Dato Tan Leong Min and Another v. The Insider Dealing Tribunal
Read the full judgment text of CACV 162/1998 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 27 January 1999 before Mortimer VP, Godfrey JA, Rogers JA.
Administrative law – judicial review – Insider Dealing Tribunal – Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap. 395) – role of counsel appointed to act for the Tribunal under para. 18 of the Schedule – private meetings and deliberations of the Tribunal with counsel – allegations of insider dealing in shares of CNPC (Hong Kong) Limited (formerly Paragon Holdings Limited) – respondents not attending hearings but represented by solicitors in Malaysia – whether private meetings between Tribunal and counsel evaluating evidence and assisting in drafting the report breached the rules of natural justice and fairness – whether the Tribunal was entitled to receive evidence after public sittings in private meetings – whether the Tribunal pre-judged the issues – whether the respondents were unfairly treated by not being provided with new evidence and the draft report for comment – whether the Tribunal could properly appear as a party in judicial review defending its own procedure – Capital 395, Schedule paragraphs 14, 16 and 18 – main issue whether the procedure adopted by the Tribunal was fair and complied with the rules of natural justice – holding that the procedure was unfair and in breach of the rules of natural justice because counsel for the Tribunal made detailed private submissions on the evidence and on the draft report without the parties having any opportunity to answer – holding that reception of evidence other than at a public sitting was not permissible under the Ordinance, but providing such evidence to other parties but not to the non-attending respondents did not cure the unfairness – holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of pre-judgment, since a fact-finding tribunal may form provisional views during the evidence – holding that the respondents were unfairly treated by being excluded from circulation of the draft report for comment when others received it – holding that although it was unusual for the Tribunal to appear as a party in its own judicial review, it was not wrong for it to do so, although its members put themselves personally at risk in costs – appeal dismissed with an order nisi for costs against the appellant.
Legal issues: Permissible role of counsel for the Insider Dealing Tribunal in private deliberations · Reception of evidence outside public sittings · Pre-judgment of issues by the Tribunal · Fairness in not providing draft report and new evidence to non-attending respondents · Propriety of the Tribunal appearing as a party to defend its own decision in judicial review
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; findings of the Insider Dealing Tribunal quashed.
Cited by 19 cases
|
CACV000162/1998 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL 1998, Appeal No. 162
(Consolidated) --------------- Coram: Hon Mortimer V-P, Godfrey and Rogers JJA in Court Dates of Hearing: 15 and 16 December 1998 Date of handing down Judgment: 27 January 1999 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Mortimer, V.-P.: 1. The main question in this appeal concerns the role which the Insider Dealing Tribunal can fairly ask its counsel to fulfil. It is an appeal by the Insider Dealing Tribunal (the Tribunal) against the order of Sears J on 1 April 1998 in judicial review proceedings. He quashed the Tribunal's findings against the two respondents in a report sent to the Financial Secretary on 3 June 1997. 2. The insider dealing proceedings began when the Financial Secretary issued a notice under s.16(2) of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance (Cap. 395) (the Ordinance) to the Tribunal to inquire into dealings in the shares of CNPC (Hong Kong) Limited (formerly Paragon Holdings Limited) between March and May 1993. The Tribunal consisted of a High Court judge (Yam J and two lay members). 3. In January 1996 Senior Crown Counsel, Mr Davies, and two others were appointed counsel for the Tribunal under clause 18 of the Schedule to the Ordinance. "Salmon" letters were sent to the two respondents outlining the allegations against each. 4. As was their right, neither respondent chose to attend any hearing of the Tribunal but each was represented by solicitors in Malaysia throughout the proceedings. 5. The first public sitting of the Tribunal was held on 8 February 1996. Thereafter, it sat on 73 days until 16 August 1996 when it adjourned sine die. There was one final public sitting on 25 November 1996. The Tribunal's report was sent to the Financial Secretary on 3 June 1997. It did not, however, contain a calculation of profits as required by s.16(3)(c) of the Ordinance and the notice of appointment. 6. The report was also sent to the respondents who were asked to submit pleas in mitigation in writing by 18 June 1997. However, on 25 June 1997 the 1st respondent obtained leave to move for judicial review. The 2nd respondent obtained similar leave on 24 July 1997. The report was later said by the Tribunal to be only a draft because of the absence of the calculation of profits. In the event the Tribunal never completed its task. 7. So much for the public sittings of the Tribunal. The judicial review concerned not the public sittings but the Tribunal's activities in private. In particular, the role which the Tribunal required its counsel to play in its closed or private deliberations. Counsel and the private deliberations of the Tribunal 8. In order to understand the nature of the proceedings, it is necessary to summarise the role which the Tribunal required counsel to undertake in its private deliberations. A full appreciation of the part played by counsel can only be gained by a reading of the minutes and the correspondence. 9. At a preliminary public hearing on 8 February 1996 the chairman referred to the role of counsel:
This gave no hint to the parties or the public of what was to happen. In the public sittings thereafter nothing was disclosed to those present or those implicated or their representatives that frequent meetings between the members of the Tribunal and its counsel were taking place - not only to discuss the administrative matters outlined in the statement. 10. After 8 February 1996 when the substantive public hearings were taking place, there were frequent conferences between the Tribunal and all its counsel. Administrative matters were discussed but by 17 May 1996 the nature of the discussion was enlarged. The chairman announced that "the purpose of this meeting was to have a 'mid-trial' assessment of the evidence against Mr W". Counsel were asked for a summary of the evidence before the next meeting. At the meeting the evidence of other witnesses was reviewed and discussed. On 27 May 1996 counsel were asked "to assist the Tribunal in writing the report" by providing a summary of the witnesses' evidence compared with their statements. On 28 May, 1 July and 3 July 1996 the chairman said he would require counsel's contribution and assistance in writing the report and on 7 August 1996 he said while he was away "counsel could start writing the main parts of the report concerning Mr W" and "he would need counsel's contribution and assistance in writing the report in October". 11. The meetings continued but by 20 August 1996 Mr Peter Davies had become troubled about the role required of counsel to the Tribunal. In consequence he wrote to the chairman and raised the question "Whether counsel to the Tribunal can lawfully become involved in the judicial aspects of the inquiry and, if so, to what extent". He added a telling footnote:
This prompted the chairman to deal with the point at the meeting on 21 August 1996 when according to the minutes:
12. But the meetings with counsel continued. Evidence was discussed at length. From time to time the fairness of the procedure was discussed. It was decided that counsel should exchange submissions in spite of the footnote to the letter of 20 August 1996. On 24 August 1996 it was decided that Mr Davies should draft a letter to the parties to "remove any possible false impression the parties might have". In paragraph 7 of the draft letter it is written:
For reasons which do not appear, the letter was never sent. Perhaps it was because the role of counsel was still under discussion for in the minutes of 4 November 1996 there is this passage:
13. After November 1996 and the final public sitting of the Tribunal, the involvement of its counsel changed. There were no further meetings. Counsel's contribution continued in correspondence. Memoranda were sent by the Tribunal asking for assistance to which its counsel replied by letter. 14. After the final public sitting of the Tribunal in November 1996, the private meetings between it and its counsel ended. There had been 37 of them. Written closing submissions were exchanged between counsel for the Tribunal and other counsel and were provided to the Tribunal. 15. The private contribution of counsel to the Tribunal continued but in correspondence. Draft chapters of the report were provided by the Tribunal to its counsel for comment and memoranda were sent to which counsel replied by letter. For example, in counsel's letter of 10 April 1997 the following passages appear:
Later,
To this, there is a footnote:
Finally, Mr Davies wrote an eight page letter to the Tribunal on 22 May 1997. This was 11 days before the report was sent to the Financial Secretary. As examples the following passages appear:
Seven points were then set out, each of which was adopted by the Tribunal. The letter continued in the same vein and in paragraph 46:
This pointed out to the Tribunal that although S was an implicated person there was no reference to him. The relevant statutory background 16. The Insider Dealing Tribunal is established under Part III of the Ordinance. The main provisions relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows: (1) The Tribunal is "statutory" and under s.16(1) is required "to inquire into the matter'. Basically therefore the procedure is inquisitorial." (2) It has specific objectives under s.16(3) which are:
(3) Under s.23, the Tribunal may order payment of any profit made or loss avoided to the Government and impose a penalty not exceeding three times the above profit or loss. (4) Additionally, there is power to ban a person identified as an insider dealer from taking part in the management of a company for up to five years. (5) The Tribunal is not bound by the usual rules of admissibility of evidence. It may determine how evidence can be received and may determine its own procedure subject to the Ordinance. (6) Its orders may be registered in the High Court and once registered take effect as an order of the Court of First Instance. There is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on law or, with leave, on fact. (7) The sittings and representation are provided for in the Schedule as follows:
The issue 17. The issue for our determination is whether the judge was right to quash the findings in "the report" on the basis of his main conclusions which were as follows:
The appellant's case 18. Mr Geoffrey Ma SC, for the Tribunal, raises four broad points. He submits that the judge was wrong to quash the findings because:
In addition, a number of miscellaneous matters were raised during the hearing of the appeal which are not determinative of it. I will make brief reference to them in due course. The role of counsel for the Tribunal 19. Mr Ma points out that counsel is not independent and is not prosecuting counsel. He is counsel for the Tribunal in inquisitorial proceedings and, therefore, he submits, it is legitimate for the Tribunal to use counsel for whatever purpose it wishes, short of actually taking the decisions or making related findings. Therefore, the requirement that counsel should summarise and evaluate the evidence and make submissions in private and even comment upon the draft report for the assistance of the Tribunal are perfectly legitimate activities. 20. Mr Ma conceded to certain provisos. The first is that if a new point was made in private, the parties must be informed so that they could make their submissions. Second, that counsel should not make any of the decisions which were for the Tribunal alone. Third, that although the Tribunal could lawfully require counsel to do anything consistent with the Ordinance and its objects, it was necessary at all times to comply with the principles of natural justice and fairness. 21. The main question in this appeal is whether the Tribunal complied with this latter proposition and I now turn to consider it. Fairness and the role of counsel 22. It is trite to say that there can be no universal rule as to what a tribunal or inquiry may require of its counsel. The tasks of inquiries and tribunals vary widely. The basis for the authority of such bodies may be statutory or consensual and the powers exercised differ greatly. It is necessary to take all these circumstances into account in deciding what is or is not fair in a tribunal's use of counsel. 23. After September 1996, the chairman visited London, he was much influenced by the procedures adopted by the Scott Inquiry which had then not reported. This may have misled him. What was a fair procedure in that inquiry can have little bearing upon the Insider Dealing Tribunal with its statutory framework and powers. In passing it is to be noted that in spite of the eminence of its chairman, the Scott Inquiry has not been the subject of independent judicial scrutiny and has not been free of informed criticism. 24. In support of a proposition that the Tribunal could invite counsel to advise upon the effect of evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, Mr Ma relies upon Dale v New South Wales Trotting Club [1978]1 NSWLR 551. In that case a bookmaker had his licence from the trotting club revoked for life. The decision was confirmed by the Club's appellate committee which was entitled under its rules to "conduct the hearing ... in such manner as it (thought) proper" and to retain a barrister "to assist at the hearing". Barristers were present and took part in the deliberation of the committee in making its finding. Hutley JA adverted to this at 558 - Mr Conti was counsel:
But note the important reservation in the last paragraph. 25. Mr Ma also relies upon a passage in Canada (Attorney General) v Royal Commission of Inquiry of Blood System (Can.) (1997) 207 NR 1 FED see A at 52:
Note again, however, the second sentence of this passage. This and the cases cited under footnote 14 demonstrate that this authority is of little assistance to this Tribunal with its different composition, statutory background, function and powers. The distinctions are important and obvious. Sears J had them much in mind when he referred to the relevant passage in Professor Wade's Administrative Law 7th Edition at p.910. The Insider Dealing Tribunal 26. This Tribunal was fulfilling a quasi criminal function. Its task was not only to inquire into, but also to determine, wrongdoing. Having done so, it had to impose penalties. In this case, Mr Gerard McCoy SC, for the 1st respondent, informs the Court that the financial orders could have amounted to as much as $510m. 27. Although the Tribunal is inquisitorial, the statutory framework requires its procedure to be near that of a conventional adversarial hearing. The real difference is the occasional need for the Tribunal to pursue lines of inquiry which may arise in the course of the hearing or become apparent from the statements taken earlier in SFC inquiries. 