Christian Emil Toggenburger and Others v. Luu, Hung Viet Derrick and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACV 218/2012 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 6 September 2013.
1. I agree with the judgment of Barma JA.
Cites 1 case
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CACV 218/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2012 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 815 OF 2009) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ Hon Stock VP: 1.I agree with the judgment of Barma JA. Hon Yuen JA: 2.I agree with the judgment of Barma JA. Hon Barma JA: 3.This was an appeal by the 1st plaintiff, Christian Emil Toggenburger (“Mr Toggenburger”), against certain aspects of the judgment of Chung J dated 31 July 2012 by which the Judge dismissed the claims made by Mr Toggenburger and the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs (companies owned and controlled by him) against the 1st to 3rd defendants, Luu, Hung Viet Derrick (“Mr Luu”), Zhong Yi (Hong Kong) C.P.A. Company Limited (“Zhong Yi”) and Tang, Ka Siu Johnny (“Mr Tang”). By the judgment, the Judge also dismissed Mr Luu’s counterclaim against Mr Toggenburger, and made no order in relation to a claim by Zhong Yi for an indemnity or contribution from Mr Luu. 4.Mr Toggenburger is an investor, who at the relevant times was involved in investing funds belonging to himself and his family. The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs were companies through which he made some such investments. Mr Luu was an investor in various businesses and projects in Hong Kong and the Mainland. He was introduced to Mr Toggenburger by Mr Tang, an accountant practising in Hong Kong with Zhong Yi, of which he was a shareholder and director. During 2007 and 2008, Mr Toggenburger invested substantial amounts of money (totalling HK$111,702,670.40) in a number of projects in Hong Kong and the Mainland at Mr Luu’s suggestion. Unfortunately, none of the investments proved to be successful. By these proceedings, Mr Toggenburger sought to recover compensation from Mr Luu for losses suffered as a result of the investments. Claims were also made against Zhong Yi and Mr Tang. Although there were a number of different claims made by Mr Toggenburger against the various defendants (all of which were dismissed), this appeal is concerned only with two of them, both made against Mr Luu alone. 5.These were:-
6.The trial below extended over 28 hearing days, the evidence being heard in September and October 2011, with closing submissions in January 2012. Shortly after the conclusion of the trial, on 8 February 2012, Mr Luu was made bankrupt on a creditor’s petition. In September 2012, Mr Toggenburger obtained leave from the court to pursue this appeal, at which he was represented by Mr Thomas Lee and Ms Joyce Leung, who had appeared for him at the trial. So far as Mr Luu was concerned, his rights in relation to these proceedings formed part of his estate in bankruptcy and accordingly vested in his trustees. Mr Arab, one of the trustees, appeared at the start of the appeal to inform us that having considered the position, the trustees did not wish to take part in the appeal. It seems that Mr Luu was present during the appeal, but as he had no standing to make submissions (since his rights in relation to the proceedings vested in his trustees on his bankruptcy), we did not hear from him. 7.Notwithstanding that the appeal was not opposed, it of course remained necessary for Mr Lee to establish that the Judge had erred in coming to the conclusions that he did in relation to the claims in respect of which the appeal was brought. 8.Dealing first with the claim for total failure of consideration in relation to the car racing project, the claim can be summarised as follows:-
9.Mr Luu did not dispute that Mr Toggenburger had paid sums totalling HK$38,702,670.40. However, he denied being liable to Mr Toggenburger for the following reasons:-
10.Mr Lee submitted that there were two broad questions to be considered:-
