Yiu Ka Fung Vincent t/a Confidence Services Centre v. Info-vantage Ltd and Another

Read the full judgment text of HCA 1066/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 July 2014.

1. On 8 April 2014, this court handed down a judgment in relation to two applications (“ Judgment ”), one of which was an application by the 2 nd defendant (“ D2 ”) to amend its defence under O 20 r 5 of the RHC (“ Amendment Summons ”) and the other an application by the plaintiff (“ P ”) to strike out D2’s defence under O 18 r 19 (1) (a), (b) and (d) (“ Striking Out Summons ”).

Cited by 4 cases

Case No.HCA 1066/2013
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Jul 2014
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA 1066/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1066 OF 2013

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BETWEEN

YIU KA FUNG VINCENT trading as CONFIDENCE SERVICES CENTRE Plaintiff
  and  
  INFO-VANTAGE LIMTIED (騰訊有限公司) 1st Defendant
  DYMOCKS FRANCHISE SYSTEMS (CHINA) LIMITED 2nd Defendant

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge B Chu in Chambers
Date of Plaintiff’s written submissions on costs: 16 May, 6 June 2014 (reply)
Date of Defendant’s written submission on costs: 30 May 2014
Date of Ruling: 23 July 2014

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RULING ON COSTS
AND SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

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Orders for Costs

1.On 8 April 2014, this court handed down a judgment in relation to two applications (“Judgment”), one of which was an application by the 2nd defendant (“D2”) to amend its defence under O 20 r 5 of the RHC (“Amendment Summons”) and the other an application by the plaintiff (“P”) to strike out D2’s defence under O 18 r 19 (1) (a), (b) and (d) (“Striking Out Summons”).

2.As a result of the Judgment, the order made was that D2 was to make an election within 14 days of the order, as to whether it would continue to rely on the Relevant Paragraphs 7-9 of its defence, or to rely on the New Paragraphs 10-11 of the proposed amended defence (“Election Order”).  D2 has since filed a Notice of Appeal against the Election Order.  In the Election Order, the question of costs was reserved.

3.There seemed to be some confusion as to what the court meant by “the question of costs was reserved”.  In any event, any such doubts should be removed from my indication at the hearing on 2 May 2014 that I would decide on the question of costs for the hearing on 26 February 2014 on paper by way of written submission by both parties. No actual costs order (ie costs be reserved ) had been made in the Judgment, and the question of the court being functus officio to deal with the question of costs should not arise, nor was P seeking a variation of any costs order.

4.Apart from raising the issue that the court had already made a costs order, and thus functus officio, there were no other objections put forward by D2 as to why D2 should not be ordered pay P’s costs of the Striking Out Summons and the Amendment Summons, subject to the deletion of those words referring to the New Paragraphs in D2’s defence being in the alternative to the Relevant Paragraphs, and in the event the Striking Out Summons was allowed.

5.Although this court did not in the end make an actual order in the striking out the Relevant Paragraphs in D2’s defence, this was at the request of D2 to allow D2 to have an election.  I accept that P was in effect the successful party in the Striking Out Summons and P should be entitled to its costs.

6.As for the Amendment Summons, the usual costs order for amendment of pleading should apply, and costs should be borne by the party applying for the amendment.

7.D2 had objected to P’s application for summary assessment of costs.  Again, its grounds seemed to based on that a costs order had already been made by this court. 

8.The parties were in agreement that the Election Order was a non-interlocutory order.  However, in light of the Civil Justice Reform, and that the two summonses were relatively straightforward applications, the hearing being only half a day, I am of the view that an appropriate order would be for costs to be summarily assessed and to be paid within 14 days.

Summary Assessment

9.P submitted a statement of costs dated 16 May 2014, and D2 had set out its objections.  Thereafter, P then submitted a revised statement of costs dated 5 June 2014 for HK$170,600.  The revised statement included further professional costs for perusing skeleton submissions on costs, and further counsel’s fees for drafting written reply submission on costs.

10.There were no objections to the hourly charging rates of the Fee Earners.  The hearing on 26 February 2014 in relation to the summonses lasted 2 hours 40 minutes. The skeleton submissions of P’s then counsel Mr Tung were of 15 pages, and there were 8 authorities.  D2’s counsel’s skeleton submissions were about 8 pages and there were 3 authorities.  As for the submissions on costs, there was really no need to instruct counsel.  Thus, under sections E and F, I will only allow HK$75,000 for Counsel’s Brief Fee for the two summonses, and not for any Counsel’s drafting of submissions on costs.

11.Under sub-sections D1 and D2 on preparation and perusal of documents, I allow 5 hours for AS and 2 hours for SM including preparation for submissions on costs, and under sub-section D3 for attending the hearing, and I allow 3 hours in total for the attendance of AS.  The total amount under sub-sections D1, D2, and D3 is assessed at HK $38,400.  Under section B for manual work, I allow HK$5,200 and under section C for communications, I allow the amount of HK$24,800.

12.The total amount summarily assessed is HK$143,400.

Order

13.This court’s order for costs is :

(i) D2 shall pay P’s costs of the Amendment Summons and the Striking Out Summons including the submissions on costs.  Such costs are summarily assessed at HK$143,400 and shall be paid by D2 within 14 days.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Cheng Hon Gi Henry, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Douglas Clark, instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright Hong Kong, for the 2nd defendant