香港特別行政區 訴 許智峯
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 693/2015 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 16 December 2016.
1. 上訴人原本被控兩項「普通襲擊」罪，違反普通法並可根據香港法例第212 章《侵害人身罪條例》第40 條予以懲處。上訴人否認控罪，經審訊後被東區裁判法院裁判官黃士翔裁定兩項控罪罪名不成立。控方其後申請覆核。裁判官維持原判，但向上訴人頒下簽保令，以 $ 1,000自簽守行為12 個月。上訴人不服判令，提出上訴。
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HCMA 693/2015 香港特別行政區 高等法院原訟法庭 刑事上訴司法管轄權 判令上訴 案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2015年第693號 (原東區裁判法院刑事案件2014年第4099號) ______________________
判 案 理 由 書 1.上訴人原本被控兩項「普通襲擊」罪，違反普通法並可根據香港法例第212 章《侵害人身罪條例》第40 條予以懲處。上訴人否認控罪，經審訊後被東區裁判法院裁判官黃士翔裁定兩項控罪罪名不成立。控方其後申請覆核。裁判官維持原判，但向上訴人頒下簽保令，以 $ 1,000自簽守行為12 個月。上訴人不服判令，提出上訴。 2.本席在聆訊後判令上訴得直，撤銷簽保令。以下是本席的理由。 案情 3.答辯人代表高級檢控官黃俊賢在其書面陳詞扼要道出本案案情及裁判官裁定上訴人罪名不成立的原因，本席沿用如下：
4.就裁判官為何頒下簽保令的原因可見於其裁斷陳述書：
上訴理由 5.上訴人代表大律師原本提出多項上訴理由，但本席經考慮後，認為祇須處理下列兩項理由：
上訴理由(一) 6.此上訴理由基本上是針對裁判官的用辭。 7.劉惠和 訂下的原則如下(第47 段)：
8.裁判官在口頭裁斷及裁斷理由書就 劉惠和 訂下的原則卻說：
9.裁判官採用的字眼與 劉惠和 不盡相同，但考慮了裁判官與律師以下的對話(上訴文件第165 頁J-L 行)：
看來裁判官的用詞雖與案例不盡相同，但他並無錯誤理解案例列出的原則。 10.此上訴理由不成立。雖則如此，本席仍希望裁判官以後在用辭方面留心一點，避免不必要的誤會。 上訴理由(二) 11.簽保守行為是一「預防式」(precaution)的做法。 12.終審法院常任法官李義在 HKSAR v Chow Nok Hang [1](周諾恆)如此說：
14.根據裁判官的裁定，上訴人並無使用武力。裁判官在回應控方指上訴人對保安員使用武力，他的回應是若是如此，他的判決便不會是無罪釋放。[3] 15.上訴人亦無向保安員威脅使用武力，裁判官須考慮的是包括「有理由令人恐怕有暴力行為出現」。雖然保安員主觀上很可能認為他們有理由相信上訴人會有暴力行為，但無證據顯示上訴人將會有暴力行為出現。上訴人將情況告知裁判官，但裁判官認為不須考慮(上訴文件第169 頁E-Q 行)：
16.雖然裁判官提及「唔會因為關於你嘅聲譽與否，而作出任何影響」，但看上文下理，裁判官是指他不會考慮上訴人會否再次前往有關秘書處時會威脅到該處的保安。 17.本席此看法亦有裁判官的裁斷陳述書支持：
18.裁判官是指他祇考慮案件發生時是否有人恐怕有暴力發生，不須考慮是否將會發生。 19.上訴人無刑事紀錄，更無暴力行為前科，以本案的情況而言，裁判官不應單憑一次的事件(尤其是經審訊後他裁定上訴人罪名不成立的案件)，在無證據、無前科顯示上訴人將會對他人或財產施以暴力、或威脅施以暴力、或將會作出行為令他人有理由恐怕此等暴力將會出現的情況下，要上訴人簽保。 20.基於上述理由，本席判令上訴得直，撤銷簽保令。 簽保令內容 21.本席曾就簽保令內容是否過於廣泛表示關注。在 劉惠和 一案，終審法院對簽保令須有明確性有以下闡述 [4]：
22.根據上述一案所訂的法律原則，簽保令的約束理應是針對防止再次作出與案件類似的行為。若有理據須上訴人守簽保令，其目的理應是防止上訴人將來再次遇到與本案類似的情況時再次作出破壞社會安寧的行為。 23.本簽保令的內容是上訴人「承諾要保證遵守法紀，不作出或不企圖作出任何涉及對任何人使用暴力或恐嚇會施用暴力的刑事行為」，看來內容是太廣泛了。 24.正如上訴人代表大律師陳詞所指，上訴人本身並非一名暴力人士，整件事件起因及其後的發展都是於中西民政事務處的辦事處，裁判官是以上訴人曾對保安人員「不合作」、「嘗試強行留低」等等為基礎頒下簽保令，但簽保令卻約束上訴人向「任何人」使用暴力或恐嚇使用暴力的刑事行為，此束約並不符合當初頒下簽保令的目的，亦欠缺清晰度及明確性。 25.既然本席已裁定裁判官不應判處上訴人簽保令。本席無須繼續處理簽保令的內容(尤其是事實上有關簽保令已完滿結束)。
答辯人： 由律政司高級檢控官黃俊賢代表香港特別行政區 上訴人：由何謝韋律師事務所轉聘蔡維邦大律師、陳偉彥大律師及勞穎豪大律師代表上訴人 [1] HKSAR v Chow Nok Hang (2013) 16 HKCFAR 837, 原文：“81. Moreover, while a breach of the peace is not, as such, a criminal offence, it founds an application to bind over. The jurisdiction to bind over dates back at least to the 1361 Statute of Edward III. In Hong Kong, the jurisdiction is now conferred by the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, with procedural provisions contained in the Magistrates Ordinance. It is a jurisdiction aimed at preventing breaches of the peace in the future. A binding-over order may thus be made requiring a person to keep the peace where there are grounds for reasonably apprehending that he may become involved in a breach of the peace in future. That person may, for instance, have previously been involved in violence to a person or property; or may threaten such violence; or be guilty of conduct giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that such violence will take place.” [2] 原文：“197. There is no offence known to the criminal law as ‘breach of the peace’; a person cannot be charged with breaching the peace. And yet, under s 61 of the Magistrates Ordinance, he can be bound over to keep the peace, and is liable to be imprisoned in default of compliance with the order. The power given to magistrates under s 61 is to administer preventative justice: To prevent a future event happening when public order might be disturbed by a breach of the peace. But this brings us no further to defining the scope of the expression ‘breach of the peace’, nor to identify with any precision when disorderly behaviour is likely to cause a breach of the peace, which lies at the heart of the offence created under s 17B(2) of the Public Order Ordinance, Cap 245.” [3] 上訴文件第165 頁R 行 [4] 原文：“49. Although the traditional form of bind-over order is an order requiring the person concerned to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, without any greater precision, we do not think that an order simply in that general form should any longer be regarded as satisfactory. Nor do we regard an implied limitation by reference to the facts that prompted the making of the order to be satisfactory. We think the principle of legal certainty requires that the order spell out with precision, in the same way as would be expected of an injunction, what it is that the person must not do. For example, in the present case, if a bind-over order was to be made against the appellant, it should have been an order requiring him to keep the peace and be of good behaviour by abstaining from assaulting or threatening to assault his brother or by doing anything to give rise to a reasonable apprehension that he intended to assault his brother, or in some such terms. A guide to an acceptable formulation of a bind-over order would, in our opinion, be whether an injunction in those terms would be acceptable.” | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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