Lam Wong Kwan Ying and Another v. Lam Sik Se, Tony

Read the full judgment text of HCA 1885/1987 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 March 2014.

1. I am not satisfied that the 2 nd plaintiff’s intended appeal has reasonable prospects of success. The cases referred to and relied upon by the 2 nd plaintiff in support of the argument that the terms in the Schedule to a Tomlin Order should be enforced, irrespective of any delay, are distinguishable. The observations made by the court in these cases deal with variation of the terms in the schedule. In paragraphs 11 to 13 of my Decision handed down on 21 October 2013, I made it clear that inor

Cited by 10 cases

Case No.HCA 1885/1987
Court
High Court CFI
Date19 Mar 2014
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA 1885/1987

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1885 OF 1987

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BETWEEN

  LAM WONG KWAN YING 1st Plaintiff
  LAM SIK YING VICTOR 2nd Plaintiff

and

  LAM SIK SE, TONY Defendant

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Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 19 March 2014
Date of Decision: 19 March 2014

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D E C I S I O N

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1.I am not satisfied that the 2nd plaintiff’s intended appeal has reasonable prospects of success. The cases referred to and relied upon by the 2nd plaintiff in support of the argument that the terms in the Schedule to a Tomlin Order should be enforced, irrespective of any delay, are distinguishable. The observations made by the court in these cases deal with variation of the terms in the schedule. In paragraphs 11 to 13 of my Decision handed down on 21 October 2013, I made it clear that inordinate delay was considered in the context of an application to the court under the “liberty to apply” provision of the Tomlin Order itself to seek compliance with the terms of the Schedule, and that the finality of a Tomlin Order, and its “liberty to apply” provision, is important. These considerations are separate to the question of the applicability of any limitation period.

2.Since the CJR, delay has been regarded as sufficient prejudice.  Arguments that the defendant has not sustained any prejudice as a result of the plaintiff’s delay are unsustainable.

3.The application for leave to appeal is accordingly dismissed, with costs.

(Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Kenneth C L Chan and Ms Annie Lai, instructed by Fan Wong & Tso, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Alan C Y Yung, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the defendant

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCA 1885/1987