28. Save in exceptional circumstances the hearings must be public. Counsel for the Tribunal opens the case and examines the witnesses, who are then cross-examined by counsel for the other parties before being re-examined by him. Those potentially implicated who receive "salmon" letters may give evidence in their own defence and will be cross-examined by counsel for the Tribunal. At the conclusion of the evidence counsel for the Tribunal and those implicated may make submissions after which the Tribunal makes its determination and findings under s.16 of the Ordinance. Thereafter it will hear pleas in mitigation before ordering repayment, penalties or disqualification. Conclusion on the Tribunal's first point 29. The true role of counsel for the Tribunal was never disclosed to the parties or the public. The consequence was that apart from the public hearings, the Tribunal was receiving submissions summarising and evaluating the evidence from counsel in parallel private proceedings. Counsel for the Tribunal were making the submissions before the evidence had been concluded and thereafter the submissions were made in writing, forcefully and in detail until a few days before the report was sent to the Financial Secretary. Additionally, counsel for the Tribunal made detailed submissions upon the draft report. Counsel for the other parties and the parties themselves had no opportunity to answer or be heard upon these submissions which almost certainly influenced the Tribunal's decisions. 30. In these circumstances the absurdity of asking counsel for the Tribunal to provide written submissions to the Tribunal with copies to the other parties at the end of the evidence was recognised by Mr Davies. Nevertheless final submissions by counsel were ordered in writing. The submissions were exchanged with a right of reply. But this was a charade as counsel for the Tribunal continued to make submissions thereafter in writing unknown to the other counsel and parties. 31. Mr McCoy SC, for the 1st respondent, had little difficulty in demonstrating that the judge was right and the procedure adopted was unfair. Private submissions to the decision-makers by counsel - who have the role of presenting evidence of wrongdoing - during the hearing and after the hearing on the draft report, were unfair and in breach of the rules of natural justice. On this point alone the judge's conclusion was justified as was his order to quash the Tribunal's findings. The reception of evidence in private meetings 32. Undoubtedly the Tribunal received some evidence after the public sittings had finished. There were nine instances asserted and some are conceded. Mr Ma contends, however, that the procedure adopted was not unfair as the evidence was supplied to the parties other than the respondents. He submits that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to refer this evidence to the respondents as they had not attended the hearings and in correspondence, the 2nd respondent had said through solicitors that he preferred to be "left alone". 33. As I see it, the difficulty faced by the Tribunal is that the Ordinance requires it to sit in public unless for specific reasons it orders otherwise. The reception of evidence other than at a public sitting is not, therefore, permissible. If it is done, difficulties arise in seeking to be fair by providing the evidence to those involved for their comment or other action. 34. Even in the Pensions Appeal Tribunal, where the medical member could be expected to advise the others upon the effect of medical evidence, the basic rule was explained. See Moxon v Minister of Pensions [1945] 1 KB 490 at 501 per Tucker J (as he then was):
We have not investigated on appeal whether the evidence received in private was determinative and as such would have led to a quashing of the Tribunal's findings had the point stood alone. It is simply another example of a difficulty into which the Tribunal led itself. 35. I would also hold - in accordance with the judge's finding - that it was not permissible under the Ordinance for the Tribunal to receive written submissions from counsel and parties other than at a public sitting. The Ordinance requires that the hearing is public and therefore that the public as well as all implicated and interested parties have the right to know the nature of the cases being advanced. I am not suggesting that it is necessary for the written submissions to be read out to the court in full. The practice of referring to and summarising the skeleton arguments as adopted in proceedings in court is sufficient. Pre-judgment of issues 36. The judge concluded that during some of the meetings with counsel before the evidence was complete, the Tribunal had decided some issues contrary to the respondents. Certainly some of the minutes cited by the judge appear to express a concluded view. See for example those of the meeting of 22 October 1996. However, I do not think the evidence is sufficient to support this finding. The Tribunal was at pains to point out from time to time in the minutes that the decisions on the evidence were solely for the Tribunal. Any fact finding tribunal is entitled to form opinions, even strong ones, in the course of the evidence. This only becomes unfair if it determines to close its mind to any evidence thereafter. The evidence here does not go so far. Counsel's submissions and the report 37. Associated with this last point is the anxiety of the respondents that counsel for the Tribunal wrote some of the report. This arises from the earlier minutes in which the chairman suggested that counsel should assist in writing the report and his request for the provision of the disk containing counsel's submissions, some of which were incorporated into the report, including typing errors. Although it