Akihiro Oba and Others v. Kishimoto Sangyo Co. Ltd. and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 211/1995 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 12 April 1996.
1. This is an appeal by the defendants in an action tried by Barnett J in June, July and August 1995. By his judgment dated 6 September 1995 Barnett J gave judgment for the plaintiffs, in terms which will need close analysis later on.
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CACV000211/1995 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1995, No. 211 Headnote Contractual duties of employees and fiduciary duties of directors of companies - Breach of duties of fidelity resulting in nominal damages - Whether breach of fiduciary duties led to equitable remedies - Concept of diversion of maturing business opportunity in Canadian Aero Service v. O'Malley [1973]40 DLR (3rd) 371 is one aspect of the wider principle of equity stated in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967]2 AC 134. Held (Court of Appeal) reversing the trial judge: Breach of contractual duties sounded in nominal damages only. Diversion of business opportunity requiring the intervention of equity not established on the judge's findings of fact. Appeal allowed. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1995, No. 211
------------------- Coram: Hon. Litton, V.-P., Godfrey and Ching, JJ.A. Date of hearing: 19, 20, 21, 22 and 26 March 1996 Date of handing down of judgment: 12 April 1996 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Litton, V.-P.: Introduction 1. This is an appeal by the defendants in an action tried by Barnett J in June, July and August 1995. By his judgment dated 6 September 1995 Barnett J gave judgment for the plaintiffs, in terms which will need close analysis later on. 2. The 1st Plaintiff (Kishimoto Japan) is a large Japanese trading corporation. The 2nd Plaintiff (Kishimoto HK) is a subsidiary of Kishimoto Japan. From 1991, when he was seconded from Japan to Hong Kong, the 1st Defendant (Mr Oba) was managing director of Kishimoto HK, for the purposes of developing the overseas trade of Kishimoto Japan. He remained at the same time a senior manager of Kishimoto Japan. His principal function was to develop Kishimoto's business in the region, and this included the emerging liquid crystal display (LCD) market. This product, known more precisely as TFT-LCD (thin film transistor - liquid crystal display) is the display component found in colour computer notebooks and products of this kind. Essentially, it is the screen on which the images are displayed. It consists of two pieces of glass with a minute gap in-between (measuring 0.3 microns) which is filled with liquid crystal. On one of the pieces of glass there is implanted a micro printed-circuit, the other piece of glass being a colour filter. When the printed circuit is energised, the liquid crystal refracts light and this forms the basis of a high resolution colour screen. Technically, this unit is known as a "cell assembly process" and it was the obtaining of contracts for the supply of equipment to mass produce these screens which provided the focus of this case. 3. In brief outline, the events leading up to this litigation is as follows:
4. It is the plaintiffs' case (put at its simplest) that but for Mr Oba's activities Kishimoto would have got, or had a good chance of getting, a significant number of contracts for the Prime View mass-production project; Mr Oba "wooed" the team of manufacturers who had supplied equipment for the pilot plant (ING, Nakan and SPC) and "deliberately cultivated" Mr S.N. Lee the president of Prime View, with the result that Kishimoto lost the chance of getting those contracts. The proceedings 5. After their solicitors had on 6th October 1994 warned Mr Oba of possible breaches of covenant and after a short exchange of letters, Kishimoto issued a writ against the Defendants on 12th January 1995. BOIS was, at that time, on the verge of securing a contract for the supply to Prime View of a piece of machinery manufactured by Nakan. In response to a summons seeking interlocutory injunctions, the Defendants gave undertakings not to involve themselves in the production project. It was agreed that there should be a speedy trial. 6. By their statement of claim, Kishimoto pleaded against Mr Oba: breach of his duty of fidelity as an employee; breach of his fiduciary duty as a director of Kishimoto HK and as a senior manager of Kishimoto Japan; breach of an express agreement made on 31st October 1993 not to use secret or confidential information; and breach of confidence and fiduciary duty after he left Kishimoto by using and disclosing knowledge relating to Kishimoto's dealings with Prime View. 7. Against Mr Leung, Kishimoto also pleaded breach of duty of fidelity; breach of fiduciary duty; and breach of confidence and fiduciary duty after leaving Kishimoto. 8. Against both Mr Oba and Mr Leung, Kishimoto pleaded that each induced caused or procured the other to act in breach of his duties. 9. Against BOIS, Kishimoto pleaded that it induced, caused or procured Mr Oba and Mr Leung to act in breach of their duties. The alleged "diversion" of a "maturing business opportunity" 10. As the judge puts it: "although various individual breaches of duty have been pleaded, in combination they constitute Kishimoto's real complaint, which is that Mr Oba diverted or tried to divert to himself or BOIS what has been called a 'maturing business opportunity', that is the production project. Kishimoto also claims that Mr Oba misused confidential information. This claim is in reality part of the main complaint, but is capable of independent life if the main complaint fails". 