Wu Mei Sam v. The Pui Ying Middle School of Hong Kong
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1122/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 31 August 2015.
1. I have before me an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action on behalf of The Pui Ying Middle School of Hong Kong, which is a company limited by guarantee and operates on a not for profit basis a school in Pok Fu Lam. I shall refer to it as the “ Company ”. The intended defendants are 2 current directors, Choi Kin Chung and Chan Yee Yee, and a former director Tsang Ip Chun Daniel.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 4 cases
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HCMP 1122/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1122 OF 2015 -----------------------------
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________________ JUDGMENT 1.I have before me an application for leave to commence a statutory derivative action on behalf of The Pui Ying Middle School of Hong Kong, which is a company limited by guarantee and operates on a not for profit basis a school in Pok Fu Lam. I shall refer to it as the “Company”. The intended defendants are 2 current directors, Choi Kin Chung and Chan Yee Yee, and a former director Tsang Ip Chun Daniel. 2.The School operated by the Company is affiliated with TheHong Kong Council of the Church of Christ in China. 3.As of the passing of a special resolution on 30 July 1985 the articles(13) have provided that the board of the Company shall consist of no less than 10 and no more than 20 directors. Article 13 provides that all directors “shall be members of the School”. It is clear that the reference to “School” in the articles means the Company: see for example paragraphs2 and 3 of the memorandum of association. It is also clear that in the context of a company incorporated by guarantee that the reference to members are to those person who have become members of the Company: section 2(1) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap.622. Article 4 provides that “All members of Protestant Churches shall be entitled to be admitted as a member of the Company upon his giving notice of his intention to become a member of the Company”. It follows that all directors must be members of a “Protestant Church”. There is no requirement that they have been alumni of the School. 4.The Plaintiff is a member of the Company and an alumni ofthe School. 5.In the draft Statement of Claim exhibited to the Plaintiff’s supporting affidavit 3 claims against the intended Defendants are pleaded. One of those is that the intended 1st and 2nd Defendants are not alumni of the School and were not, therefore, qualified to be directors and a mandatory injunction should be granted for the removal of their names from the Companies Registry showing them as directors. As I pointed out at the first call over hearing of the summons this claim was based on a clearly erroneous reading of the memorandum and articles of association. It should have been abandoned. It has not been abandoned. The Plaintiff has filed a further affidavit drafted by solicitors suggesting that as a matter of ordinary English usage “members of the School” means somebody who went to the School and disagreeing with my explanation given at the first hearing of the originating summons. The claim is also retained in the revised Statement of Claim prepared by Mr. Foster Yim, who appeared for the Plaintiff at the call over hearing and before me on the substantive application, after the call over hearing. This argument ignores:
The Plaintiff’s argument is unsustainable and obviously so. 6.There is an associated claim that the intended 1st Defendant admitted at an annual general meeting on 16 December 2014 that he is not a Christian. The Company does not dispute this. Although the draft Statement of Claim in neither its original nor revised form spells it out it is intended to suggest that as a result he could not be a director. The Company explains through the evidence of Reverend So how the intended 1stDefendant came to be a director. The intended 1st Defendant attended a Pui Ying School in Guangzhou. He subsequently came to Hong Kong and became a successful businessman, has made donations to various Pui Ying schools and is regarded as one of the most distinguished alumni of what one might loosely call the Pui Ying community. He was invited to join the Board. Initially he declined. He agreed in March 2009. Reverend So says that the intended 1st Defendant had made it known before joining the Board that he was not a Christian. Mr. Adrian Lai, who appeared for the Company, explained that the Company had taken on board my explanation of how the articles operated at the call over hearing. The intended 1st Defendant’s term of office expires in October of this year. Absent a change in the articles it accepts that he could not continue on the Board. It seems to me that there is no need for any action to be brought for the removal of the intended 1st Defendant and, in any event, thePlaintiff could have brought one in his personal capacity for breach of the articles. There was no need to bring a derivative action. In the circumstances to suggest that it is appropriate to bring an action against the intended 1st Defendant seems uncharitable given Reverend So’s evidence on how the intended 1st Defendant came to be involved with the Company. 7.There are 2 other claims that the Plaintiff wishes to bring. Before addressing them it is helpful to explain the provision of the Companies under which these applications are brought. Sections732 and733 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 provide:
8.In determining whether or not to grant leave under section733, the principal matters that the court is concerned with are:
