Re So Kiu Fan
|
HCMP 242/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 242 OF 2005 ____________
____________
____________
_______________________________________ REASONS FOR ADJOURNMENT _______________________________________ Introduction 1.This was the receiver’s application for:
2.At the end of the hearing, the receiver sought, and was granted, an adjournment sine die with liberty to restore. The reasons for the adjournment appear below. Background 3.This action was commenced in January 2005. The original applicant was a Madam So (“So”). She sought, and was granted, an order on 1 February 2005 appointing the receiver (with express powers incidental, or ancillary, to such office) (“the Feb 2005 order”). 4.So’s supporting affirmation sets out the reasons for this action. They can be summarized as follows:
5.Among the various express powers given in the Feb 2005 order, the receiver was empowered to:
This application 6.Three affirmations have been filed in support of this application: two made by the receiver and one by Lau. 7.The receiver’s affirmation (apart from summarizing some of the background set out above) states that:
Lau’s affirmation confirms the above. 8.In response to queries raised by the court, the receiver’s second affirmation states that:
The adjournment 9.Whether this application has been properly brought depends on at least two inter-related matters:
10.The nature of the receiver’s powers conferred by the Feb 2005 order is not difficult to understand. In view of the grounds advanced in So’s affirmation (see para 4 above) (see also para 5(b) above), those powers were interim in nature and were conferred with a view to preserving:
(from the receiver’s point of view, there should be a substantial (if not complete) overlap of the two). 11.One of the events which has been contemplated as bringing an end to the receiver’s appointment would be the grant of letter of representation (para 4(5)(a) above). So’s affirmation estimated the time taken to obtain the grant would be not less than 2 years. But by the time of the hearing of this application, about two months short of 9 years have lapsed (So’s affirmation was made in January 2005). 12.The grant of representation is also of importance for another reason. While the receiver does not have the power to transfer the shares of the sports company, s 67, Cap 32 provides that:
Thus, a personal representative of the estate of the deceased couple can transfer those shares (to Lau for example, who in effect is said to be the sole beneficiary (and also his nominee if necessary/appropriate)). A personal representative can also be treated as a shareholder for the purpose of calling for general meetings: s 114B(1) and (3), Cap 32. 13.With the appropriate person(s) becoming the sports company’s shareholder, a general meeting can be convened, and a board of directors appointed if so resolved at the meeting. This will be another event which can bring an end to the receiver’s appointment (para 4(5)(b) above). For completeness, s 114B, Cap 32 is repeated (this confers power on the court to order general meetings in certain cases). 14.Finally, as stated above, Lau has in effect been considered the sole beneficiary of the estate of the deceased couple (see for example para 4(2) above and para 3, receiver’s affirmation). He was described as 17 years old in 2005 (para 4, receiver’s affirmation). The age of majority is 18: s 2(1), Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 410). In Lau’s case, he should have attained full age in November 2005 (about 8 years earlier). 15.The above would raise various questions concerning why the receiver’s appointment should continue beyond the dates of occurrence of the above events (or, as the case may be, beyond dates on which they could reasonably have occurred). These questions have not been addressed in the affirmations filed so far. 16.A receiver also has a duty (among others) to render an account (especially to those beneficially entitled to the assets administered by him). This is not addressed in those affirmations either. 17.Finally, because the receiver’s appointment is very probably interim in nature, it is at least arguable his powers are to be exercised only for that purpose (para 4(5) above). Appointing directors whose office is intended to be “permanent” (which appeared to be what this application sought) may not fall within the scope of his powers. 18.The above observations are not to be understood as necessarily criticisms, or suggestions of misconduct, of the receiver. But it is only correct that they should be drawn to the receiver’s attention, who should also be afforded an opportunity to consider how they should be addressed. 19.For that reason, an adjournment was properly sought, and was granted.
Mr Gary Lam Chin Ching, instructed by DS Cheung & Co, for the receiver |