11.The Judge came to the conclusion that there had been no total failure of consideration, since, notwithstanding any problems that there might have been in relation to New Energy BVI (and in this regard his attention was, no doubt as a result of the emphasis in the arguments before him, focussed on the question of that company’s status at the time the licensing agreement was entered into), he was satisfied on the evidence he had heard (which included evidence from a representative of CCWS) that the precise identity of the company involved in the project was, regardless of the terms of the licensing agreement relating to non-assignability, not a matter of concern to CCWS, so long as the persons operating the project in the Mainland were the same as those with whom CCWS had dealt, and all relevant fees were paid. Thus, the Judge did not regard it as being of particular importance that New Energy BVI had been struck off, and could not, on the agreed evidence as to BVI law, have been capable of entering into the licensing agreement as it purported to have done, so long as New Energy HK was available to operate the agreement in its place. 12.Having come to the view that there had thus been no failure of consideration, the Judge did not deal in any detail with the second issue, saying only that he regarded this part of Mr Luu’s case as being “inherently more likely”. 13.Mr Lee contended that the Judge was clearly wrong to conclude that it did not matter that New Energy BVI could not have entered into the licensing agreement, because of the existence of New Energy HK. He pointed out that:-
14.With respect to the Judge, I think that Mr Lee is right as to the failure to secure for Mr Toggenburger a valid interest in the car racing project through the corporate and trust structure described by Mr Luu. In my view, the structure breaks down when one examines the position of Madam Bao in relation to New Energy BVI and New Energy HK. As to New Energy BVI, although Madam Bao had apparently executed what would appear to be a declaration of trust of a shareholding in that company in favour of China Sport, there was no evidence to show that she was in fact a shareholder of New Energy BVI. On the other hand, so far as New Energy HK is concerned, there was no evidence of any declaration of trust in respect of Madam Bao’s shareholding in the company for the benefit of China Sport. Whichever of the two New Energy entities actually held the benefit of the rights obtained from CCWS under the licensing agreement, there was a breakdown in China Sport’s supposed beneficial entitlement to the New Energy entity concerned, and hence a breakdown in Fortune King’s indirect entitlement to that entity. 15.I also think that Mr Lee’s complaint as to New Energy BVI having been struck off is a valid one. Although it may have been a relatively simple matter to restore New Energy BVI to good standing by making the necessary payments to the BVI companies registry, thereby (according to the BVI legal opinion) retrospectively validating all acts done in respect of New Energy BVI during the period when it was struck off, this was never done. Nor was there any evidence to show whether or not this could have been done at the instance of Mr Toggenburger. Absent such evidence, it seems to me that it is open to Mr Toggenburger to complain that he did not receive what he bargained for – a valid interest in the car racing project through the corporate structure that had been put in place. Had there been evidence to show that Mr Toggenburger could himself have paid the arrears of charges to effect the restoration of New Energy BVI to the register, the position (so far as this argument is concerned) might well have been different (since he could then have restored the company to good standing and sought to recover the cost of doing so, but could not have said that there had been a total failure of consideration). But there was no such evidence. In any event, given the gap in the evidence of Madam Bao’s shareholding in New Energy BVI, there would still have been a failure on Mr Luu’s part to show that Mr Toggenburger had obtained the benefit bargained for. 16.It therefore becomes necessary to consider the second question in relation to this claim. This is directed to whether or not Mr Luu must make restitution to Mr Toggenburger in respect of the amounts paid by Mr Toggenburger. 17.Although this question was framed in terms of whether Mr Luu was an owner or promoter of the car racing project rather than a co-investor with Mr Toggenburger, I think that the correct approach would be to focus on whether or not Mr Luu entered into an agreement with Mr Toggenburger in respect of Mr Toggenburger’s participation in the car racing project, for which Mr Luu received consideration from Mr Toggenburger. If so, the consequence of the failure to secure for Mr Toggenburger a valid interest in that project (for the reasons explained above) would be that Mr Luu would be obliged to return to Mr Toggenburger the consideration that he received from him. 18.As I have noted, the Judge did not make any clear findings as to this. There was, however, no