Sinodental Investments Ltd and Others v. Sin Chung Yin Ronald and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2176/2012 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 June 2015.
1. This is yet another application by the plaintiffs against the 4 th and 7 th – 18 th defendants (collectively called “the defendants”) under O.24, r.7 and r.11 RHC for the following categories of documents:
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 1 case
|
HCA 2176/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HIGH COURT ACTION NO 2176 OF 2012 _________________________
_________________________
_____________ D E C I S I O N _____________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is yet another application by the plaintiffs against the 4th and 7th – 18th defendants (collectively called “the defendants”) under O.24, r.7 and r.11 RHC for the following categories of documents:
2.This application is contested by the defendants and the parties are legally represented.[2] THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3.The plaintiffs have summarized the factual background as follows:
THE DEFENDANTS’ GROUND OF OBJECTION 4.The defendants’ grounds of objection are as follows:
DISCUSSION The relevant legal principles 5.Both parties have set out extensively the relevant legal principles on specific discovery cited in the previous authorities of my decision. I do not propose to repeat them here. Those legal principles would be applied in the discussion below. In fact, it can be seen that the parties do not dispute over those legal principles cited in the authorities. It is a matter of opinion or positions of the parties that they are unable to resolve their disputes themselves. In my view, the difference in their opinions must be considered in light of the factual issues to be resolved in the trial. The plaintiffs’ facts as pleaded 6.The plaintiffs have set out the fundamental factual issues in support of their case against the defendants, upon which they now apply for specific discovery against the defendants. I shall set out the plaintiffs’ facts as follows:
7.The defendants have raised no objection to the factual issues above. As such, the parties’ argument must be considered upon the above facts. 8.I shall now discuss the plaintiffs’ application for the categories of documents. Documents relating to D13’s negotiation with Galaxy on XD SKW Clinic and payment records for rental deposits 9.It will be convenient to set out the full reasons for the plaintiffs to discover the category A documents relating to the SKW clinic and the NP clinic tenancies:
10.The main reason is 23(3), evidence to show the arrangements furthering the conspiracy in competing with the H&C Group. We must bear in mind that for the present proceedings, the investigation of the facts should focus on the defendants. 11.The plaintiffs have pleaded that at the material times:
12.The plaintiffs admit that they have difficulty in the documents they attempt to discover as they have difficulty in proving that the documents are in the possession, custody or power of the defendants. However, this issue will become insignificant even if the plaintiffs are able to establish this fundamental condition for specific discovery as the documents are not relevant for the trial or they will not be for a fair trial or for saving costs as will be discussed below. 13.It is quite difficult to understand why the plaintiffs should refer to the analysis in Kao Lee & Yip v Koo Hoi Yan [2003] 3 HKLRD 296 where the discussion was on when a fiduciary or employee crosses the line between legitimate and illegitimate preparatory steps to start a competing business. The factual disputes in this matter do not match those discussed in Kao Lee & Yip case. See §6 supra. In any event, the plaintiffs rely upon the complicated factual situations below in support of their application for the documents under category A. 14.The plaintiffs explain why the documents under this category are necessary. They say that the property of the tenancy agreement of the 13th defendant was first purchased by Galaxy, a company controlled by the 1st to 3rd defendants. Galaxy entered into a tenancy agreement with a company called Kinvic Ltd and Dr. Angela Ho signed the tenancy agreement for Kinvic. In March 2012, the property was then sold to another company, which nominated another company called Cheung Co to take up the property. In November 2012, the property was sold to another company called TYW, the present landlord. Upon discovery ordered by this Court, the 13th defendant only produced rents records which did not show who paid the rental deposit. Being suspicious, the plaintiffs had written to the 13th defendant’s solicitors for an explanation. The solicitors did not give the particulars of the transactions leading to the formation of the tenancy agreement, especially on who had paid the rental deposit for the tenancy agreement, the plaintiffs ask for discovery of the documents as set out in the schedule. 15.It is apparent that those transactions before the tenancy agreements of the 13th and the 15th defendants were the conveyancing transactions of the respective properties. 