Banca Di Roma Societa Per Azioni v. Lee Kai and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 176/1997 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 March 1998.
1. This is an appeal from an order of Stone, J. made on 1 August 1997. The action in which the judge made his order, as constituted at the date of his order, was an action in which the only plaintiff was Banca Di Roma Societa Per Azioni ("BDR"). The defendants in the action were Lisgold Holdings Ltd ("the debtor") and Lee Kai and Chan Kueng Un ("the guarantors").
Cited by 2 cases
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CACV000176/1997 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL 1997, No. 176
---------------------- Coram : Hon. Mortimer, V.P., Godfrey, J.A. & Le Pichon, J. in court Date of hearing : 20 March 1998 Date of judgment : 20 March 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Godfrey, J.A. : Introduction 1. This is an appeal from an order of Stone, J. made on 1 August 1997. The action in which the judge made his order, as constituted at the date of his order, was an action in which the only plaintiff was Banca Di Roma Societa Per Azioni ("BDR"). The defendants in the action were Lisgold Holdings Ltd ("the debtor") and Lee Kai and Chan Kueng Un ("the guarantors"). 2. The order under appeal was made by the judge on BDR's application for summary judgment, under Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court, against all the defendants. The judge ordered that judgment be entered in favour of BDR against the debtor for HK$6,044,630.45 together with interest and costs. There is no appeal by the debtor against that order. The judge further ordered that the guarantors should be granted unconditional leave to defend the action. Dissatisfied with that, BDR has appealed to this court, claiming that judgment should be entered against the guarantors as well as against the debtor. 3. At the hearing of the appeal, it became apparent that there might be difficulties in BDR's way and it asked for and was granted an adjournment to file further evidence. When the appeal was restored for hearing today, we were further asked to grant BDR leave to amend, by adding Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura ("BNA") as a co-plaintiff in the action. So, we must now treat this appeal as an appeal by BDR and BNA against the judge's grant to the guarantors of unconditional leave to defend . 4. The question for this court is whether on the material before us the guarantors have demonstrated that there is an issue between the guarantors on the one hand and the plaintiffs on the other hand, and that that is an issue which ought to be tried. The guarantors say that they have raised such an issue, and that it ought to be tried, not determined summarily. The facts 5. Before I attempt to explain what the issue is, it will be convenient to refer to the facts. 6. Before the events took place which gave rise to this action, the debtor was a customer of BNA, with its liabilities to BNA secured in part by the guarantors under guarantees, expressed to enure for the benefit of its "successors or assigns", dated 18 August 1994. It appears that in 1995 BDR took over BNA, an event which affected the rights of the debtor against BNA in relation to the deposits of the debtor held by BNA, and the rights of BNA against the debtor in relation to the moneys owed by the debtor to BNA. It also affected the rights of the guarantors. On 20 March 1996, BNA revoked the debtor's facilities. Shortly after, BNA dispatched two letters, dated 1 April 1996, one addressed to the debtor and the other to one of the guarantors. The facts as recited in the letter from BNA to the debtor give rise to what the guarantors claim is the issue which ought to be tried and I must, I think, therefore read it more or less in full :-
7. I shall read two further paragraphs :
And :
8. The letter concludes by asking for the debtor's consent to the transfer of its accounts and associated obligations to BDR on the transfer date, to be evidenced by the debtor's signing and returning the attached copy of the letter. The debtor in due course returned to BNA the signed copy of the letter as it had been asked to do, and accordingly thereby consented to the arrangements which had been proposed. 9. The second letter to which I have referred again mentions BNA's decision to close its Hong Kong branch and set out the machinery by which that was to be effected. It contains the following paragraphs which are significant :-
10. The addressee of this letter was invited to acknowledge its receipt and was asked to signify its agreement to the "transfer and novation" by signing and returning the attached copy letter to BNA. However, this did not happen; and neither of the guarantors consented to what was proposed in the letter. The issue 11. The issue which arises, say the guarantors, is as follows. 12. Did the arrangements made here operate so as to discharge the debtor from its debt to BNA and substitute, for that debt, a debt due from the debtor to BDR by way of novation of the contract between the debtor and BNA; or did they operate to effect what has been called "a mere assignment" of the debt owed by the debtor from BNA to BDR? The law 13. If the arrangements to which I have referred operated to effect a novation in a sense in which I have used that expression, the liability of the guarantors may well have been discharged. If, however, BNA has merely assigned to BDR the benefit of the debt owed to it by the debtor, then the liability of the guarantors has not been discharged. 14. To make this good, I propose to read certain extracts from one of the authorities cited to us, which gives some guidance as to the approach of the court to a question such as that which has arisen here. I refer to Bradford Old Bank Ltd v. Sutcliffe [1918] 2 KB 833. I take the facts from the headnote :-
15. On those facts, a number of points arose, into only one of which I need to go. 16. I will start with the judgment of Pickford, L.J. at p. 841, where he mentions what he calls "the last defence". Pickford, L.J. says this :-
The judge set out the facts and continued :-
He continued :-
17. I think I need read only short extracts from the other two judgments. At page 846, Bankes, L.J. said this :-
18. He set out the facts, and continued by referring to Wheatley v. Bastow (supra), pointing out that there it was expressly held by Turner, L.J. that the position of the surety was in no respect altered by such an assignment. 19. The judge concluded his judgment by saying this :-
20. Scrutton, L.J. at p. 849 refers to what he calls "the third defence" . He says this :-
He continued :-
