Li Hao Tian v. The Secretary for The Civil Service

On 17 August 2026, the Court of Appeal (Au and Anthony Chan JJA) refused Mr Li Hao Tian's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in CACV 480A/2024. Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by the Department of Justice, together with Ms Celina Lam, Government Counsel, acted for the successful Secretary for the Civil Service.

This CFA leave application was the latest stage in Mr Li's challenge to a decision of the Secretary for the Civil Service. He had originally applied for leave to apply for judicial review, which Coleman J refused on 4 November 2024 ([2024] HKCFI 2580). Mr Li's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 8 January 2026 ([2026] HKCA 16). He now sought to take the matter further to the CFA, raising ten purported questions of great general or public importance spanning misfeasance, the propriety of a rolled-up hearing, costs, judicial bias, and the sequencing of related appeals.

The Court held that the application was plainly devoid of merit, for three reasons (§§12-14). First, the questions advanced were all fact-specific to Mr Li's individual circumstances and did not relate to any question of great general or public importance; on this basis alone the application had to be dismissed. Second, most of the contentions were no more than a regurgitation of arguments already raised below, coupled with disagreement with the reasons the Court of Appeal and Coleman J had given in rejecting them. The court reiterated that a CFA leave application cannot be used to re-run arguments already canvassed in the appeal, citing Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling at [2]-[3]. Third, the procedural unfairness complaints also failed. The complaint that the Court of Appeal had not addressed misfeasance in public office was academic: as explained at [43]-[44] of the CA Judgment, Mr Li had not demonstrated any public law errors in the challenged decision, so there was nothing to support a damages claim for misfeasance. The complaint about the sequencing of this appeal before his legal aid appeal (CACV 367/2024) had no substance. The rolled-up hearing was a proper filtering mechanism, used correctly here. As for bias, the court relied on Deacons v White & Case LLP and Chau Siu Woon v Cheung Shek Kong, holding that adverse judicial decisions against a litigant do not by themselves justify recusal; Mr Li's allegations were "subjective surmises and bare speculations" (§14(4)).

The Notice of Motion was dismissed, with costs of HK$33,888 summarily assessed against Mr Li (§§16-19).

Why it Matters

Practitioners advising prospective CFA appellants should screen their proposed questions for genuine general or public importance at the outset. A CFA leave application is not a vehicle for revisiting fact-finding or re-arguing points already rejected at first instance and on appeal; doing so risks an adverse costs order in addition to refusal. Allegations of judicial bias must be supported by clear evidence beyond a litigant's disagreement with adverse rulings.