Hui Chi Keung v. Telent (Hong Kong) Holding Ltd
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HCMP 3062/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 3062 OF 2013 ______________________
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______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ 1.I have before me an originating summons issued by Telent (Hong Kong) Holdings Limited seeking an extension of time pursuant to section 122 of the Companies Ordinance for laying its profit and loss accounts and balance sheet before the company in annual general meeting for its first accounting period from 10 February 2011 to 31 March 2012, and for the subsequent financial year. 2.Although the originating summons does not seek an extension of time for the holding of an annual general meeting, it needs such an order for the following reasons. 3.The company did hold a paper annual general meeting pursuant to section 116B and 111(6) of the Companies Ordinance Cap 32. However, what appears to have been overlooked at the time the application was formulated is that section 111(6)(a) provides that a company is not required to hold a physical meeting if “everything that is required or intended to be done at the meeting (by resolution or otherwise) is done by a resolution or resolutions in accordancewithsection 116B”. 4.What that means is that in order for there to be an effective annual general meeting by a written resolution, it is necessary for section 122 to have been complied with. If section 122 is not complied with, the purported written resolution in place of a physical annual general meeting is not effective. 5.However, there are more fundamental problems with this application. 6.As is now well established, the court generally takes into account three principle factors when considering applications of this sort:
7.The originating summons first came on before me on 10 January 2014. At that time I was satisfied that the second and third factors that I have referred to above were met. The application has been made in connection with a proposed listing on the Malaysian Stock Exchange, and I am satisfied that as a result of the due diligence and other associated processes that that involves, it is likely that the companies’ directors will become fully familiar with their relevant obligations under the Companies Ordinance. 8.I was not satisfied with the evidence in relation to the first factor, namely, the question of inadvertence. In the first affirmation of Hui Chi-keung who is the sole director of the company, the explanation for the failure to comply with section 122 is explained as follows:
9.Mr Hui filed a second affirmation on 6 January 2014 shortly before the first hearing of the originating summons. 10.Paragraph 3 also addressed the issue of the reason for non‑compliance. In paragraph 3, Mr Hui does no more than repeat what he had said in his first affirmation. 11.I adjourned the originating summons in order to allow the company to file further evidence dealing with the inadvertence issue and the precise requirements of the Malaysian Stock Exchange. 12.Mr Hui filed further short affirmations and one substantial fifth affirmation. 13.In paragraph 6 of this fifth affirmation he says this about the circumstances in which the company came to breach section 122:
14.As is clear from this paragraph, it would appear that the company secretary advised Mr Hui that it was necessary to convene an annual general meeting each year, and at it to table its audited accounts. It appears for reasons which are manifestly not adequately explained that Mr Hui simply ignored this advice. 15.It does not seem to me, therefore, that the breach can properly be characterised as arising from inadvertence. If a director of a company chooses to ignore the advice of its company secretary about an important corporate governance issue, he cannot sensibly expect to obtain an order from the court remedying the resulting breach simply by stating without more that he did not follow the advice because,
16.In conclusion, I do not think that this is an appropriate case in which to grant an order remedying the breaches, and I dismiss the originating summons.
Ms Miranda Li, instructed by Cheung & Lee, for the plaintiff The defendant was not represented and did not appear | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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