Integrated Marketing Communications Ltd and Another v. Registrar of Companies
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1962/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 September 2015.
1. This is an application to the court for the restoration of a company to the Companies Register pursuant to section 765 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622). Although there is a consent summons for disposing of the proceedings and restoring the company to the Companies Register, a point has arisen as to the proper parties to an application of this kind, in particular as to whether the company that has been struck off, deregistered or dissolved can or should be made a party to the application.
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HCMP 1962/2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1962 OF 2015 ____________
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_____________ DECISION 1.This is an application to the court for the restoration of a company to the Companies Register pursuant to section 765 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622). Although there is a consent summons for disposing of the proceedings and restoring the company to the Companies Register, a point has arisen as to the proper parties to an application of this kind, in particular as to whether the company that has been struck off, deregistered or dissolved can or should be made a party to the application. Since the issue has arisen in a number of cases recently and because there seems to be some confusion among practitioners over what the correct practice is, I have decided to publish my reasons in this case in the hope that they will provide some guidance to the profession. 2.Section 765 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) provides for a single streamlined procedure for the restoration of a company to the Companies Register. It replaces the procedure for restoring a struck off company under section 291 of the previous Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) and the procedure for reinstatement of a deregistered company under section 291AB of the same Ordinance. 3.Section 291(7) of the previous Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) provided as follows:
4.It can be seen that this sub-section expressly provided that notwithstanding a company had been struck off (and consequently dissolved under section 291(3), (5) or (6)), the application for restoration could be made by the company itself as well as by a member or creditor of the company. Section 291 was derived from section 295 of the (UK) Companies Act 1929 which later became section 353 of the (UK) Companies Act 1948. Section 291(7) of the previous Companies Ordinance was in terms similar to section 353(6) of the Companies Act 1948. It is stated in Buckley on the Companies Acts (14th ed), vol 1, p 807 in relation to that provision that:
See also In re Test Holdings (Clifton) Ltd [1970] Ch 285, 289E. In Re New Timbiqui Gold Mines Ltd [1961] Ch 319, 325, Buckley J also said in relation to this provision that it was
Likewise, in Tyman Ld v Craven [1952] 2 QB 100, 112, Evershed MR expressed the view:
It was nevertheless the practice under the English section, where a company had been struck off for failure to make annual returns, for the company to be joined as applicant to give undertakings to bring the returns up to date: Re Walter Wright Ltd [1923] WN 128. 5.Section 291AB(2) of the previous Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) was, however, differently worded in this respect. It provided:
This sub-section did not provide that a company which had been deregistered under section 291AA (and consequently dissolved upon deregistration pursuant to section 291AA(11)) could itself make an application for reinstatement. 6.In Re Skychain Investment Ltd (unreported HCMP 6506/2000, 1 February 2001), Chung J declined to make an order for reinstatement under section 291AB(2) where the deregistered company was the applicant, doubting that a company which had already been deregistered and therefore dissolved could properly be the applicant in such an application. 7.With respect, I think that must be right. As a matter of general principle, a company that is dissolved has ceased to exist as a legal entity. In the absence of express statutory provision such as found in section 291(7) of Cap 32 before its repeal, a dissolved company is not normally in a position either to sue or be sued or indeed to do any other legal act. 8.Both of the above procedures have, as I have already stated, been replaced now by section 765 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622). That section provides as follows:
9.As can be seen, the section is divided into 3 parts.
10.It can be seen that in this uniform procedure for restoration, none of the provisions specify that a dissolved company, irrespective of whether the dissolution was a result of being struck off or deregistered under the previous Companies Ordinance or the new Companies Ordinance, may make the application. The anomaly found in section 291(7) of Cap 32 has not been reproduced in Cap 622. As a matter of general principle, such a company cannot, in my view, be a party to the application. In this respect, I agree with the statement in Butterworths Hong Kong Company Law Handbook (16th edition), page 1247 concerning section 765 that:
11.In the present case, notwithstanding that the company in question had been deregistered and dissolved upon deregistration pursuant to section 751 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622), it has been named the 1st applicant in these proceedings. In this regard, the solicitors for the applicants may have been misled by the commentary in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015, para 102/2/58, which appears to suggest that in an application under section 765 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622), the company should be joined as a co-applicant or be made a respondent. In my view, that suggestion is contrary to principle and should not be followed. 12.In the present case, subject to striking out the company in question as the 1st applicant in these proceedings, I am prepared to make an order on the basis of the consent summons and there will be an order accordingly.
Messrs Bennett Chan & Co, for the applicants The respondent is not represented |
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