Mill-pro (Hong Kong) Ltd (Formerly Known As Dash Solutions Ltd) v. Pollard-cncec Joint Venture
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 2240/2015 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 18 January 2016.
1. This is the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons issued on 7 September 2015 for summary judgment against the defendant under Order 14 of the Rules of the District Court. The defendant opposes this application.
Cites 3 cases
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DCCJ2240/2015 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 2240 OF 2015 --------------------
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--------------------- DECISION --------------------- 1.This is the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons issued on 7 September 2015 for summary judgment against the defendant under Order 14 of the Rules of the District Court. The defendant opposes this application. The Plaintiff’s Claim 2.The plaintiff claims against the defendant, a joint venture, for outstanding payment of goods sold and delivered to the defendant. 3.Between 9 September 2013 and 22 July 2014, the defendant issued to the plaintiff 14 purchase orders (“the Purchase Orders”) to buy materials and supplies of water system (“the Goods”) for a total price of HK$2,962,703.98 (“the Total Price”). 4.The plaintiff delivered the Goods to the defendant pursuant to the Purchase Orders. 5.The plaintiff issued to the defendant 36 invoices (“the Invoices”) for the Total Price for the Goods delivered. 6.The defendant made payments totaling HK$2,494,927.30, leaving an outstanding amount of HK$467,776.68 unpaid despite repeated demands and requests from the plaintiff. 7.The plaintiff claims against the defendant herein the outstanding amount of HK$467,776.68. 8.The plaintiff has adduced documentary evidence and affirmation evidence from its Sales Manager Hui Lok Leung Avery (“Hui”) as follow:-
The Defence 9.The defendant’s pleaded defence is that it had never entered into any contract for purchase of the Goods with the plaintiff nor had it authorized anyone to do so. It denies that it ever settled any payment of the Invoices. 10.In opposing this application for summary judgment, the defendant has adduced an Affirmation filed on 18 November 2015 from Tso Hung Chuen (“Tso”) who states the following:-
11.Defence counsel submitted in court that the provision of the IIB Test Reports is a condition precedent of the sale and purchase agreement as evidenced in the Purchase Order. In the event that the Purchase Orders are held to be binding on the defendant, the defendant is still entitled to withhold payment of the outstanding sums, ie the subject matter of the claim herein, due to non-provision of the IIB Test Reports. This is the defendant’s fall-back position. 12.This alternative position or defence is not pleaded in the Defence. 13.It is noted that some, but not all, of the Purchase Orders contain the term of payment of “30 Days after materials and IIB report delivered”. The Law: Order 14 summary judgment 14.The legal principle on Order 14 summary judgment is trite. The underlying policy of the summary procedure is to prevent a defendant from delaying the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in case in which the defendant clearly has no defence to the plaintiff's claim: Man Earn Ltd v Wing Ting Fong [1996] 1 HKC 225. It enables plaintiffs in those cases to obtain expeditious summary judgment to avoid unnecessary delay. 15.Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the defendant, both procedurally and substantively, the burden will be on the defendant to satisfy the court that there is a triable issue and summary judgment should not be granted against him. See §14/4/1 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2016. 16.In Ng Shou Chun v Hung Chun San [1994] 1 HKC 155, Godfrey J noted it was not appropriate to embark on a mini-trial of the action on affidavit evidence. The court should ask itself the question whether what the defendant says is credible or believable. If so, he must have leave to defend; if not, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. Discussion 17.There is no evidence in support of the defendant’s allegation of lack of authority of Tai in dealing with the plaintiff and procuring the contract as evidenced by the Purchase Orders. There is no documentary evidence of eg any internal memo or mandate to demonstrate that Tai, in his capacity as the Assistant Project Manager of the defendant, had no authority or otherwise exceeded his authority in procuring or issuing the Purchase Orders. 18.The Authority Letter, issued by the defendant to the Consultant, relates to omitted items and variation orders in construction works. It does not have the effect of restricting the authority of the Assistant Project Manager in procuring or entering into the sale and purchase agreement with the plaintiff. It post-dates almost all of the Purchase Orders (issued between September 2013 and July 2014). 19.In any event, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on Turquand’s rule, also known as the indoor management rule, referred to and formulated by the Court of Appeal in Grand Trade Development Ltd v Bonance International Ltd [2001] 2 HKLRD 759 (per Le Pichon JA) as follows:-
