HKSAR v. Lionel John Krieger and Another
Read the full judgment text of FAMC 1/2014 on BabelCite. This FAMC judgment was delivered on 6 August 2014.
1. At the hearing, we dismissed the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, reserving our reasons. These are our reasons. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. [1]
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FAMC No. 1 of 2014 IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1 OF 2014 (CRIMINAL) (ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM CACC NO. 99 OF 2012) _____________________ Between:
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_________________________________ REASONS FOR DETERMINATION _________________________________ Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ: 1.At the hearing, we dismissed the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, reserving our reasons. These are our reasons. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.[1] 2.The Crimes Ordinance,[2] section 159A, relevantly provides:
3.Here, the conspiracy charged was an agreement to commit an offence against section 9(2) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance[4] which states:
4.The prosecution case was that:
5.The prosecution accepted that section 9(2) does not have extraterritorial effect. But it sought to argue that there was a fully constituted conspiracy in Hong Kong, relying on PBO section 2(2) which provides:
6.The prosecution submitted that this provision means that a person can offer an advantage to an agent without communicating the offer to the agent – that it was enough in the present case that an agreement was reached among the conspirators in Hong Kong to make the offer contained in the draft consultancy agreement.[8] 7.Section 2(2) is an interpretation section. The offence created by section 9(2) is constituted by offering an advantage to an agent. The reason why section 2(2) does not mention the agent is that its focus is on what constitutes the offering of an advantage. Applied to section 9(2), section 2(2) elaborates on the words “offers any advantage”, making it clear that those words cover variations on the ways in which an advantage might be offered, including cases where:
8.Plainly, in providing this elaboration, section 2(2) does not purport to cut down on the elements of the offence as created by section 9(2). In particular, it does not purport to eliminate the requirement that the offer of an advantage is made to the agent. 9.Section 2(2) does not help the prosecution. In so far as it is textually applicable, it serves merely to make it clear (i) that Krieger and Tam can be regarded as offering an advantage via Nolasco, acting on their behalf; and (ii) that a relevant offer is involved since Nolasco is to hold out to Ao an agreement or undertaking or promise to pay in accordance with the draft consultancy agreement. Neither of these points is in dispute. 10.The prosecution’s difficulty was accordingly that if the agreed course of conduct were carried out, it would not amount to or involve the commission of any offence triable in Hong Kong since the offer of an advantage was to be made to Ao (the agent) in Macau, and the section 9(2) offence has no extraterritorial effect. By virtue of section 159A, a conspiracy to make such an offer in Macau is not indictable in Hong Kong. The case is therefore not reasonably arguable and leave to appeal had to be refused. 11.While we respectfully are in complete agreement with the Court of Appeal’s decision allowing the appellants’ appeal, we note that in paragraphs 117 to 135, their Lordships discussed obiter a possible alternative basis for establishing jurisdiction. We wish to state that we say nothing in this Determination as to the correctness or otherwise of that discussion.
Mr Peter Duncan, SC and Mr Neil Mitchell on fiat for Department of Justice, for the Applicant Mr David Perry, QC, Mr Daniel Marash, SC and Mr Derek Chan, instructed by Haldanes, for the Respondents |
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