business counterparts whose statements were not produced and they were not called as witnesses. However, as pointed out by Mr. PARRY in paragraph 17 of the Prosecution’s closing, “these statements were unchallenged, there was no issue at trial as to the fact that these witnesses explained how they were defrauded and that their defrauded funds ended up in the defendants’ bank accounts.” It is not the case of D2 and D3 that they had dealings with PW1 to 7 and monies went into the accounts as a result of the dealings. 142.As for the statement of Mr. IP Lau-chuen of the BOC, I attach full weight to it. There is no dispute between the Prosecution and Defence that since the BOC found the signature on the acknowledgement of receipt form in relation to Day Leader problematic, thus the internet banking facility was never activated. 143.It is the Prosecution’s case that D2 willingly passed all the bank items to others and permitted other people to operate bank accounts of Day Leader, thus the receipt, which was sent to the correspondence address of Day Leader, ie the Sheung Wan address, was not signed by D2. 144.It is D2’s case that he was deceived by Yaser and Rainbow into opening the bank accounts, thinking that the bank items would be sent to his U.K. address, i.e. 5A Cuthbert Street. The signature on the receipt was forged. 145.From the above, one can see that the statement of Mr. IP is consistent with both the Prosecution’s case and D2’s case. 146.I have considered the Bankers’ affirmation evidence. 147.It is clear from the affirmations that for the HSBC, Hang Seng and the BOC bank accounts of Day Leader, during the relevant period, the total deposits amount was approximately HK$8.1 million. 148.For the HSBC, Hang Seng and the BOC bank accounts of Charmsky, during the relevant period, the total deposits amount was approximately HK$3.2 million. 149.Annex 1 of the Prosecution’s opening is a fair summary of the details of the transactions of the bank accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky and I adopt the same as an Annex to this judgment. 150.I have considered the evidence of the live witnesses called by the Prosecution. 151.I find the evidence of PW8 LAI Chau-kuk and PW9 LEE Ho-yan, both of the BOC, credible and reliable. 152.The evidence of PW8 and PW9, when read together with the 65B statement of Mr. IP Lau-chuen, explained why the internet banking facilities of the BOC was never activated. 153.I accept the evidence of PW8 that the answers and information provided in response to questions asked by PW8 were provided by D2, but Rainbow, who was present, would interpret for the applicant as PW8’s English language proficiency was not good. 154.The evidence of PW9 shows that Yaser is not a man of fiction. It is common ground that Yaser had a role to play in the laundering activities. It is D2 and D3’s case that they had been deceived by Yaser. It was Yaser who was responsible for the bank transactions other than the cash withdrawals made by D2 and D3 during their second visit. The Prosecution’s case is that D2 and D3, were willing participants in money laundering in that they willingly lent their bank accounts and bank items to others, including Yaser, so that other people could operate the accounts of Day Leader and Charmsky when D2 and D3 were not even in Hong Kong. 155.I find PW10, Mr. KWOK Chun-tim, an honest and reliable witness. He gave his evidence in a straightforward manner. 156.I accept PW10’s evidence that he had passed all the bank items to D2 at the time Day Leader’s account was opened at Hang Seng. PW10’s evidence on this issue is supported by P261 (page 1274), a receipt which, according to PW10, was signed by D2 at the time the Bank items were given to and received by D2. I see no reason why PW10 would pass the important bank items to people other than D2. I see no reason why PW10 would let people other than D2 to sign to acknowledge receipt of the Bank items. 157.I accept also PW10’s evidence that in respect of the bank items for Charmsky, they were given to the director of Charmsky, i.e., D3. I see no reason why PW10 would pass the bank items to people other than the director of Charmsky. 158.I am aware of PW10’s evidence that he saw Yaser in the lift lobby carrying the bag used to contain all the Bank items. PW10 has never retracted from his evidence that the Bank items had been given to the directors of Day Leader and Charmsky. In other words, Yaser only received the Bank items from D2 and/or D3 after PW10 had given the same to D2 and D3. 159.I accept the evidence of PW11, Miss LEE Kit-ying of the HSBC, like PW10, PW11 gave her evidence in a straightforward manner. I find her evidence as to what transpired at the time of the account opening both credible and reliable. She kept clear record as to what Bank items were given to the clients at the time of the opening of the accounts and to whom the Bank items were given. In the case of Day Leader, the relevant record is at page 933, and for Charmsky, page 1018. 