11. I have underlined the words "or tried" in the judgment quoted above because, as I see it, there is a real difference between a case, such as Canadian Aero Service v. O'Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3rd) 371, upon which the judge heavily relied, where the defendants obtained for themselves a profitable contract by the misuse of their positions as senior officers of the plaintiff, and a case such as this where the focus of the evidence was simply upon an embryonic business project: There was no profitable contract to which the "activities" complained of could have been directed; Mr Oba was not negotiating on the plaintiffs' behalf any contract for the mass-production plant at the time he left the company; no contract as such appeared over the horizon for nearly a year. 12. As the judge rightly said:
13. If a director has profited from a misuse of his position as a director, in breach of his fiduciary duty, he is liable to account to the company for that profit, irrespective of whether the company has been damaged or not: see Lord Russell of Killower in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver at 140-141: Though the court could, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, order payment to be made to the director for his work and skill in obtaining that profit: see Phipps v. Broadman [1967] 2 AC 46 at 104-E and 112D. 14. In Canadian Aero Service v. O'Malley senior officers of the plaintiff had undertaken much preparatory work for an aerial survey of Guyana, a project to be funded by the Canadian government. At a time when "it was felt the job was a certainty for Canaero" the officers resigned. Through their own company they got the contract. The amount tendered for the project, $2.3 million, was exactly the same as that in a proposal prepared by one of the defendants for Canaero. In giving judgment for the plaintiff the Supreme Court of Canada (delivered by Laskin J) said:
15. Although judgment was entered for the plaintiff in Canaero for "damages" (more accurately equitable compensation), the juridical basis for relief was that equity would not allow a fiduciary to profit from his own wrong. This is to be contrasted with the present case where Mr Oba had made no profit by the alleged diversion of business opportunity and therefore the equitable reliefs of an accounting of profits or "unjust enrichment" to which Laskin J referred in Canaero were not available. The formal judgment 16. Barnett J gave judgment in favour of the plaintiffs on 6 September 1995. The formal order is expressed thus:
17. The reason why judgment was given in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 is because, in the second week of the trial, and after some of the plaintiffs' witnesses had given evidence and been cross-examined, there was an application to split the trial, with "liability" only to be determined by the judge, any 'inquiry as to damages' to be separately assessed at a later stage. This was objected to by counsel for the defendants, unsuccessfully. 18. Para 1 of the order contains an obvious clerical error. Where the order refers to "50% impairment of the First Defendant's chance of obtaining contracts", the judge must obviously have meant the 1st Plaintiff. Read thus, the order is still very odd. On the evidence, Prime View eventually entered into 14 contracts for equipment. The judge, however, made no findings as to how many of those contracts the 1st Plaintiff had a chance of obtaining, nor whether the chances were uniform as to them all. In fact, the 1st Plaintiff had been asked by Prime View to tender for 12 of the 14 contracts; it chose to tender for only two and got two: one for Ayumi Kogyo Co. Ltd. to supply an LC filling machine and one for Yodogawa to supply a cassette handling machine. The "lost chance" could therefore only have related to 12 contracts. How the assessment would proceed according to the judge's order is difficult to imagine. 19. Mr Thomas QC says this: On the assessment of damages, an expert can proceed on the assumption that the plaintiff would, but for the activities of the 1st Defendant, have obtained all 14 contracts. I cannot see how such an assumption can be made. Whilst the ascertainment of profits (if any) to be derived from a contract or a series of contracts is properly a matter for experts, the finding as to the chance or chances of getting any of the contracts and the percentage of such chance or chances in each case, are matters for the judge. 20. There are many cases in the books where company directors and similar fiduciaries have been made to account for profits they have made by the misuse of their positions. Industrial Development v. Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443 was cited as an example. In Pacifica Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Andersen [1986] 2 NZLR 328 the equitable relief of injunction was ordered. Those are clear-cut cases. 21. Here Barnett J ordered, on 6 September 1995, that an injunction be granted restraining the defendants from soliciting or entering into contracts with Prime View for the supply of equipment for the manufacture of TFT-LCDs at its mass-production plant - at a time when, on the evidence, all the contracts for the cell-assembly process had long since been let. The need for the injunction is obscure. Injunction is an equitable remedy. Equity never acts in vain. The judge made no finding that the defendants had profited from any misuse of Mr Oba's position. He made no finding that Mr Oba had misused any confidential information derived from his fiduciary office (hence the Respondent's Notice to the effect that the judge ought to have so held). He made no finding that the plaintiffs had suffered substantial damage either directly or foreseeably as a result of the defendants' acts: yet he made an order for the assessment of damages which left questions of causation and proximity wholly in the air. When the result is as curious as this, it calls for the most anxious consideration by this court of the foundation of liability. The facts 22. The evidence accepted by the judge amounted to this:
The judge's conclusions 23. The judge's broad conclusion is as follows:
24. The judge rejected Mr Oba's evidence to the effect that he had no intention of forming his own trading company until after the various meetings he had with suppliers in September 1993: Mr Oba's intention, the judge found, was formed as early as July. The judge said:
The "real issue" 25. Earlier, the judge had said that the "real issue" in the case was what was Mr Oba's true intention between June 1993 and January 1994. Having found in effect against Mr Oba on this point, it is not surprising that Barnett J gave judgment against him. 26. Mr Thomas QC, counsel for Kishimoto, concedes that the judge's focus on Mr Oba's "true intention between June 1993 and January 1994" as defining the "real issue" in the case was too narrow: A better formulation of the issue is the judge's earlier statement (p3 of his judgment) when he said:
"Maturing business opportunity" 27. The problem here is that at the time when Mr Oba severed his relationship with Kishimoto, at the end of October 1993, the production project, as a business opportunity, was at best prospective. The machinery for the pilot plant had not yet been delivered to Prime View; it was not set up until December 1993; there was no certainty that even if the pilot plant proved successful, Prime View would necessarily proceed to establish the mass production plant. The site for the plant had not yet been acquired. And even if Prime View should decide to go ahead with setting up the production plant - an investment of some ¥12 billion, with the production line budgeted at ¥8 billion, of which the cell-assembly was a substantial component - there was no certainty that Prime View would necessarily have dealt with the manufacturers and suppliers through a trading company - the judge, at p37 of his judgment, noted that the trading company played a "lesser role in setting up an automatic production line". As a matter of common-sense, the added cost to Prime View of using a trading company as "middleman" would only be justified if the trading company could render a real service. And even if a trading company was going to be employed, there was no certainty that the "team" of manufacturers who had supplied the bulk of the pilot plant (ING, Nakan and SPC) would be selected for the production line: though, as a matter of common-sense, they would have an advantage over other bidders, having set up the successful pilot plant. In the end 16 vendors representing 24 machine-makers approached Prime View for contracts. There was evidence before the judge, adduced through hearsay notices, to the effect that Prime View looked at many different vendors for each of the numerous contracts and asked for proposals and costings. Kishimoto, as mentioned earlier, were also asked to put forward proposals. Dr Hu Dyi Chung, senior director of Prime View, said:
28. Nothing before the judge contradicted this statement. 29. As regards the suppliers, Mr Iinuma was, of course, a one-third share-holder in BOIS, but there was no evidence that any other manufacturers - in particular SPC and Nakan - had any relationship with Mr Oba other than an arm's length professional one. SPC, which made the cleaning equipment, is a publicly-listed company in Japan. Odajima's evidence, apparently accepted by the judge, was to the effect that whilst he had great respect for Mr Oba, he was "not particularly impressed" by Kishimoto. Odajima was president of Nakan. 30. As regards Iinuma the judge said (p10 judgment):
31. This is in effect a direct refutation of any suggestion that Mr Iinuma had become the "property" of BOIS (his one-third shareholding notwithstanding). And as regards Mr Oba's own skill and ability as a marketing man, compared with Kishimoto's lack thereof after his departure, the judge accepted Mr Iinuma's evidence to this effect (p29 judgment):
Alleged breaches by Mr Oba 32. In these circumstances, a number of broad questions arise:
Remedies in common law and equity 33. Breach of the duty of fidelity results in the common law remedy of damages; breach of fiduciary duties calls for remedies in equity. Although, since the Judicature Act of 1873, the streams of common law and equity have merged, there are essential differences in remedies which must be recognised. Breach of duty of fidelity 34. The duty of fidelity arises by implication from the contract of employment. For breach of this duty damages are recoverable at common law. Where the defendant is liable for a breach of contract, the plaintiff is in general entitled to nominal damages although no actual damage is proved: see Chitty on Contracts (General Principles) 27ed. para 26-004. 35. The law in this regard is reasonably clear: An employee is bound by his implied duty of fidelity and good faith to his employer (i) not to use or disclose during his employment confidential information gained in the course of his employment and (ii) not to use or disclose either during his employment or thereafter information which is not merely confidential but can properly be regarded as trade secrets: see Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler [1987] 1 Ch. 117. 36. The judge, correctly on the facts, made no finding against Mr Oba in regard to any use or misuse of confidential information or trade secrets. Outside of such specific instances of breach of the duty of fidelity and good faith by an employee, the matter becomes somewhat nebulous. 37. The judge's finding is as follows:
38. As can be seen, paras (vii) and (viii) are not independent breaches, and the matter boils down to two specific instances of breach: acquiring BOIS during the period of employment with a view to competing with the plaintiffs and lying about his future intentions. Had Mr Oba acted properly Kishimoto could have taken steps to isolate him from dealing with Prime View and "the team". 39. Assuming that these matters do amount to breaches of the duty of fidelity, can they result in more than nominal damages? 40. The situation here is rather similar to that which faced the British Columbia Court of Appeal in State Vacuum Stores v. Phillips [1954]3 DLR 621 where top executives of a company made secret plans during their employment to set up a competing company and approached salesmen of their employer to join the new company at higher commissions. No substantial damages were shown to have resulted. The British Columbia court held (by a majority) that the proper result was to give judgment for the employer with nominal damages of Can. $100. 41. In my judgment, this would be the proper result in the present case. It is no answer for the plaintiffs to say: "But we have not led any evidence as to damage because of the split trial". The plaintiffs have not pleaded that they suffered any special damage in their statement of claim: Hence they are not be entitled to lead any evidence in that regard: see Chitty on Contracts (General Principles) 27ed. para 26-002. Moreover, Barnett J did not in fact order any assessment of damages arising from the two breaches of duty: These two breaches, occurring during the employment, cannot on any view of the case have resulted in any impairment of the plaintiffs' chance of obtaining contracts for the production line: the focus of para 1 of the judge's order. Breach of fiduciary duty 42. Breach of fiduciary duty imports wider considerations. Equitable relief for such breach is founded on the concept developed in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver that a director cannot profit from his position as director without full and adequate disclosures, and a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The facts found by the Judge can be summarised thus: Apart from acquiring BOIS, during the currency of his employment in October 1993 with a view to competing with the plaintiffs and concealing his intentions, (which also constituted breaches of the duty of fidelity and good faith as an employee), the judge also found that Mr Oba was "deliberately cultivating" Mr S.N. Lee of Prime View and "wooing" the team to "give himself a head start in the bidding". These matters occurred both during his employment and afterwards; taken in the round they constituted the "diversion of business opportunity" for which an "inquiry into damages" was ordered. "Absent Mr Oba's activities" said the judge at p38, "I see no reason why the team, of whom Mr Iinuma was plainly the leader, would not have co-operated with Kishimoto". The judge determined that Kishimoto had a chance of "getting substantial business" and the chance was impaired to the extent of 50%. 43. With respect to the judge, it seems to me that this approach is fundamentally flawed. 44. In considering breaches of fiduciary duty, for which equity gives relief in certain circumstances, the remedy is inseparable from the acts which give rise to the relief. 45. In an earlier part of his judgment (p35) the judge said that he was initially attracted to Mr Stone's argument that the production project called for a fresh initiative on the part of Mr Oba by the use of his own skill and knowledge, since the project involved a distinct series of contracts for the supply of equipment. 46. These contracts were nowhere in sight when Mr Oba left the company at the end of October 1993: all that existed at that time were the contracts for the pilot plant which, as everyone had hoped, might lead to substantial contracts for the production line later on. There were no contracts on which equitable relief could bite. Can the mere prospect of future business come within the concept of a "maturing business opportunity", as formulated in Canaero? In my judgment the answer must be No. 47. In Canaero itself, the foundation of liability was the Guyana aerial survey contract - worth Can $2.3 million - diverted to the defendants' own company. From a purely jurisdictional point of view, it may be that the Canaero concept is not confined to a situation where the "business opportunity" has matured to the stage when a specific contract can be identified, and can be stretched to cover situations where there is no specific contract in existence. An account of profits is not the only remedy in equity. The court can award "damages" for breach of fiduciary duties: Section 17 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (which in effect enacts the provisions of Lord Cairns' Act 1858 in Hong Kong) says:
Causation and remoteness 48. But equitable damages, no less than common law damages, require evaluation by the trial judge of the fundamental issues of causation and remoteness - and, as with other forms of equitable relief, requires the exercise of a judicial discretion. 49. Plainly, on the judge's findings of fact, a principal reason why Kishimoto failed to secure contracts to supply key pieces of machinery to Prime View (except for two) was the absence of Mr Oba from Kishimoto. The suppliers and Prime View had confidence in his skill and expertise. The exploitation of such skill and expertise for his own profit cannot constitute breach of fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs, after the termination of his employment, unless it was, in the language of Canaero at p391 "in the heat of the maturation of the project". And if it were so, the profit for which Mr Oba is in equity bound to account to the plaintiffs - or the loss for which Mr Oba would be bound to compensate the plaintiffs - would be readily apparent. These would be proximate. They would need no such "inquiry" as the judge has ordered in the present case. 50. The "inquiry" as ordered by the judge - to ascertain the chance or chances of the plaintiffs getting all 14 contracts, or some of the 14 - is intrinsically an impossible exercise. How is a court to assess the effect of Mr Oba "wooing" the suppliers and "cultivating" Mr S.N. Lee? What inequitable conduct is comprised in the concept of "wooing" and "cultivating"? 51. A man is entitled to use his own accumulated knowledge skill and experience for his own profit. He is equally entitled to cultivate his own commercial relationships, with suppliers customers and anyone else, without attracting the disapproval of equity. 52. A substantial element of what happened here is surely this: Without Mr Oba, the plaintiffs lacked the necessary skill and expertise to develop the TFT-LCD business: one which was, in 1993-4, at the frontier of new technology. They did not have their own specialist until August 1994 and by that time it was too late. 53. In my judgment, what the plaintiffs signally failed to show at the trial was any causal link between the acts complained of and the loss they allegedly suffered: They avoided the issue by persuading the judge to "split" the trial. 54. If they had been able to show by evidence that, as a result of Mr Oba's "activities", they had suffered substantial damage on, say, one contract, then conceivably it might have been justifiable for the judge to order that the damages be assessed by a Master under Order 37 r1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The profits from that contract would be ascertainable - by the use of expert witnesses if necessary. But this is not what the judge ordered in this case. The 2nd defendant 55. The formal order as drawn up directs that damages be assessed for breach of Mr Leung's "fiduciary duties". There was no finding that Mr Leung owed fiduciary duties. 56. The judge's finding is as follows:
57. The judge made no finding that, in consequence of these breaches, the plaintiffs has suffered substantial damage. On the evidence none was incurred. 58. The proper order in the circumstances is to make an award of nominal damages. The injunction 59. As indicated earlier, the events giving rise to the necessity for an injunction, by September 1995, were long spent. Conclusion 60. I would discharge the judge's order of 6 September 1995 altogether, and likewise his order relating to costs dated 12 January 1996, and order as follows:
61. We should hear counsel further on the question of costs, both in this court and below. Godfrey, J.A. : 62. I agree with Litton, V.P. that the order made below should be set aside, and the order which he proposes substituted for it. 63. I also agree with his conclusions and with the route by which he reaches them, though subject to one reservation which does not affect the result. 64. I would not, for myself, relate the jurisdiction of the court, in cases of breach of fiduciary duty, to award equitable compensation to be paid by the wrongdoer to the wronged, to the provisions of section 17 of the Supreme Court Ordinance, as Litton, V.P. does. This legislative provision is derived, as he notes, from Lord Cairns' Act, 1858. This Act enabled the court of equity to award "damages" (something it could not previously do) where the plaintiff could make out a case for specific performance, or for an injunction, but where these discretionary remedies were inappropriate or inadequate. In such cases the Act added "damages" to the armoury of weapons of the court of equity to enable it to do complete justice. The court's jurisdiction to award compensation for a breach of fiduciary duty is independent of its jurisdiction to award specific performance or an injunction; it is, rather, akin to its jurisdiction to award compensation for a breach of trust. But, in the present case, nothing turns on the point. Ching, J.A.: 65. Subject to the qualification in the judgment of Godfrey, J.A., I am in agreement with the judgment and the order proposed by Litton, V.P.
Representation: Mr William Stone, Q.C. (M/S Deacons Graham & James) for 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/1st, 2nd & 3rd Appellants Mr Michael Thomas, QC and Mr Godfrey Lam (M/S Lovell White Durrant) for 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs/1st and 2nd Respondents |
Cases cited in this judgment