21. He said (at p.852) that he did not wish to express a final opinion on the question whether even a novation would necessarily have discharged the surety. The pleadings 22. The claim in the action, as I have already indicated, was a claim made by BDR alone. The plaintiffs have now sought, and been granted, leave to amend, so as to include BNA as a plaintiff so that it will be bound by the result. We have also given leave for an amendment designed to put right another point; that is to say, that in its original form, the statement of claim did not plead that notice of the assignment had been given to and demand for payment had been made against the guarantors. Conclusion 23. I conclude, as did the judge, that there is here an issue as to whether what took place in this case did amount to a novation discharging the guarantors as distinct from "a mere assignment" which did not. 24. The more difficult point, I think, is whether that is an issue which is fit to be tried, or whether we have here a short and simple point which we can and should now decide ourselves, even though these proceedings come before us by way of appeal from a judgment under Order 14, and not from a judgment given at trial. 25. Having regard to the way in which the plaintiffs have developed their case since the issue of the writ, and that there has been no discovery in the action, so that not all the documents which may be material to the conclusion to be reached upon the issue are yet available, I conclude, though with no great enthusiasm, that this is not a case suitable for summary judgment, and that we have to let it go to trial. There is an issue which ought to be tried. I say nothing as to the chances of success of the guarantors in fending off the plaintiffs' claim at such a trial. It is sufficient to say that, the defendants having raised an issue which ought to be tried, we have no alternative but to dismiss this appeal. Le Pichon, J. : 26. For the reasons given by my Lord Mr. Justice Godfrey, I, too, would dismiss this appeal. Mortimer, V.-P.: 27. I also would dismiss this appeal. 28. On 9 August 1994 the BNA granted facilities to the debtor for up to US$3m. On 18 August 1994 the guarantors signed guarantees which supported those facilities personally. In April 1995 BDR took over BNA but BNA continued to be the debtor's banker. In January 1996 BNA suspended the facilities they had granted and later in March 1996 they revoked them. But in April 1996 BDR took over the business of BNA. On 1 April BNA wrote the letter which has been referred to by Godfrey JA. This was a proforma letter to all BNA's former customers to seek their agreement to bank with the new bank. In accordance with that aim, the letter sought the agreement of the debtor in the terms set out. I do not intend to refer to all the passages. It suffices for me to say that that letter contained the following :
Later, there appears:
As invited, the debtor agreed to those terms. 29. The guarantors, however, although invited to make new guarantees in respect of the debts to BDR never did so. BNA held a deposit for the debtor. That deposit was transferred to BDR and in due course was set off against the debtor's overdrawn account which had also gone to BDR. In due course the debtor was unable to pay. Letters of demand were sent both to the debtor and to the guarantors. The remaining sums outstanding were not paid and so the plaintiff sued all three and applied for summary judgment under O14. 30. The application came before Stone J on 28 July 1997 and on 1 August he gave judgment against the debtor and gave the guarantors unconditional leave to defend. The latter is the order against which the plaintiff appeals. 31. There is only one issue : Is it reasonably arguable that the debtor, BDR and BNA agreed that the original agreement between the debtor and BNA was at an end and the obligations between BNA and the debtor should be extinguished and be the subject of a new agreement between the debtor and BDR? Was the debt originally owed to BNA extinguished and replaced by a new debt to BDR? If extinguished by novation, there was no debt left to be the subject of the guarantees. The guarantors contend here as they did below that the terms of the letter of 1 April were such that it is at least arguable that the debt to BNA was novated. 32. After hearing counsel, the judge agreed and in part of his judgment he said this :
If the judge was right, that is an end of this appeal. 33. But Mr Smith submits that the legal consequences of the letter are clear beyond argument. He says that there was an assignment of the debts for which no consent or agreement of the debtor was necessary, but there was a novation of the obligations of BNA for which an agreement of all three parties was necessary. In respect of the provision of banking and the liability for the deposit that is what happened but he submits, as to the debt, it was a mere assignment. 34. The issue in this case is illustrated clearly by passages in Bradford Old Bank v Sutcliffe [1918]2 KB at 833 where Scrutton LJ at p 849 said:
Later, at p.851, he says:
35. Considering the issue in this case and applying those principles, if I were to say that I would lean towards the plaintiff if I decided the issue here and now, is nothing to the point. BDR wanted the debtors' agreement to a novation of the former arrangements with BNA. Whether this was a mere assignment or an assignment which amounted to a novation of the debt is, in my view, not a concluded question. The terms set out in the letter are not plain beyond argument. They give rise to some difficulty. More light may be thrown upon the effect of that letter and those particular passages to which reference has been made if more is known of the surrounding circumstances and the dealings between the parties. Also more may come to light on discovery. 36. There is in my view reasonable doubt whether the plaintiff is here and now entitled to judgment. This issue is one which in my judgment should go to trial. I agree with the judge. I would dismiss the appeal, noting as I do so that we have granted leave to the plaintiff to re-amend its statement of claim. It has shifted its ground somewhat since the hearing before the judge. In those circumstances this appeal is dismissed. The defendants will have their costs of the appeal. That means the costs can be taxed and paid forthwith if they so choose. So far as the leave to amend is concerned, there will be leave to amend the statement of claim and the writ. The costs of and occasioned by the amendments will be also to the defendant.
Representation: Mr. Clifford Smith (M/s. Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for Appellant/Plaintiff Mr. Samson Hung (M/s. Joseph C.T. Lee & Co.) for 1st Respondent/2nd Defendant Mr. Lawrence Yip (M/s. Wong & Partners) for 2nd Respondent/3rd Defendant |
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