Yu Kit Chiu and Another v. Yu Kit Chiu t/a 陳潮昌士多
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 5488/2003 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment.
1. This is the application of Choi Chi-fook (“Mr Choi”) :-
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DCCJ 5488/2003 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 5488 OF 2003 -------------------- BETWEEN
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------------------------- D E C I S I O N ------------------------- 1.This is the application of Choi Chi-fook (“Mr Choi”) :-
2.The application is opposed by the plaintiffs. Background 3.The plaintiffs are the executors of the estate of Yu Ki-cheung, deceased (“the Deceased”), who was the registered owner of Remaining Portion of Lot 994 and Lot 995 in DD 115 before his demise. 4.By this action, which was commenced on 19 September 2003, the plaintiffs claimed against the defendant for possession of Remaining Portion of Lot 994 and damages for trespass. The defendant asserted in his defence that he had been in adverse possession of the land for over 20 years and counterclaimed for a declaration that the plaintiffs’ right to recover the land had been time-barred. 5.The action was tried before Her Honour Judge Mimmie Chan (as she then was) in February 2010 and, by a judgment dated 22 March 2010 (“the Judgment”), judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs and the counterclaim was dismissed. The defendant’s appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 February 2011. 6.The plaintiffs proceeded with execution and obtained the subject writ of possession with fifa combined in November 2011. 7.Then came two applications:-
8.Both applications came before His Honour Judge Leung (as he then was) and the learned Judge dismissed the applications on 26 July 2012. Both Mr Cheng and Madam Chan applied for leave to appeal but their applications were dismissed by the Judge on 30 November 2012. Madam Chan applied further to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, but her application was also dismissed on 19 February 2013. 9.For the purpose of this application, Mr Cheng’s application is irrelevant and we should focus on Madam Chan’s unsuccessful application. It is common ground that Mr Choi is the son of Madam Chan. 10.Judge Leung has this to say, in his decision dated 26 July 2012, on the relationship between the plaintiffs’ claim herein against the defendant and Madam Chan’s application:-
The present application 11.Mr Choi is the son of Choi Senior and Madam Chan. His application (for joinder and interim stay of execution) is supported by an affirmation in which he deposed to the fact that:-
12.The plaintiff has filed an affirmation in opposition in which they recounted the history of this action and the involvement or interest of Mr Choi in the unsuccessful application of Madam Chan. They complain that the present application is a re-litigation of the issues finally determined by Judge Leung (which was upheld on appeal) and is an abuse of the legal process. 13.Today, the legal representatives of both sides elaborated on their respective position as stated above. Discussion 14.In my view, Mr Choi’s application is misconceived and totally unnecessary. 15.The fight in this action was between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The issues identified by Judge Chan in paragraph 7 of the Judgment were:-
16.The learned Judge found on the evidence (which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on appeal) that:-
17.Although Mr Choi has not identified the legal basis of his joinder application in his summons, his counsel, Mr Ho, confirms that the test is none other than Order 15, rule 6(2)(b) of the Rules of the District Court. 18.There is no suggestion that Mr Choi is privy to the events and documents pertaining to the issues between the plaintiffs and the defendant recounted above. Mr Ho is not suggesting that Mr Choi can offer any material evidence in those regards. I do not see how it can be said, in terms of Order 15, rule 6(2)(b)(i), that Mr Choi’s presence in this action is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. 19.The fight between Mr Choi and the plaintiffs is in DCCJ 2698/2013. I am given to understand that that action is proceeding and has reached the stage of Case Management Conference. Significantly, the plaintiffs herein (as the defendants in that action) has not applied to strike out that claim. Mr Choi and the plaintiffs will have to resolve their differences in that action. I do not see how it would be just and convenient, in terms of Order 15, rule 6(2)(b)(ii), to allow Mr Choi and the plaintiffs to ventilate their disagreement in this action. 20.Mr Choi’s application to join in as a defendant is dismissed. 21.It appears that Mr Choi is most concerned that the plaintiffs, in enforcing the Judgment, may somehow evict him from the Premises before the disposal of DCCJ 2698/2013. In my view, such fear is unfounded. 22.Judge Chan has indeed decided at paragraph 22 of the Judgment that:-
23.Judge Chan’s decision was justified based on the evidence then available to her. Mr Choi was not a party back then and did not participate at the trial. The court was simply not aware of Mr Choi’s allegations. 24.The Judgment, including the order for possession, was made against the defendant in this case. The sealed order for possession is in these terms:-
25.Simply put, the Judgment is directed at the defendant and not against Mr Choi. This may be contrasted with an order for possession made under Order 113 which is to enable the plaintiff in such a case to recover possession of the subject premises against those in occupation, in terms of Form No. 42A of Appendix A to the Rules of the District Court. The plaintiffs have never invoked Order 113 in this action and the Judgment is directed at the defendant (as well as anyone claiming under the defendant). Since Mr Choi’s claim is independent from that of the defendant, I am of the view that he is not bound by the Judgment. 26.Although the writ of possession issued on 17 November 2011 directed the bailiffs to “enter the said premises [defined as Remaining Portion of Lot 994 in DD 115] and caused the plaintiffs… to have possession of it”, it was made pursuant to leave granted by Master J Chow on 25 July 2011 which was in these terms:-
27.When the Writ is read together with the order of Master Chow and properly understood in the context of an enforcement of the Judgment, it becomes clear that it does not have an effect of evicting Mr Choi, who has an independent claim against the plaintiffs. Mr Chong (leading Ms Wong) does not dispute all these. 28.Mr Choi’s application for an interim stay of execution of the Judgment is therefore misconceived. 29.The above is sufficient to dispose of the application but I should say further that I agree with Mr Chong that the present application of Mr Choi is an attempt to re-litigate an issue finally determined by Judge Leung. 30.Mr Choi has quoted Order 45, rule 3 in his summons. However, his counsel has advanced no argument based on that provision. In my view, that is understandable having regard to Judge Leung’s observations in paragraphs 35 to 41 of his decision dated 26 July 2012. 31.The true basis of the present application seems to be the alleged claim of adverse possession by the Choi’s family in relation to the Premises. Madam Chan relied on the same factual scenario in her bid to join in this action. Judge Leung dismissed that application and Madam Chan’s application for leave to appeal was dismissed by both Judge Leung and the Court of Appeal. Mr Choi’s present application is, in my view, an attempt to have a second bite of the cherry. It goes without saying that any claim of adverse possession must be based on factual possession. Mr Choi’s case (as disclosed in the pleadings in DCCJ 2698/2013) is premised on the occupation of his late father and Madam Chan. Mr Choi has filed affirmations in support of his mother’s unsuccessful application. When his mother’s attempt failed, he now mounts his own application seeking essentially the same relief. That, in my judgment, is an abuse of process. Conclusion 32.For the above reasons, I dismiss Mr Choi’s application with costs with certificate for one counsel, such costs to be taxed on District Court scale if not agreed on indemnity basis. 33.The simple reason for ordering indemnity costs against Mr Choi is that I have so far heard no justification for the present application, that is notwithstanding the short discussion before the argument. 34.Furthermore, Mr Choi has elected to proceed with this application notwithstanding the concession made by Mr Chong. Taking all these into consideration, I consider that this is an appropriate case to order indemnity costs against Mr Choi.
Mr K M Chong & Ms Emma Wong, instructed by K M Lai & Li, for plaintiffs. Mr Kenneth Ho, instructed by Louis K Y Pau & Co, for Mr Choi Chi-fook. |
Cases cited in this judgment
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