dispute between the parties that Mr Toggenburger made payments totalling HK$38,702,670.40 to acquire the interests in the car racing project. It was also not in dispute that throughout, Mr Toggenburger dealt directly (and only) with Mr Luu. The payments were made at Mr Luu’s direction, to agents of his. Two sums of HK$5,000,000.00 and HK$18,000,000.00 were paid by Mr Toggenburger to Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co, solicitors who were then acting for Mr Luu, and were directed by Mr Toggenburger to be paid on by them in accordance with instructions received by him from Mr Luu. The remaining HK$15,702,670.40 was paid by Mr Toggenburger to Zhong Yi, again at Mr Luu’s request. Mr Luu subsequently gave instructions to Zhong Yi as to how to deal with those funds. Indeed, Mr Luu admitted that he had signed a copy of an extract from Zhong Yi’s general ledger containing an account of transactions on his temporary account with Zhong Yi, which recorded the receipt of this payment (and others) and the disbursement of funds by Zhong Yi, to confirm that such receipts and payments had been effected on his behalf and were correct. 19.This evidence is, in my view, strongly corroborative of Mr Toggenburger’s case that his dealings in relation to the car racing project were between him and Mr Luu personally. It also demonstrates, I think, that Mr Luu did in fact receive those payments from Mr Toggenburger, and suggests that all such payments are also to be viewed as payments from Mr Toggenburger to Mr Luu, all of which payments Mr Luu is liable to return given that the consideration which Mr Toggenburger was to receive in exchange for them had wholly failed. 20.This aspect of the appeal therefore succeeds. Although Mr Toggenburger’s Amended Notice of Appeal only sought repayment of the sum claimed in paragraph 64A of the Amended Statement of Claim, which related to the HK$15,702,670.40 paid by Mr Toggenburger to Zhong Yi, Mr Lee clarified that it was in fact intended to seek repayment of the whole of the consideration provided by Mr Toggenburger, including the HK$23,000,000.00 paid via Mr Luu’s solicitors, which was claimed in paragraph 64B of the Amended Statement of Claim. We gave leave at the hearing for the necessary further amendment to be made to the Notice of Appeal. I would therefore make an order that Mr Luu should repay to Mr Toggenburger the sum of HK$38,702,670.40 in respect of this claim, with interest. 21.I turn to consider the second part of Mr Toggenburger’s appeal. This related to his claim that there had been an overall settlement agreement reached between Mr Luu and himself on 24 June 2008, as recorded by him in his email (and letter in identical terms) to Mr Luu and Mr Tang dated 25 June 2008. This claim encompassed all of the other claims made by Mr Toggenburger, including that based on the total failure of consideration in relation to the car racing project that has just been considered. Mr Luu denied that any such settlement had been agreed. Having considered the evidence in relation to this claim, paying particular regard to the correspondence between the parties (which I shall describe in more detail below), the Judge concluded that Mr Toggenburger had failed to establish that such a settlement agreement had been entered into. The Judge also concluded that Mr Luu had failed to establish his counterclaim for sums totalling HK$3,000,000.00 which he said had been paid by him in anticipation of reaching an agreement with Mr Toggenburger, on the basis that such payments should be refunded if, as turned out to be the case, no agreement was finally reached. There has been no cross-appeal against the dismissal of Mr Luu’s counterclaim. 22.Mr Toggenburger’s case was that a concluded settlement agreement was reached at a meeting between him and Mr Luu (also attended by Mr Tang and Mr Littman, Mr Toggenburger’s adviser). He said that the terms of the agreement were recorded in his letter and email dated 25 June 2008, and were as follows:-
