HKSAR v. Yu Wai Nang
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CACC 383/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 383 OF 2013 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC 305/2013) ____________
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________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon D Pang J (giving the reasons for judgment of the court): 1.On 10 October 2013, after trial before Deputy Judge Geiser and a jury, the applicant was convicted of one count of ‘trafficking in a dangerous drug’ involving 18.52 grammes of a crystalline solid containing 18.27 grammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride (“ice”)[1]. He was sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. Having been refused legal aid on the merits (23 December 2013), and also the free legal service of the Hong Kong Bar Association (3 June 2014), the Applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction in person. (His application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed upon his notice of abandonment dated 30 January 2014.) THE PROSECUTION CASE 2.At about 1 am on 28 February 2013, the applicant who was pushing a bicycle at the junction of Portland Street and Prince Edward Road was stopped by the police and found to have in his left front jeans pocket 13.94 grammes of ice wrapped in tissue paper. In a subsequent search at Mong Kok Police Station, he was found to be in possession of another quantity of ice in two plastic bags (2.19 and 2.39 grammes) in a black colour pouch that was hidden inside the waistband of his jeans. On both occasions, under caution, the applicant stated that the drug was for his own consumption. The same explanation was repeated in a video recorded interview in which the applicant detailed how as an addict he had just purchased his month’s supply of ice for $1,650. 3.Police witnesses accepted that prior to his interception, the applicant was not seen to have met or passed by any person. It was accepted that the applicant had told the officer stopping him that he was a construction site worker. Nothing suspicious was found in the applicant’s home search. It was the expert evidence of the third prosecution witness (a Detective Senior Inspector) that, at the time, the average price of ice was $734 per gramme, and the aggregate value of the drug concerned was $13,601. It was the expert evidence of the fourth prosecution witness (a consultant psychiatrist) that chronic ice-users commonly consumed 250 milligrammes to 1 gramme of the substance a day. 4.It was the prosecution’s case that the applicant’s explanation of self-consumption was untrue and that he was having possession of the drug for unlawful trafficking. THE DEFENCE CASE 5.The applicant did not challenge the admissibility of his video recorded interview. He gave evidence that is consistent with it. The following is a summary of what he said by the trial judge:
6.As the judge rightly pointed out to the jury:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 7.The applicant had advanced seven homemade grounds. 8.Ground 1: There was insufficient evidence for the prosecution to prove its case. Nothing by way of packing paraphernalia or large amounts of cash were found in his home that could prove the applicant was engaged in drug trafficking. No call record was produced to show that he was in contact with a third party at the material time. 9.Ground 2: There was nothing to gainsay the claim that the applicant was a drug user. That he was so was confirmed by the Correctional Services Department doctor upon his being taken into custody. There was nothing to show that the drug in question was not for his own consumption. 10.Ground 3: In cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the applicant if he provided financial support to the children of his ex-wife and ex-girlfriend. That question had no relevance to the issue at trial. In answering in the negative, the applicant must also have left an unfavourable impression with the jury. The judge should have but wrongly failed to redress this point in his summing up. 11.Ground 4: The name of the applicant was written on the packet of ice found in his left front jeans pocket. No drug dealer would leave his name on a packet of drug in such manner. A dealer might, on the other hand, write his buyer’s name on a packet for ease of identification. 12.Ground 5: The prosecutor made certain assumptions about the applicant’s income. These assumptions were not supported by evidence[2]. The judge should have but failed to instruct the jury on how to deal with these assumptions in his summing up. 13.Ground 6: As explained to the officer when he was first stopped, the applicant had no knowledge of what the weight of the drug in this case would be. All he knew was he was buying $1,500’s worth of ice. It was only at the police station when the drug was weighed that he found out about its weight. 14.Ground 7: In his closing speech, the prosecutor was wrong to suggest that it was possible for the applicant to have intended to traffic in only the two smaller packets of ice and not the big one. That was pure speculation. The judge should have but failed to redress this in his summing up. DISCUSSION 15.It is not impossible for drug addicts to be engaged in trafficking. It is known that some addicts do traffic in drugs to feed their habit. Ground 2 therefore has no merit. 16.Ground 7 also has no merit. It is perfectly possible for an addict-drug dealer to intend to sell part of the drug in his possession and reserve the rest for his own consumption. Whether this is so is a question of fact for the jury. The prosecutor was entitled to advance this as a common sense proposition for the jury’s consideration. There was no cause for any interference by the judge, who correctly stated what the law is in this regard[3]:
17.Presumably, the prosecutor advanced the proposition just mentioned to anticipate what possible implications there might be from fact that the applicant’s nickname (as opposed to name) was written on the larger packet of ice. That proposition goes a long way to meet the complaint in Ground 4. In any event, this point was unequivocally dealt with by the judge in his summing up, and the jury obviously made nothing of it. This is what the judge said[4]:
18.As the judge fairly pointed out, the prosecution case was one based entirely on inferences, and from a restricted number of primary facts, so there could be no mistake on the part of the jury as to the scope and nature of the allegation against the applicant[5]:
19.In the same breath, the jury was reminded of what the defence contended. This and the other passage just quoted from the summing up are a complete answer to the complaint in Ground 1. The jury decided the matter with full knowledge of what is or is not in the evidence, and their competing inferences[7]:
20.Grounds 3 and 5 have no merit. As said, the applicant’s lack of means to purchase the lot of drug entirely for his own use was a major pivot in the prosecution case[8]. The prosecutor was entitled to press the point by inquiring into various aspects of the applicant’s expenditure. By asking such questions, no insinuation can justifiably be presumed to have been made or perceived to be so by the jury. 21.Ground 6 has no merit. The point here is not whether the applicant knew he was purchasing 18.53 grammes of ice. The point is whether any dealer would part with that amount of ice at $1,650. The third prosecution witness had testified that it could fetch $13,601 when sold at quantities of 5 grammes and below. It is for the jury to decide whether the applicant did get the very substantial discount that he said he did for bulk purchase, or that his version of events was in fact untrue. CONCLUSION 22.None of the applicant’s grounds of appeal has any merit. We are satisfied that the defence case had been given a fair wind at trial. The jury by a majority of 6 to 1 obviously disbelieved the applicant. For those reasons, we dismissed his application.
Miss Vivien Chan, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the respondent The applicant appeared in person [1] The rest of the quantitative references in this judgment are by weight of the crystalline solid, as opposed to the weight of its pure narcotic content. The difference between the two is however minimal. [2] When asked what those assumptions were by this Court, all the applicant did was give a rambling explanation of his finances. [3] Appeal Bundle, pages 20U – 21F. Partial retention of a quantity of drug for self‑consumption by the trafficker, if accepted, may however affect sentence. [4] Appeal Bundle, page 23Q – R. [5] Appeal Bundle, page 21J – T, and pages 22P – 23F. [6] The judge was careful enough to add, later on in the summing up, that: “the inspector conceded in cross-examination that this price [ie $734 per gramme] was based on quantities of 5 grammes and below, and that he had no data for the retail price of 10 to 20 grammes of ‘Ice’ …..” (Appeal Bundle page 27C –E) [7] Appeal Bundle, page 23F – R. [8] See the quote under paragraph 18 of this judgment. |
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