Wong Luen Hang and Another v. Chan Yuk Lung and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1382/2011 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 July 2015.
1. This is an appeal by the defendants against an order of Master K Lo made on 13 January 2015. The order requires the defendants to provide further and better particulars.
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HCA 1382/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 1382 OF 2011 _____________
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_____________ DECISION _____________ 1.This is an appeal by the defendants against an order of Master K Lo made on 13 January 2015. The order requires the defendants to provide further and better particulars. 2.This action is a common law derivative action instituted by the plaintiffs as shareholders of the 5th defendant, a Hong Kong company, against the 1st and 2nd defendants and for the benefit of the 5th defendant. The 5th defendant is under the management and control of the 1st and 2nd defendants who are its controlling shareholders and directors. When I refer to the defendants’ hearing below, I am only referring to the 1st to 4th defendants. 3.The 5th defendant has a subsidiary called Dongguan Shipai Longwei Fabric Manufacturing Factory (“Long Wei”). Long Wei is a joint venture company operating a factory in the mainland that manufactures automobile parts. 4.The plaintiffs have queries on the finance of the 5th defendant. They say that the 1st and 2nd defendants did not answer the queries satisfactorily. They therefore engaged private investigators to investigate on what the 1st and 2nd defendants had done to the business and operation of Long Wei. As a result of the investigation, the plaintiffs instituted this action. 5.The part of the statement of claim relevant to this appeal are §§33 to 39 as follows:
6.The defendants dealt with §§38 and 39 of the statement of claim in §27 of their defence filed on 11 October 2011 as follows:
7.The plaintiffs asked for further and better particulars of, among other matters, §27 of the defence. The requests and the defendants’ answers on §27 that were provided on 19 December 2011 (“the first particulars”) are as follows:
8.There is a schedule annexed to the answers. It lists out the dates and amounts of receipts and whether the amounts were paid by Seibon or Regal. There is no other information. The plaintiffs therefore made a further request for particulars on 7 July 2014 (“the further requests”) after having spent a lot of time and efforts to obtain discovery of the relevant documents from the defendants. The further requests are as follows:
9.The defendants did not provide the particulars. Their solicitors wrote on 17 July 2014 advising the plaintiffs’ solicitors that the defendants were going to amend their defence and the amendment would make the further requests totally irrelevant. 10.However, the defendants did not issue a summons to amend the defence within a month thereafter. Hence, the plaintiffs issued a summons on 26 August 2014 for an order requiring for the further requests. 11.The defendants then filed a summons to amend the defence on 11 September 2014 annexing to it a draft amended defence. §27 of the draft amendment reads:
12.The proposed new §27 did not make any material change to the original §27 as read in conjunction with the first particulars. The enw paragraph made further admissions that the payments by Seibon and Regal into the accounts of the 3rd and 4th defendants were sale proceeds that the 3rd and 4th defendants received for Sun Fu Yee and Wang Bon. Hence, the merits of the further requests were not affected by the draft amended defence. 13.Leave was given by Master Chow on 26 March 2015 for the defence to be amended in terms of this draft. 14.The defendants, after issuing the summons to amend the defence, filed the 2nd affirmation of Chan Yuk Wai on 3 October 2014 opposing the summons for further particulars requested in the further requests. Mr Chan said in §8 of his 2nd affirmation (“§8 of the affirmation”):
15.The defendants’ case as advanced in §8 of the affirmation is different from §27 of the existing defence read in conjunction with first particulars or the new §27 in the draft amended defence. §8 of the affirmation said that the payments deposited by Seibon and Regal into the accounts of the 3rd and 4th defendants were not for payment of the sales of goods by Sun Fu Yee and Wang Bon to Seibon and Regal, but were payments made by Seibon and Regal to the 3rdand 4th defendants which received them on behalf of some unparticularized mainland companies. 16.Despite the filing of Chan’s 2nd affirmation, the defendants did not seek to amend §27 of the existing defence or file a fresh summons to amend with a new draft amended defence so as to make the pleaded defence case the same as §8 of the affirmation. Hence, the defendants were still bound by its pleaded defence. 17.When the summons for further requests was before Master K Lo on 13 January 2015, Mr Kwok, counsel for the defendants admitted that the schedule produced by the defendants in the first particulars only mentioned the payments received by the 3rd defendant. Mr Kwok also agreed to provide a further schedule for the payments received by the 4th defendant. Hence, Master K Lo made an order 1(b) which is pursuant to further requests 1(a) and Mr Kwok’s concession. The order requires the defendants to provide further and better particulars in the form of:
18.There is no appeal from order 1(b) save that Mr Kwok has indicated in his written submissions that the schedule provided in the first particulars contained payments received by both the 3rd and 4th defendants. This is contrary to his admission before Master K Lo on 13 January 2015. 19.Mr Tang, counsel for the plaintiffs said at the hearing of the appeal that he wanted separate schedules for the payments received by the 3rd and 4th defendants and Mr. Kwok did not demur. 20.Master K Lo further made an order 1(c) which is in terms of 1(b) of the further requests. It requires the defendants to provide:
21.Since §8 of the affirmation has advanced a different case from §27 of the defence, Master K Lo also made orders 1(a) and 1(d) requiring the defendants to provide particulars to the plaintiffs under §8 of the affirmation as follows:
22.I have already mentioned above that the defendants are not appealing against order 1(b). They are only appealing against orders 1(c), 1(a) and 1(d) in the sequence as used in Mr Kwok’s written submissions for the appeal. 23.The basis of the defendants’ appeal against order 1(c) is the unpleaded defence embodied in §8 of the affirmation. Mr Kwok submitted that the 3rd and 4th defendants were not sellers of the goods and, apart from receiving the proceeds of sale from Seibon and Regal for the mainland companies, they did not have information about the sellers. He further submitted that the defendants were unable to provide the particulars required in this order and were not compellable to do so even if their version in §8 of the affirmation was not to be believed. He further said that there was no justification to compel the defendants to confess to something which they had clearly denied knowledge and were therefore unable to answer. 24.However, the pleaded defence clearly said that the payments received by the 3rd and 4th defendants were proceeds of goods sold to Seibon and Regal. This was the case in the original §27 of the defence as read together with the first particulars. This is still the case in the new §27 after the defence was amended on 26 March 2015 by the order of Master Chow. The new §27 further says that these payments were proceeds of sale received by the 3rd and 4th defendants for Sun Fu Yee and Wang Bon. Hence, order 1(c), which was made pursuant to request 1(b) of the further requests raised on the previous §27 is also apposite for the new §27 in the amended defence. 25.The defendants cannot use an affirmation to replace their pleaded defence. If they should consider the pleaded case in the amended defence incorrect, they should seek leave to correct it by re-amendment. Whether they would be allowed to re-amend the amended defence to reflect the case advanced in §8 of the affirmation is of course a matter that may have to be considered on another occasion. However, in the meantime they are bound by their amended defence. They cannot rely on an affirmation which purportedly discloses a different defence and then oppose the request for particulars of the pleaded defence. I find the ground of appeal against order 1(c) has no merit and I dismiss it. 26.Regarding order 1(a), it requires the defendants to provide particulars of the mainland companies referred to in §8 of the affirmation. Mr Chan alleged in §8 of the affirmation that these are the companies for which the 3rd and 4th defendants had received payments from Seibon and Regal. 27.The defendants’ ground of appeal against this order is that the plaintiffs had not asked for these particulars in the further requests. Mr Kwok said that the particulars requested for are different from the particulars ordered. 28.However, Mr Kwok at the hearing of the appeal abandoned his appeal to this order. He accepted that the Master had jurisdiction to order particulars even without a request. He however submitted that the particulars as ordered had not been sought by the plaintiffs in the request or the summons but were only ordered by the master at the hearing. The defendants therefore had been taken by surprise. Hence, he argued that it was unfair to order the defendants to bear the costs of the application and the hearing. 29.I disagree. Whether those entities referred to in §8 of the affirmation were sellers on whose behalf the 3rd and 4th defendants had received the proceeds of sale of goods from Seibon and Regal or were just mainland companies for whom the 3rd and 4th defendants had received monies from Seibon or Regal, they were the purported beneficiaries of the payments received by the 3rd and 4th defendants from Seibon or Regal. When the defendants opposed the application for particulars of the sellers by saying in §8 of the affirmation that there were no sellers but only beneficiaries of payments, they were trying to avoid the need to provide the particulars of these purported beneficiaries and the payments purportedly received by the 3rd and 4th defendants on their behalf. The Master’s order 1(a) defeats this opposition. It is therefore just and fair to require the defendants to pay the costs of the application and the hearing. 30.Order 1(d) is in similar terms as order 1(a) but relates to the 4th defendant. My ground for disagreeing with Mr Kwok on costs for order 1(a) should apply to this order as well. However, Mr Kwok did not make the same argument he used for order 1(a) as against this order. He instead used the same ground of appeal that he had used against order 1(c). He relied on §8 of the affirmation that the defendants did not know what they were ordered to particularize. I have already dismissed this ground under order 1(c) above. I therefore dismiss the appeal against order 1(d) as well. 31.In the premises, I dismiss the appeal with costs against the defendants to be taxed. I also extend the time for compliance with the order by fourteen days from today.
Mr Ronald Tang and Ms Carmen Kei, instructed by Lee Chan Cheng, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs Mr Kwok Kam Kwan, instructed by Wong Poon Chan Law & Co, for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 1382/2011