16.What the plaintiffs are trying to establish at trial in support of their conspiracy claims against the defendants is the fact that those tenancy agreements for the 13th and 15th defendants respectively were set up to accommodate their business in competition with the plaintiffs’ business. The fact of who had paid the rental deposit may be of assistance to identify the beneficial lessees of the properties. The real question as pleaded in the pleadings is whether the defendants or any one or several of them had conspired together by setting up the tenancies to accommodate the businesses in competition with those of the plaintiffs’. Evidence of who had paid the rental deposit may not be conclusive as to who the beneficial owners of those tenancies are. There are a number of possibilities. They might be the lenders of the fund under separate agreement without taking up the beneficial interest of the leases. As revealed in the letters between the solicitors of the respective parties, there might have been set-off of money paid for the conveyancing transactions. The parameter of discovery should be whether the defendants were part of the conspiracy to compete with the plaintiffs. This is the pleaded case of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the question is whether it is necessary to require those documents as set out in the schedule for this purpose. 17.In my view, it is not necessary to obtain those documents as proposed by the plaintiffs to establish the fact discussed above. The prima facie fact has been established that the 13th and the 15th defendants were established by the 4th defendant as the director of the companies until late 2012. See §6(c)(v) supra. The plaintiffs have the information of the shareholders of the 13th and 15th defendants. 18.As to who had paid the rental deposits for the properties under the respective tenancy agreements is, in my view, insignificant as the burden will be on the defendants to show that the money did not come from the shareholders of the companies. 19.The plaintiffs may still argue that in order to expel any ambiguity or argument as who the real owners of the tenancy agreements are, the ones who had paid the rental deposits should be identified. It may be so. But to embark on an expedition of such massive discovery of the documents as proposed is, in my view, disproportionate to the probative value of the evidence obtained. The plaintiffs can, as suggested by the defendants, administer interrogatory on the defendants as to who had paid the rental deposits for the properties under the tenancy agreements entered into by the 13th and 15th defendants respectively. If they refuse to answer, the matter can be taken further. In any event, they have to answer the questions at trial during cross-examination. Besides, the plaintiffs may discover the financial statements under the category B and category C for the information on top of those that I have mentioned above. 20.Furthermore, the defendants have already affirmed: “there [is] no written negotiation documents concerning SKW and/or NP premises”. The affidavit evidence must be taken as conclusive for the interlocutory applications. See Ready Set Goal Ltd v Kay-El (Hong Kong) Ltd. [2015] HKEC 731. However, in view of the arguments as put to this Court this morning, the expression in the 2nd affirmation of the defendants may need clarification. This may need to call upon the affirmant to make another affirmation to clarify or to order cross-examination of him in another hearing, which is depreciated by the authorities. I do not propose to take this course for the reasons stated for category A documents. 21.The discovery of the documents as proposed by the plaintiffs will not be for a fair trial as they may even muddle the issues. They are not saving costs. As such, the application for the documents is dismissed. Documents relating to D15’s negotiation with Stars Technology Ltd on XD NP Clinic and payment records for rental deposits 22.The plaintiffs’ reasons for the discovery of the documents of the NP clinic are similar to those for the SKW clinic as discussed above. For the same reasons, I dismiss the plaintiffs’ application for discovery of the documents as requested. 23.These documents are under category A, which I dismissed. Category B & C: bank records showing the capital injection into D7-18 and the audited financial statements of D7-18 24.Paragraph 30 of the plaintiffs’ written submissions states: “Category B refers to bank records showing the capital injection into D7-18. Category C refers to the audited financial statements of D7-18.” 25.The plaintiffs submit that “the documents are clearly relevant as they would show the parties who have funded the establishment and operation of D7-18 by way of injection of capital: 4th Lee §§13-14 [A/125-126]. It will also show when the companies were put in funds.”[6] 26.The defendants’ grounds of objection to discovery of these categories of documents can be dealt with below:
27.The defendants’ objection to these categories fails. 28.The plaintiffs have succeeded in their application for Category B and Category C. COSTS 29.As to the costs of this application, having considered counsel’s submissions, I consider the appropriate order should be each party bears its own costs, with counsel’s certificate. ORDERS 30.I shall now make an order in terms as follows:
Mr. Jason Yu, instructed by Li, Wong, Lam & W.I. Cheung, for the plaintiffs Ms. Lorinda Lau, instructed by Ng, Lie, Lai & Chan, for the 7th to 18th defendants |
Cases cited in this judgment
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 2176/2012