Chu Po Chuen v. Kwong Yip Co Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCMP 1062/2015 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 21 July 2015.
1. By the Originating Summons, the plaintiff claims the following reliefs:-
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DCMP 1062/2015 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1062 OF 2015 ---------------------------
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------------------------------------- REASONS FOR DECISION ------------------------------------- 1.By the Originating Summons, the plaintiff claims the following reliefs:-
2.The plaintiff is the current registered owner of the Property. 3.The first defendant (D1) was the developer of the building of which the Property forms part. 4.The second defendant (D2) was the Administratrix of the estate of Madam Lee Shun Yung. In 2011, D2 in her capacity as the Administratrix assigned the Property to the plaintiff. Relief (i) Declaration of Error 5.In the plaintiff’s affirmation in support of the application, he described in detail what the error in the 1971 Plan was and how it was discovered. In short, such error was discovered when he attempted to sell the Property and requisitions were raised by solicitors acting for the purchaser. 6.I am satisfied that on the evidence the court should be in a position to make the declaration sought in relief (i). Relief (ii) The Covenants for title 7.The Covenants can be found on p 4 of the 1971 Assignment. The Covenants pertinent to this application are:-
8.The term “Purchaser” used in the 1971 Assignment is defined right at the beginning of the deed, which includes the then purchaser’s (Madam Lee Shun Yung’s) “assigns” where not inapplicable. As an ‘assign’ of Madam Lee, the plaintiff enjoys the benefit of the Covenants. 9.Further, section 39 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap 219) provides that: “A covenant relating to any land of the covenantee shall be deemed, unless the contrary intention is expressed, to be made with the covenantee and his successors in title ...” There is no contrary intention expressed in the 1971 Assignment. Hence the plaintiff enjoys the benefit of the Covenants. D1 and D2 cannot now be found 10.D1 has been wound up decades ago and D2 has emigrated and could not be found after reasonable inquiry. 11.Applying section 38A(2) to the present case, the court may order the confirmatory assignment or deed of rectification to be executed by such person as the court may nominate for that purpose. The suitable person for the court to nominate is the Registrar of the District Court. 12.In Goldsteady Investment Ltd v Fatima Estates Ltd [2000] 1 HKC 819, the defendant company was the plaintiff’s predecessor in title whose attorney executed the assignment on the defendant’s behalf. The power of attorney was however defectively executed by the defendant company. At the time of the hearing the defendant company was no longer at its registered office and could not be found. Woo J made an order pursuant to s.25A of the High Court Ordinance appointing the Registrar of the High Court to execute a confirmatory assignment. 13.In Li Kwan Chuen v Vector Development Ltd [2009] 3 HKLRD 511, the defendant vendor was a BVI company who had mistakenly applied a wrong common seal when it executed the assignment in favour of the plaintiff purchaser. At the time of the hearing, the BVI company had been struck off from the register of companies (although it had not been dissolved). The plaintiff could not locate the BVI company and Sakhrani J, following Goldsteady, held that it was appropriate to make an order appointing the Registrar of the High Court to execute a confirmatory assignment in favour of the plaintiff. 14.The issue here is that D1 had already been wound up. Could it be made a party in this application? 15.D1 was wound up in 1980 by its members’ voluntary liquidation. From the company search result, the company seems to have been dissolved on 17 December 1980. 16.The court’s power under section 38A(2) to nominate a third party to execute a confirmatory assignment can be exercised if the person directed to execute it under a judgment “cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found”. 17.Mr. Yao for the plaintiff submits that a company that has been wound up is a company that ‘cannot be found after reasonable inquiry’. 18.Support for this view can be found in sub-para (c) of para [389], p.165, Part VI of Hong Kong Conveyancing Law and Practice, 2015, by Prof Sihombing and Prof Wilkinson, where the learned authors stated:-
19.Hence, the fact that D1 was wound up and dissolved, and hence no longer in existence, is no bar to relief (ii) sought under section 38A. 20.I grant the relief accordingly.
Mr Eric Yao, instructed by Peter W K Lo & Co, for the plaintiff The 1st and 2nd defendants were not represented and did not appear [1] Section 38A of the District Court Ordinance is the equivalent of section 25A of the High Court Ordinance. |
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