is better that such errors be corrected, there is no reason why the Tribunal should not incorporate counsel's submissions into its report verbatim if it independently concludes them to be correct and wishes to express its findings in the same terms. Unfairness to the respondents 38. Additionally, the judge found that the respondents had not received fair treatment because they were not sent the new evidence and were not provided with the passages in the draft report in which they were criticised. I have already touched upon the evidence received in private. As to the provision of the draft report, the Tribunal initially determined to send this to the respondents for their comments but later decided not to do so, on the basis that they had not appeared or taken part in the proceedings. The respondents were represented by solicitors throughout and I have no doubt that if the draft report was sent to some for comment, it ought to have been sent to all those implicated. It was unfair to leave them out. On this, the judge was right. 39. However, I must note in passing that if conventional procedure had been adopted by the Tribunal no problem about the provision of evidence or the provision of parts of the draft report would have arisen. By this I mean that if all the evidence had been received in public, if the submissions of counsel for the Tribunal had been heard in public and the meetings of counsel with the Tribunal had been limited to administrative matters, the procedure would have been fair and beyond challenge. In these circumstances, it would have been quite unnecessary to provide either evidence or passages of the report to anyone for further comment. Conclusions on the appeal 40. For these reasons I am quite satisfied that the judge's conclusions (with the one exception I have mentioned) were justified. I agree with them and I would dismiss this appeal. Mr Ma SC has presented the appeal on behalf of the Tribunal with considerable restraint but on the substance of the judge's finding, the appeal is without merit. 41. Before leaving the appeal, there are several matters to which counsel adverted and to which I now turn. The role of counsel for the Tribunal 42. In his judgment Sears J considered the historical background of the provision and use of counsel at inquiries and cited relevant passages from the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry established in 1966 under the chairmanship of Salmon LJ. He summarised the role of counsel to this Tribunal as follows:
I entirely agree with this summary. Mr McCoy agreed that it was permissible for counsel and the Tribunal to meet in private as often as necessary for the purposes outlined by the judge until the start of the inquiry. Thereafter, he submitted that there must be no private contact or meetings. For my part, I do not think that there can be an absolute rule of this nature. Obviously, the Tribunal should never meet with counsel privately and involve them in the judicial function or the decision-making process. But there may be exceptional circumstances in which it is convenient for the Tribunal to meet counsel to discuss administrative matters or even a new line of inquiry after the hearings have begun. Such meetings should be kept to a minimum and the other parties should be told when the meetings are taking place and the nature of the discussion. 43. Further, the statutory obligation to hold the hearings in public must be maintained. It follows that the evidence must be received and submissions on law and evidence by counsel for the Tribunal or for the parties must be made at public hearings. Counsel for the Tribunal should never be invited to assist in the writing of the report or to make submissions upon the draft report. The participation of the Tribunal as a party in these proceedings 44. Undoubtedly, it is unusual for a Tribunal to appear as a party to defend itself when its decision-making process is challenged in judicial review proceedings. Where misconduct is being inquired into, it is usual to allow the person making the allegation to present the case against the applicants. The judge summarised his views upon the participation of the Tribunal briefly as follows:
On this, Mr Ma submits that it is not wrong for the Tribunal to appear and put its side of the story, to explain what happened and to assist with legal submissions. He asks the Court to note comments by Cooke P in Goodman Fielder Ltd v Commerce Commission [1987]2 NZLR 10 at 20 cited in Re Sutherland (Deceased) [1994]2 NZLR 242 at 246:
These observations of Cooke P hardly apply to the circumstances of this case but for my part, I accept Mr Ma's submission that it is not wrong for the Tribunal to appear. It remains unusual. Sears J correctly described the normal practice. It can be said in favour of the Tribunal that Mr Ma's submissions on appeal have been moderate and restrained as they were below. However, having brought this appeal its members put themselves personally at risk in costs. This is undesirable even if they are indemnified. 45. Mr Ma's second submission is to challenge the judge's view that the Tribunal took an aggressive attitude to justify the procedure it adopted in its determination to avoid disclosure of the minutes of its meetings with counsel. 46. Mr Ma rightly points out that the well-known passages in R v Lancashire County Council, ex parte Huddleston [1986]2 All ER 943 at 945 where Sir John Donaldson MR says that judicial review in these circumstances:
must be balanced by Parker LJ's observations at 947 that:
In spite of these passages, however, I find it difficult to accept that in the unusual circumstances of this case once a challenge had been made, the minutes of the meetings and the correspondence should not have been disclosed. This falls into the category of disclosing all that is necessary to enable justice to be done. The manner in which the minutes came to light partially and grudgingly during cross-examination of counsel for the Tribunal in the Magistrates Court was unfortunate. An account of this appears in Sears J's judgment. His strictures are in point. Finally 47. Finally, it must be said that the minutes demonstrate no intention on the part of the Tribunal to be unfair. Rather the reverse. But the Tribunal misled itself upon the true nature of these proceedings. Once made that mistake was almost impossible to rectify. It led to an unanswerable challenge. The challenge having succeeded below, it would have been well for the Tribunal to have accepted its error and to have allowed matters to rest. Godfrey JA: 48. The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance, Cap. 395, enables a Tribunal constituted thereunder to "appoint a legal officer nominated by the Attorney General, a barrister or a solicitor to act as counsel for the Tribunal" (see para. 18 of the Schedule to that Ordinance). This language is the same as that used in relation to a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Ordinance, Cap. 86, section 6(4) of which enables the Commission to "appoint a legal officer nominated by the Attorney General, a barrister or a solicitor to act as counsel for the Commission." No distinction need be drawn between a Commission appointed under Cap. 86 and a Tribunal appointed under Cap. 395 in this respect; that each is obliged, as a matter of general law, to act fairly. Each is entitled to make such use of counsel appointed to act for it as it chooses, provided that it does not breach this obligation. But there the resemblance, I think, ends. 49. The legislature, in Hong Kong, has not made insider dealing a criminal offence. But it requires a Tribunal constituted under Cap. 395 to sit in public (see para. 14 of the Schedule) and empowers it to make penal orders against those found guilty of insider dealing (see section 23(1)). 50. The respondents here are entitled to say that the use which a Tribunal constituted under Cap. 395 makes of its counsel should properly reflect these two considerations. 51. I waste no tears on the respondents, who refused to co-operate with the Tribunal and, in the case of one of them, went to so far as to ask to be left alone. Nevertheless, if, in the end, they have not been treated fairly, they are entitled to complain. 52. And they do complain. They complain that the use the Tribunal made of its counsel here, having regard to the nature of its task, went beyond what was fair. With considerable reluctance, I find myself compelled to agree. 53. The reason why, as it seems to me, both in the case of a Commission constituted under Cap. 86 and a Tribunal constituted under Cap. 395, the Commission or the Tribunal is empowered to appoint counsel to act for it, is to remove the impression of hostility and unfairness which would be created if the Commission or Tribunal itself conducted the process of eliciting the facts on which it has to base its conclusions. The appointment of counsel for the Commission or the Tribunal removes this impression; if any such impression remains, it shifts to the shoulders of counsel for the Commission or the Tribunal. 54. It is particularly important that in the case of a Tribunal constituted under Cap. 395, those in the position of the respondents, and indeed the public at large, should feel able to trust to the impartiality of the Tribunal. This is not, as it seems to me, compromised in any way by meetings between the Tribunal and its counsel to discuss administrative arrangements (though I think a transcript of the proceedings at such meetings should be made and any interested party should be told of the meetings and what transpired at them). But the reception of evidence in private, through the instrumentality of counsel for the Tribunal, the evaluation of evidence by the Tribunal in consultation with counsel, and the involvement of counsel in the drafting of the Tribunal's conclusions, all go well beyond what the interests of fairness permit, at any rate in the proceedings of a Tribunal constituted under Cap. 395, even if they would, or may, be permissible in the case of a Commission constituted under Cap. 86. 55. Unfortunately, the Tribunal here saw the matter differently and in doing so, I agree that it fell into error. 56. For these reasons, I too would dismiss this appeal. Rogers JA: 57. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Mortimer V-P in draft and I agree with it. In the circumstances I do not wish to add anything further. Mortimer V-P: 58. The appeal is dismissed with an order nisi for costs against the appellant.
Representation: Mr Geoffrey Ma, SC and Mr Daniel Wan (M/s Stephenson Harwood & Lo) for Appellant Mr Gerard McCoy, SC and Miss Lindy Course (M/s Richards Butler) for 1st Respondent |
Other judgments that cite this case