160.The Bank items were given to D2 of Day Leader and D3 of Charmsky. It is inherently improbable that PW11 would pass the bank items to people other than the “Authorised Users” for Phonebanking, Business Internet Banking and Business Debit Card facilities, stated to be D2 for the account of Day Leader and D3 for the account of Charmsky, according to the record, see page 931 and 1016 of Bundle 2. 161.I find D2 a dishonest and unreliable witness despite his clear record. 162.I agree with Mr. PARRY’s submission that there is a demonstrable vagueness in D2’s evidence about the usage of 5A Cuthbert Street, London. Furthermore, if all along, D2 expected that the Bank items and bank statements of the HSBC, Hang Seng and the BOC would be sent to the U.K. address, it is unreasonable that D2 would provide “5A Cuthbert Street” as his address when it was not his main address and he would rent the place to some Kuwaiti people in the summer. 163.I agree with the Prosecution’s analysis that the arrival times to Hong Kong of both D2 and D3 on all occasions are almost identical, see P161 and P162 at page 533 and 534. D2’s evidence that he only met D3 and Eisa for the first time at the airport in Hong Kong on 28th November 2011 does not sit well with the Movement Records of D2 and D3. If D2, D3 and Eisa only came to know each other for the first time on 28th November, it is difficult to understand why the trio would travel together to Macau for pleasure on the 29th and return together on 30th November, 2011. 164.It is clear from the evidence that D2 is not someone who does not know any English at all. He lived and worked in the U.K. in his own evidence, he was able to make some enquiries with the banks during his second visit and he was able to make cash withdrawals from Hang Seng, the HSBC and the BOC on 21st February 2012, totalling HK$408,000. It is inherently improbable that Rainbow and Yaser would take the risk to use the Sheung Wan address as the correspondence address of the bank accounts as if they were sure D2 would not be able to comprehend what was going on. 165.In my judgment, D2’s evidence as to why he wanted to open a company in Hong Kong is not convincing. If D2 wanted to buy furniture for the renovation of his coffee shop, D2 could simply travel to Hong Kong and buy the furniture required, he did not have to open a company, let alone opening bank accounts with three banks. I find D2’s evidence as to how he was persuaded by Yaser to open three bank accounts unconvincing. It is also clear in his evidence that during his two visits to Hong Kong, he made no attempt to source or to buy any furniture for his coffee shop, contrary to D2’s claim that he wanted to buy furniture for his coffee shop. 166.I find it inherently improbable that if Yaser and Rainbow were keeping D2 in the dark, Yaser would ask D2 for HK$17,000 to be used as initial deposits for the three bank accounts. The sum of HK$17,000 was insignificant when compared with the HK$8.1 million that was later channelled into the accounts. If D2 was in the dark and had he provided Yaser with HK$17,000 as he claimed he did, he would certainly be concerned about the money when, sometime after his return to the U.K., he did not receive the Bank items and statements from the banks. D2 could take action at any time, and the money launderer would not know what action D2 would take about the bank accounts and when action would be taken. There is a risk that the accounts, together with the money in them, would be frozen. The money launderers must have had in mind big money, it makes no sense at all that they would do something that might trigger D2 taking action to recoup his initial deposits, hence jeopardising the whole scheme of money laundering. 167.Given D2 and D3 had opened bank accounts together during their first visit to Hong Kong, if D2 had decided to come to Hong Kong to sort out matters in relation to the accounts, I cannot understand why D2 and D3 never discussed their respective reasons for returning to Hong Kong when they met at the Heathrow Airport. 168.I reject D2’s evidence that he withdrew $480,000 in order to show the money to Yaser, his evidence does not make sense at all. 169.D2’s evidence about his visit to Mong Kok Police Station is plainly untrue, the piece of paper given to him by the police is nowhere to be found. It is inherently improbable that no one at the police station could understand D2 was making a serious complaint. D2 could have shown the cash, i.e., HK$480,000 to the police but he did not do so. 170.I reject also D2’s evidence that after he withdrew the money, he went into a casino in Jordan and lost US$5,000 in gambling. If D2 had lost US$5,000 in gambling, he would not be able to make a report to the Hong Kong Police Station as advised by the police at Mong Kok Police Station. There would be US$5,000 short. If as D2 claimed, he was sceptical about the source of the monies, he knew they were not his money and he wanted to report the matter to the police, gambling part of the money away would be the last thing he would do in the circumstances. If it was ever D2’s intention to report to the police about the monies in the accounts; he should not have withdrawn the monies in the accounts; having withdrawn the monies, he should not have changed the money into US currency. 