20.The Purchase Orders are all under the defendant’s letterhead, bear its address, impressed with the company chop and signed. 21.In 11 out of the 14 Purchase Orders, Louis Chui, the defendant’s Site Engineer, is stated to be one of the two contact persons for delivery. 22.The Goods were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant’s sites (of which it was the main contractor) or collected by the defendant’s staff during the period from 30 October 2013 to 30 September 2014 per the dates of the delivery notes. 23.The delivery notes, evidencing receipt of delivery of the goods purchased, are impressed with the defendant’s company chop and signed. 24.10 payments were received by the plaintiff, amounting to a main bulk or about 84% of the Total Price, pursuant to receipt of delivery of the Goods. 25.The course of dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant was not a one-off transaction but lasted many months. 26.There is no dispute that the defendant had used the Goods delivered to it by the plaintiff to make MOS claims and had received payments from the Consultant. 27.The fact that a few of the Purchase Orders and delivery notes were not signed and/or stamped with the defendant’s company chop should not vitiate the apparent authority that Tai had in procuring the sale and purchase, or put the plaintiff on enquiry as to the validity of or the identity of the person issuing the Purchase Orders against the background of a continuous course of dealings of delivery of the goods contracted for, receipt of delivery by the defendant, and payments received on the Purchase Orders over many months. The evidence shows that goods were delivered to the defendant and payments were received by the plaintiff in respect of some of the Purchase Orders even though they are not signed and/or stamped with the defendant’s company chop. 28.The one cheque drawn by Kintech in payment of some of the Invoices, against the evidence of the Purchase Orders and delivery and acceptance of the Goods at the defendant’s sites or by collection of its staff, should not in my view raise the suspicion or put the plaintiff on enquiry that it was Kintech but not the defendant who contracted with the plaintiff and placed the Purchase Orders. A businessman would normally be concerned whether due payment is received but not who makes the payment. 29.It makes no difference that Kintech had the same registered office as the defendant as subsequently revealed in these proceedings. 30.The argument that the defendant did not make any contract with the plaintiff was first raised in a letter dated 4 February 2015 from the defendant’s legal representatives after the plaintiff had chased the defendant for payment for many months, not even when Hui upon the invitation of the defendant attended the defendant’s site to discuss the outstanding payment matters in October 2014. 31.The defendant relies on the previous dealings between Pollard and Hui (when he was previously working for another company Tyco in his capacity as the Senior Sales Engineer) to argue that Hui should know that (i) Tai did not have the authority of the defendant to procure or issue the Purchase Orders; and (ii) the Purchase Orders were not made in accordance with the defendant’s usual practice. 32.There is no substance in this argument when the alleged previous dealings did not involve the plaintiff nor the defendant, but another company Tyco and Pollard the joint venture partner of the defendant. 33.The defendant’s argument that it is entitled to withhold payments on the ground of non-provision of the IIB Test Reports is dubious. The requirement of delivery of IIB Test Report is only stated in some, but not all of the Purchase Orders. There is no evidence that the defendant has ever made a request for the IIB Test Reports, or raised the argument of non-provision of the IIB Test Reports as a ground for non-payment when the plaintiff chased for payment for many months. This argument relating to the IIB Test Reports was first raised in the defendant’s affirmation evidence adduced in this action. The plaintiff’s position as set out in Hui’s affirmation evidence is that all the IIB Test Reports have been obtained and would be ready to be released to the defendant upon payment of the outstanding sums. 34.There is no evidence to demonstrate that Tai did in fact lack the authority to enter into the sale and purchase contract with the plaintiff evidenced by the Purchase Orders. 35.The defendant’s conduct of putting Tai in his position as the Assistant Project Manager and permitting him to act the way he did, together with receiving the Goods delivered, making partial payments and taking advantage of payments for the MOS claims for the Goods from the Consultant over a long period of more than 10 months, constitutes a representation that Tai was authorised to do the acts that he purported to do in the ordinary course of business. (See Thanakhran Kasikorn Thai Camkat (Manhachon) v Akai Holdings Ltd (No 2) (2010) 13 HKCFAR 497, p 504 (per Lord Neuberger NPG)) 36.Further, relying on the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority, the defendant would be bound by the contract procured by Tai as evidenced by the Purchase Orders and become liable to perform the contract including making payments as provided. (See Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd & Anor [1964] 2 QB 480, p 503 (per Lord Diplock)). 37.The doctrine still applies if the agent effects a forgery (as alleged by the defendant of Tai in the present case), if he does so in the course of an act within his apparent authority: Chitty on Contracts (Hong Kong Specific Contracts) (Fourth Ed) para 1-52. 38.Considering the entirety of the pleadings and affirmation evidence, I cannot accept the defendant’s proposition that it did not enter into the agreement with the plaintiff as evidenced by the Purchase Orders, or that the plaintiff was contracting with another company Kintech. What the defendant says is not credible or believable. I am not satisfied that the defendant has raised any triable issue or arguable defence. Conclusion 39.I therefore grant summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of HK$467,776.68 together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% pa from the date of the writ to the date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment. 40.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I make a costs order nisi that the defendant do pay the plaintiff costs of the summary judgment application, with certificate for counsel, and of the action (including all costs reserved, if any) to be taxed if not agreed. 41.I thank counsel for their assistance.
Mr Robin D’Souza, instructed by Tam, Pun & Yipp, for the plaintiff Mr Anthony PW Cheung, instructed by Benjamin Au & Billy Chan, for defendant |
Cases cited in this judgment