23.The letter started by expressing satisfaction that Mr Toggenburger and Mr Luu were able to agree on the items mentioned above, and saying that this convinced Mr Toggenburger that they were “going to be able to come to a final settlement in the near future”. It concluded by asking Mr Luu and Mr Tang to let Mr Toggenburger know immediately if they disagreed with any of the items mentioned. 24.Neither Mr Luu nor Mr Tang responded to this letter. However, nor did Mr Luu make any payment to Mr Toggenburger by 4 July 2008. Instead, in the absence of such payment, Mr Toggenburger requested Mr Tang to release funds which he believed were held by Mr Tang in escrow to enable him to meet margin payments due to his other financiers. This request resulted in Mr Tang emailing Mr Toggenburger on 4 and 5 July 2008, in terms which do not sit well with the notion of a concluded and binding settlement agreement. The 4 July 2008 email referred to Mr Tang’s understanding that Mr Toggenburger had tried to agree with Mr Luu to have his investments repurchased by Mr Luu, and that Mr Luu would try to give Mr Toggenburger some money in August 2008, and asked whether Mr Toggenburger wanted Mr Tang to see if Mr Luu might be willing to lend some money to Mr Toggenburger until then. The 5 July 2008 email referred to a sum of HK$3,000,000.00 being regarded as an advance payment “before [Mr Toggenburger and Mr Luu had] agreed on the price to buy back” the investments in question. 25.On 7 July 2008, Mr Luu emailed Mr Toggenburger suggesting that he might be able to provide Mr Toggenburger with HK$1,000,000.00 in July 2008 and HK$2,000,000.00 in August 2008, as a refundable deposit for a proposed sale of Mr Toggenburger’s interest in the car racing project, at a price to be agreed. The next day, Mr Tang emailed Mr Toggenburger expressing the view that this was worth considering, but that Mr Toggenburger might “need to think through the details of the buy-back or re-sale” of his shares in the investments. 26.Mr Toggenburger, who was in hospital at the time, did not respond to any of these emails to point out that there had already been a settlement. 27.On 10 July 2008, Mr Luu sent Mr Toggenburger a “Letter of Understanding”, which mentioned the investments which Mr Toggenburger had made with Mr Luu, stated that Mr Luu intended to buy out such projects (either himself or by arranging for others to do so) within 2008, and would make down-payments of HK$1,000,000.00 and HK$2,000,000.00 respectively by the end of July and the end of August 2008. The letter went on to state that the parties would endeavour to agree a purchase price for the investments by the end of August, but that if this could not be achieved, the down-payments would be refunded to Mr Luu. Although the letter appears to have been intended to be signed by Mr Toggenburger, he did not do so, and did not respond to it. 28.There was then nothing further until 4 August 2008, when a different “Letter of Understanding” was signed by both Mr Luu and Mr Toggenburger. This referred only to the car racing project (and not to the other investment involving China Oil), and stated that Mr Luu intended to buy back Mr Toggenburger’s investment in the car racing project within 2008, and would make down payments of HK$1,000,000.00 and HK$2,000,000.00 within August 2008. As with the earlier Letter of Understanding, it was stated that the parties would negotiate a price (and closing date) during August 2008, but this time adding that the price should be no lower than the original amount investment, and should take account of interest and inflation rates to calculate compensation for Mr Toggenburger. As with the earlier document, it was recorded that the down-payments were to be refundable deposits, repayable to Mr Luu in the event that no final price could ultimately be agreed. 29.It was against the background of this correspondence that the Judge concluded that Mr Toggenburger had not made out his case. Mr Lee contended that in so concluding, the Judge erred. He submitted that:-
30.With respect, I am unable to agree with Mr Lee’s submissions. 31.The Letter of Understanding dated 4 August 2008 was clearly inconsistent with the settlement agreement alleged by Mr Toggenburger. First, it related to a different subject matter – the car racing project alone, as opposed to that project plus Mr Toggenburger’s investment in China Oil. Second, it no longer provided for a minimum uplift of 10% on the amount invested, but only for compensation for interest and inflation to be provided for. Third, it provided for different terms of payment – instead of half the investment being paid back in August 2008, with the balance (including the uplift) to be repaid by the end of the year, it provided for the parties to negotiate further as to the price to be paid by Mr Luu for the car racing project. Fourth, the payments that Mr Luu did agree to make were expressly stated to be refundable. In each of these respects, the Letter of Understanding (which was signed by Mr Toggenburger) departed in a significant way from the agreement asserted by Mr Toggenburger, and therefore casts real doubt on whether or not such an