171.D2 could not explain why, on his arrest, he was found in possession of only approximately US$35,455, GBP11.01, HK$4,751.20 and €201 when he had withdrawn HK$408,000 the day before. 172.The evidence adduced by the Prosecution has satisfied me, so that I am sure that, it was never D2’s intention to disclose his suspicion to the police. What D2 said about his attempted report at Mong Kok Police Station is a story fabricated by him. In my judgment, D2 cannot find refuge under section 25(2) of Cap.455. 173.I also find D2’s explanation of moving from Victoria Hotel to Langham Place unconvincing. 174.I also find D3 a dishonest and unreliable witness despite his clear record. 175.Some of my criticisms of D2’s evidence are also applicable to D3. 176.I make the same observation about the Movement Records of D3. It is quite clear that D2, D3 and Eisa were acting together during their first trip to Hong Kong, the excursion to Macau and their second trip to Hong Kong. 177.I reject D3’s evidence as to why he wanted to set up a company in Hong Kong. He did not need to have a Hong Kong company in order to purchase furniture for his hotel renovation works in the U.K. He did not need to have a Hong Kong bank account, let alone three accounts, in order to source or to buy furniture. His evidence as to why he opened bank accounts with three banks is unconvincing. 178.D3’s English language proficiency is much better than D2. I do not believe he did not know the Sheung Wan address, i.e. the address of T.Y. Registration was used as the correspondence address for the three bank accounts. It is difficult for Yaser and Rainbow to keep D3 in the dark that the Sheung Wan address had been used as the correspondence address for the bank accounts of Charmsky. 179.I also note that the amount withdrawn by D3, i.e. HK$19,117.60 was more than the amount that D3 claimed he had given to Yaser, i.e. HK$17,000 to HK$18,000. 180.I also find it inherently improbable that if D3 was in the dark, Yaser would lure D3 to pay him HK$17,000 to HK$18,000 for providing initial deposits to open the three bank accounts. In the event D3 took action about the bank accounts, all the dirty money would be at stake and the money launderer would stand to lose a lot. 181.I agree with Mr. PARRY’s analysis at paragraph 90 of the Closing, D2 and D3 instead of coming to Hong Kong for the second time, they could have contacted the banks without necessitating the expense and trouble of travelling all the way to Hong Kong. They could have telephoned the banks, e-mailed the banks or written to the banks. After they arrived in Hong Kong, D2 and D3 could have gone to T.Y. Registration to find Yaser. 182.The fact that I reject the evidence of D2 and D3 does not mean the charges are proved against them. 183.In my judgment, D2 had dealt with the monies in the respective bank accounts of Day Leader and D3 had dealt with the monies in the bank accounts of Charmsky. D2 and D3 had certainly dealt with the monies in the accounts when they made the cash withdrawals referred to in paragraph 11 and 15 of the admitted facts. 184.In the case of D2, he withdrew HK$260,000 from the Hang Seng account of Day Leader (i.e., the account in relation to Charge 6), HK$140,000 from the HSBC account (the account in relation to Charge 7) and HK$8,000 from the BOC account (the account in relation to Charge 4). All three withdrawals were made on 21st February 2012. It is true that D2 made no cash withdrawal in relation to the BOC account in relation to Charge 5. 185.In the case of D3, he made three withdrawals from the three accounts of Charmsky; HK$2,000 from the BOC account (Charge 8), HK$1,548.80 and US$1,000 from the Hang Seng account (Charge 9) and US$900 from the HSBC account (Charge 10). All three withdrawals were made on 21st February 2012. 186.On the issue whether D2 and D3 had dealt with the monies that went in and out of the accounts through other means, for example, Internet banking. The evidence adduced by the Prosecution has satisfied me so that I am sure that D2 and D3 travelled to Hong Kong from the U.K. for the primary purpose of opening bank accounts with the HSBC, Hang Seng and the BOC, and they were in that regard assisted by Yaser, Rainbow and, to a lesser extent, Alex Choi. The setting up of Day Leader and Charmsky was not the main purpose of their visit. 187.I am sure that D2 and D3 had received the Bank items from the HSBC and Hang Seng. The only irresistible inference I can draw from the evidence is that D2 and D3 had passed the Bank items to Yaser and/or Rainbow so that the accounts could be operated by others. 188.I am aware that D2 and D3 are facing substantive charges of Money Laundering, not charges of Conspiracy to Launder Money. 189.The case of HKSAR v Lau Shui Hing & Anor, CACC 111/2008, cited by the Prosecution, concerned two defendants who lent their bank cards to their friends for receiving some money. They were charged and convicted of the offence of Money Laundering. My understanding of the judgment is different from the views of Mr. PARRY. 190.It is true that the trial judge in Lau Shui Hing concluded that lending someone a bank account to deposit and withdraw monies is an essential part of money laundering and amounted to dealing with property (see paragraph 47 of the judgment). 191.Paragraph 61 to paragraph 64 of the judgment are all relevant:
192.From the above, one can see that the convictions in Lau Shui Hing were upheld on the basis that the Court of Appeal had come to the conclusion that the only inference was that the applicants had dealt with the monies in the accounts themselves, not that they had lent the accounts to Ah Chi. 193.In paragraph 61 of the judgment, the Court of Appeal pointed out that if a person had lent his account to another person, he had not dealt with the monies in the account, proof of mens rea apart. Although D2 and D3 were not charged with the offence of conspiracy to launder proceeds, in determining the actus rea of dealing with, one should bear in mind Section 89 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap.221, which provides:
194.In the present case, there is no direct evidence that D2 and D3 were paid to come to Hong Kong for the setting up of the companies and opening of the accounts. However, the only irresistible inference I can draw from the evidence is that the first trip to Hong Kong made by D2 and D3 must be paid by others, or else, why would D2 and D3 pay out of their own pockets and take the trouble to fly to Hong Kong to set up companies that they did not use and open bank accounts and let a third party to operate the accounts? I further infer from the evidence that D2 and D3 must be remunerated or that they were promised some monetary reward. 195.As said, it is my findings that D2 and D3 were recruited to fly to Hong Kong from the UK to open the bank accounts, given the expenses involved and the number of bank accounts each defendant had opened, the only irresistible inference I can draw from the evidence is that D2 and D3 were aware that the bank accounts would be used to deal with substantial sums of monies. The conduct of D2 and D3 amounted to aiding and abetting another person to deal with the monies in the bank accounts, i.e., the transactions other than the cash withdrawals made by D2 and D3 on 21st February 2012; albeit D2 and D3 were not the person(s) who conducted these transactions. 196.On the questions of mens rea, I agree with Mr. PARRY in paragraph 105 of the Prosecution’s closing that taking into consideration the way Day Leader and Charmsky were set up, the nature and method of opening the bank accounts in question, the handing over and permitting all controlling devices of the accounts to be used by a third party, making withdrawals from the accounts monies that D2 and D3 knew were not theirs, I find it proved that for Charges 4 to 7 against D2 and Charges 8 to 10 against D3, these were grounds that a common sense, right-thinking member of the community would consider sufficient to lead a person to believe that the cash withdrawals made by D2 and D3 on 21st February 2012 and the other transactions conducted by others in whole or in part represented proceeds of an indictable offence. I have no difficulty in finding and I do find that these grounds were known to D2 and D3. On Charge 4, 5, 6 and 7, I find that the Prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt all the elements of all four charges against D2. 197.On Charge 4, D2 dealt with HK$8,000 himself but he had aided and abetted another person to deal with the rest of the property, as particularised. On Charge 5, D2 aided and abetted another person to deal with the property as particularised; on Charge 6, D2 dealt with HK$260,000 himself and he aided and abetted another to deal with the rest of the property particularised; on Charge 7, D2 dealt with HK$140,000 himself, but he aided and abetted another person to deal with the rest of the property as particularised. I find D2 guilty of Charge 4 to 7. 198.On Charge 8, 9 and 10, the Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of all three charges. 199.On Charge 8, D3 dealt with whole sum of HK$2,000. On Charge 9, D3 dealt with HK$1,548.80 and US$1,000 himself and he aided and abetted another person to deal with the rest of the property particularised. On Charge 10, D3 dealt with US$900 himself but he aided and abetted another person to deal with the rest of the property particularised. I find D3 guilty of Charge 8 to 10.
Please refer to CACC184/2013 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Further hearings and rulings under DCCC 646/2012