9.The threshold in respect of both these criteria is low. AsLordMillett notes at paragraph 55 of his judgment in Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo [2]“in applying for leave the plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case but only that there is a serious question to be tried.” Consistent with this in assessing applications for leave the prospects of success are to be investigated only to a limited extent; and the court should be slow to find against the applicant unless his prospects are so slim that he cannot be said to have any expectation of success[3]. Atthis stage it is not the court’s function to try to resolve conflicts of evidence or difficult questions of law, which require substantial argument and deliberation. In practice, if the applicant is able to produce a draft pleading that sets out a case with some prospect of success when only the allegations contained in the pleading are considered, the criteria will be satisfied unless the respondent can demonstrate fairly readily that there is a serious flaw in the claim and that it has no real substance[4]. In most cases, if a “serious question to be tried ” has been demonstrated, it is likely to appear to be in the company’s interests to bring proceedings.[5] 10.The first claim relates to renovation works carried out at a building owned by the Company at its campus in Pok Fu Lum. This is pleaded in paragraphs 7.1 to 7.6 of the draft Statement of Claim:
11.The Company says that this is a materially inaccurate description of what took place. In its evidence it explains that the work was not carried out with funds provided by the Government and, therefore, the “Guidelines on Tendering and Purchasing Procedures in Aided Schools” did not apply. If the Company did fund the renovation works, and the Plaintiff does not suggest it did not, this would appear to be correct. 12.The Company’s case in summary is this. The Board resolved to carry out renovation works. A consultant was engaged. Atthat time the cost estimate was $10,000,000. Tenders were called for. The tenders greatly exceeded the budget ranging from approximately $17,000,000 to $21,000,000. The intended 1st Defendant suggested this was excessive and having talked to a contractor he believed that it was unnecessary to call for tenders and that it would be more economical to proceed by negotiating directly with contractors for the various trades involved and without the use of an independent consultant which would be expensive. He proposed that a task force consisting of himself and the intended 2nd and 3rd Defendants deal with the project and he took responsibility for any problems that might arise. The Board approved this proposal. Anumber of contractors for different trades provided quotes which in total came to about $9,000,000. The interior work was to be carried out by Comfort Horizon Design Limited. They fell behind with their work and were replaced by Wing Sing, who in turn proved unsatisfactory and were replaced by Wah Kee. These contracts were subsequently ratified by the Board. The eventual costs of all the works was $16,385,834.49 of which approximately $12,000,000 was in respect of the original tender work and the balance in respect of additional work. The sums payable to the various contractors have been checked by independent consultants. 13.The Company says that whatever shortcomings from a corporate governance perspective may have occurred in respect of the tendering and administration for the works the documents (and the matters which I have summarised are borne out by the contemporary documents exhibited to the Company’s evidence) the fact is that works in respect to which tenders were originally called was carried out for materially less than the lowest tender and the entire works including additional works were completed for less than the lowest tender. The Company says that even if there were technical breaches of duties by the intended Defendants who were supervising the project voluntarily there is nothing to suggest that it caused any loss to the Company and indeed the Plaintiff has not identified any. It follows, the Company contends, that there is no serious question to be tried and even if arguably there has been a breach of duty the fact is that it is not in the interests of the Company to pursue it. Thereis no point in pursuing a claim merely to establish a technical breach of duty, particularly given the nature of the Company and the damage it would do to its reputation and the adverse impact it would have on those members of the Company who give their time, and in the case of the intended 1st and 2nd Defendants’ money, to assist the Company and Pui Ying community. 14.In my view neither the Plaintiff’s evidence nor Mr. Yim in his submissions to the Court provided any convincing answer to the Company’s case. The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Company’s description of what occurred is incorrect or that there is any reason to think that the way the intended Defendants managed the renovation project caused any loss to the Company. Mr. Yim suggested that it was all rather unsatisfactory and that his client and other concerned members did not know precisely what has gone on and that their concerns were understandable. If, however, the Plaintiff and others were concerned about the management of the renovation project it was open to them to pursue the normal remedies available to a concerned shareholder to obtain information about the project in order that they could consider whether action should be taken. As it is the suggestion that the intended Defendants have caused any actionable loss to the Company is simply speculation. 15.The final complaint is against the 3rd Defendant and is set out as follows in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the draft Statement of Claim:
16.The draft Statement of Claim does not tell the reader very much. In the evidence initially filed by and on behalf of the Plaintiff it is suggested that the intended 3rd Defendant has lived in a flat in the building. He should not have done so because he was a director and, in any event, heshould have paid rent for doing so as it could otherwise have been let out. 17.The Company says this is a wholly misleading description of what took place. The evidence filed by the Company explains that the flat in question was used as a site office. The intended 3rd Defendant stayed in the flat 2 or 3 times a week. He did so, he explains, because he lived in Tsuen Wan and it was convenient to do so when there were meetings the following morning. Reverend So confirms that because the flat was being used as site office there was never any question of it being let out. The intended 3rd Defendant was assisting with the renovation project on a voluntary basis, the Board was aware that he stayed on occasions overnight at the flat and there was never any question of the intended 3rd Defendant being asked to pay anything if he did so. 18.The Plaintiff has not disputed the Company’s explanation of what actually happened. Paragraph 13 of the draft Statement of Claim seems to suggest that the claim against the intended 3rd Defendant is for damages for breach of fiduciary duty, but it is difficult to see what loss was caused (assuming for present purposes that there was some breach of duty) if the Board never intended to let out the flat. If it was understood by the Board that the intended 3rd Defendant would stay there without charge because it was more convenient for him to do so if he intended to work on the project the next day I cannot see what right the Company now has to seek mesne profits. I asked Mr. Yim on what basis it was suggested that the Company was entitled to recover anything from the intended 3rdDefendant. Hewas not able to suggest an answer. 19.It seems to me that in respect of this claim the Plaintiff has not established a serious question to be tried. Even if there was some arguable claim that the intended 3rd Defendant should pay something for his occupation it seems that the sum would be so modest and any such claim looks so churlish that it would not be in the Company’s interests for the Company to pursue it. It seems to me relevant in this regard that the Company is a not for profit organisation running a School which relies to some extent on people being willing to donate time and money to helping in its operations. It is not going to be assisted by pursuing claims, which are likely to attract bad publicity and discourage people volunteering to help with its affairs. 20.I dismiss the application with costs to the Company. 21.The Company seeks in its written submission its costs on an indemnity basis. It does so for the following reasons:
22.It seems to me that the Plaintiff’s application has been poorly thought threw. It may be that the Plaintiff at the outset had genuine concerns about the way in which the project was being administered and he suspected that the intended Defendants had abrogated too much responsibility to themselves and may in some way have benefited personally from the project. There are means by which he could have investigated such concerns including an application to the court for production of documents if he felt sufficiently strongly about the matter and was prepared to incur the costs of so doing. He has not done that. He has not made any allowances for the fact that building works tend to be time consuming and complicated to deal with and the intended Defendants were giving up their time to help with the project voluntarily. He has assumed the worst although he does not have evidence to substantiate his assumptions. The claim for the removal of the intended 1st and 2ndDefendants on the grounds that they are not alumni reflects poorly on him or those who have been advising him. Even after it was explained by me that the claim was misconceived he continued to pursue it. Hiscontinued pursuit of the claim for the removal of the intended 1stDefendant on the grounds that he is not a member of a Protestant Church even after he has had the opportunity to consider the evidence of Reverend So does tend to suggest that he lacks objectivity and calls into question his motives. 23.It seems to me that it is appropriate to order that the Plaintiff pay the costs on an indemnity basis. As the Plaintiff has not, however, had the opportunity to address the Company’s argument I will make a costs order nisi in order that he has the opportunity to challenge the order if he so wishes.
Mr Foster Yim, instructed by C L Chow & Macksion Chan, for the plaintiff Mr Adrian Lai, instructed by F Zimmern & Co, for the respondent [1] Re Wing Tak Computer Embroidery Development Co Ltd (unrep) HCMP 1438/2014, 12December 2014, at §12, per Harris J; Re Li Chung Shing Tong (Holdings) Ltd [2011] 5 HKLRD 274 at §§21-26, per Harris J. [2] (2008) 11 HKCFAR 370 [3] See: Re Li Chung Shing Tong (above) at §§32-33. [4] See: Re Wing Tak Computer (above) at §15, Harris J. [5] Re Wing Tak Computer supra at §13, Harris; Re Li Chung Shing Tong supra at §§21-26, per Harris J. [6] Chu J’s judgment on costs was appealed eventually to the CFA. The CFA dismissed the appeal and held that “Chu J. exercised the discretion as to costs in accordance with principle, after taking account of considerations which were relevant to the exercise of that discretion and which indicated that the case possessed special and unusual features”: see (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114 per Li CJ at para.21 |
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