agreement had ever been made. Although Mr Toggenburger would appear by this time to have recovered from the health problems which had caused him to be hospitalised in early July, he did not protest that the terms proposed were inconsistent with the agreement he says had already been reached. Nor did he communicate to Mr Luu the view he later espoused, that he regarded the arrangements in the Letter of Understanding of 4 August 2008 as being the mere working out of part of the alleged settlement agreement made earlier (a view which, for the reasons I have explained, is not a tenable one). I am unable to accept that the differences can simply be explained away on the basis that Mr Toggenburger was acting without legal advice, and was using a language other than his first language. This version of the Letter of Understanding is, in my view, strong evidence against the existence of the settlement agreement alleged to have been made in June 2008. 32.Further, it seems to me that the correspondence in early July 2008 was also inconsistent with the existence of the settlement agreement alleged. The tenor of both Mr Luu’s and Mr Tang’s emails is clearly inconsistent with there having been a finalised agreement between Mr Toggenburger and Mr Luu, but is, on the contrary, consistent with matters being still in the course of negotiation. While it is fair to say that Mr Toggenburger may not have been able to respond at the time owing to his being hospitalised, it may be observed that he did not do so at any time up to and including early August 2008, when he signed the 4 August 2008 Letter of Understanding, which was inconsistent with his alleged settlement. I do not think that Mr Tang’s apparent change of stance at the trial, where he sided with Mr Toggenburger, requires a different conclusion to be reached. 33.Finally, it should be noted that Mr Toggenburger’s own letter and email of 25 June 2008 are at best inconclusive as to whether an overall settlement had been finally agreed upon. As I have noted, they refer at the outset to his conviction that a settlement would ultimately be agreed upon at the end of the day. In addition, the terms set out are vague and flexible. The amount of the deposit to be paid is described only as a “medium seven digit HK$ amount”. The amount of compensation to be paid in respect of interest and inflation is left open for further discussion (albeit there is a statement that this should not be less than 10%). The make-up of the first 50% payment is left open, in terms of how it is to be satisfied. The identity of the purchaser of Mr Toggenburger’s investments (whether it is to be Mr Luu or some other investor) is not clear. Having regard to all of these uncertainties, it seems to me that what transpired in June 2008 cannot be regarded as more than an agreement as to an outline or framework for further negotiations as to the basis on which Mr Toggenburger was to be extricated from his unsuccessful investments with Mr Luu. It certainly cannot be said that it was more probable than not that a final and binding settlement agreement had been reached. 34.For all of the foregoing reasons, I do not think that the Judge was in error in dismissing this claim of Mr Toggenburger’s. On the contrary, I think that he was entirely justified in doing so, and this part of Mr Toggenburger’s appeal must be dismissed. 35.I would therefore allow Mr Toggenburger’s appeal in part, and order that the judgment below be varied to the extent of entering judgment for Mr Toggenburger against Mr Luu in the sum of HK$38,702,670.40. So far as interest and costs are concerned, these not having been the subject of submissions before us, I would propose that these matters be addressed by way of written submissions, following receipt of which the court will deal with them on paper, without a hearing. To this end, Mr Toggenburger is to file written submissions on interest and costs within two weeks from the date of this judgment, Mr Luu’s trustees in bankruptcy are to file submissions in response (if any) within two weeks thereafter, and Mr Toggenburger is to file submissions in reply (if so advised) within one week after that. Hon Stock VP: 36.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated in the judgment of Barma JA, and orders are made in the terms suggested by him in paragraph 35 above.
Mr Thomas Lee and Ms Joyce Leung, instructed by Haldanes for the 1st Plaintiff/Appellant 1st Defendant/Respondent’s trustee in bankruptcy attended in person, but was excused from further attendance |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 218/2012