Darach E. Haughey and Another v. Lam Mui and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1593/2014 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 8 June 2017.
1. The plaintiffs are Administrators of the Estate of Chiu Keung (“ the Deceased ”) appointed by the court. They seek directions on distribution of the Estate pursuant to Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court.
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HCMP 1593/2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO1593 OF 2014 ____________
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_____________ Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 24 January 2017 Date of Judgment: 8 June 2017 _____________ J U D G M E N T _____________ INTRODUCTION 1.The plaintiffs are Administrators of the Estate of Chiu Keung (“the Deceased”) appointed by the court. They seek directions on distribution of the Estate pursuant to Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court. 2.The Deceased died 62 years ago on 17 April 1955, leaving behind an enormous estate (“the Estate”). He was survived by 17 family members, ie the wife, 3 concubines, 5 sons and 8 daughters. The names of the family members and their status as parties are set out in Table 1 annexed to this judgment. I shall refer to each fong (房) by the respective names of the concubines. 3.The Administrators propose (“the Proposal”) to distribute the HK$39 million in their hands in the following manner:
4.All the beneficiaries who wished to be heard have been joined as defendants. Some have just filed affirmations or made representation. 5.D1, D4, D5 and D6 (the Lam Mui fong)are represented. So is the 5th son (D3). They have no objection to the Proposal. 6.The 3rd son (D2)’s Estate is represented by his daughter (“Hiu Hung”). She opposes the Proposal. She claims that the 3rd son (D2) should be entitled to the whole Estate now remaining because there had been prior distribution of the Estate to other beneficiaries to the exclusion of the 3rd son (D2) whilst he was residing in Mainland China. She also claims that married daughters are not entitled to share in the proceeds of sale of real properties. 7.The Administrators have given notice under section 29 of the Trustee Ordinance, Cap 29 on 15 November 2013 to all persons who might wish to claim against the Estate. Despite that, the Administrators have not heard from the 4th son at all. 8.The 8th daughter appeared in person and appeared not to oppose the Proposal. 9.For convenience, when I refer to “the defendants” below, I shall exclude Hiu Hung. LEGAL PRINCIPLES 10.The court has discretion under Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court to give directions on the administration of the estate of a deceased person. The court will have regard to the best interests of the estate instead of the rights of adversarial parties: Marley v Mutual Security Merchant Bank [1991] 3 All ER 198, at 201g-j:
BACKGROUND 11.The Deceased was a businessman in his lifetime. He operated drug stores in Cholon and Hanoi. He held properties in North and South Vietnam, Canton, Hong Kong and Paris before his death. 12.The Deceased made his last will on 28 August 1953 (“the Will”). At that time, he had a wife, 3 concubines, 4 sons and 8 daughters. 13.On 6 November 1954, the last son (the 6th son) was born. 14.Five months later, on 17 April 1955, the Deceased died in Hong Kong, survived by a wife, 3 concubines, 5 sons and 8 daughters. The 1st son had pre-deceased him in the war. 15.The Estate of the Deceased included a property at House No. 4, Derby Road, Hong Kong (“the Derby Property”). 16.On 9 October 1956, a Deed of Partition (Amicable) (“the 1956 Deed”) was executed in Saigon, Vietnam, among the following persons:
17.Under the 1956 Deed, amongst others:
18.Six months later, on 4 April 1957, a Chinese Agreement (“the 1957 Agreement”) was executed in Saigon, Vietnam, among the same persons. It was agreed, amongst others, that:
19.The 1956 Deed and 1957 Agreement (collectively “the 2 Documents”) were formal documents signed by the 2nd son, 5th son (D3) and the 3 concubines. Adults who were not present had given powers of attorney (eg the wife and the 1st daughter). However, the 3rd son (D2) was not a party to the Documents and he had not given a power of attorney, although he had attained majority (born in 1930). He was then residing in Mainland China, under the Communist government. His mother Chan Mui purported to have stated that she was confident that she could represent him and would be able to obtain his consent. He claimed not having been given prior notice or opportunity to attend the meeting before the 2 Documents were executed and had received nothing from the Estate. 20.On 7 September 1966, letters of administration with the Will annexed was granted to the wife and the 4th son as administrators. 21.About 16 years after the grant, a dispute arose between the co-administrators. The 4th son sought an order against the wife for an account of incomes and profits of the Estate, in particular as regards the Derby Property; and a declaration that the 1956 Deed was null and void. 22.On 27 March 1985, in HCMP 1845/1982, Rhind J declared the 1956 Deed null and void and ordered that the Derby Property be sold once the Wife ceased to live therein or died. The proceeds of sale were to be distributed in accordance with the terms of the Will. Until sale of the Derby Property, the tenancies and incomes should be administered by an international trustee company. The wife died in the following year. 23.In 1995, the 4th son as sole surviving administrator commenced HCA 6123/1995 against the 3rd son (D2) alleging wrongful interference with the Estate (including collection of rent), and seeking orders for delivery up of the Deceased’s properties in Canton, government bonds, share certificates, rents books, chops and accounting records. 24.The 3rd son (D2) denied the claim. He counterclaimed for an order for removal of the 4th son as administrator, an account and inquiry of assets of the Estate that have come into the hands of the 4th son, delivery up of assets and an order for administration of the Estate. 25.On 24 September 2001, in HCA 6123/1995, Chu J (as she then was) again ordered that the Derby Property be sold. Without prejudice to the 3rd son (D2)’s dispute as to entitlement of the beneficiaries under the Will, Chu J ordered that the proceeds be divided into 17 shares as set out in the Will. 26.On 16 May 2003 (18 years after Rhind J’s order), the Derby Property was finally sold for HK$45 million. 27.On Hiu Hung’s application, there had been 2 orders for interim payment to the 3rd son (D2) a total of HK$4,470,600 (“the Sum”) out of the proceeds of sale. 28.On 27 October 2003, HCA 6123/1995 was tried. By then, the 4th son had absconded. Yam J appointed the Administrators to replace the 4th son. The letters of administration issued in 1966 were revoked. The 4th son was ordered to give an account of the Estate on oath. Yam J also ordered that Hiu Hung’s costs be paid out of the Estate on indemnity basis. 29.The 4th son had never given any account. The Administrators had to obtain documents in relation to the Estate from his solicitors. 30.On 6 January 2006, new letters of administration with the Will annexed were granted to the Administrators. IDENTIFIED ASSETS OF THE ESTATE 31.There are cash of about HK$39 million, the Paris Apartment, and properties in Mainland China (“the PRC properties”), North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Hiu Hung alleges that there are other properties that may form part of the Estate. There might be a bank account in Paris but the Administrators have no information as to the particulars of the bank account. The 5th son (D3) has denied existence of this bank account. 32.On 30 June 2014, the Administrators made the present application seeking the reliefs set out in paragraph 3 above. ISSUES 33.The issues in this case are summarized as follows:
A. Scope of the Estate A1. Whether the Sum should be put back to the pool of the Estate 34.By orders dated 25 September 2003 and 19 January 2009 respectively, Yam J ordered, in HCA 6123/1995, that there be payment to the 3rd son (D2) the sum of HK$3,000,000 and HK$1,470,600 respectively out of the sale proceeds of the Derby Property. The Administrators also had to pay Hiu Hung HK$100,000 as costs in respect of the 2nd payment. See letter of Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum dated 20 January 2009. 35.There is dispute over the purpose of the Sum. The Administrators say that it was interim distribution of the Estate to the 3rd son (D2). Hiu Hung says that it was for her costs in HCA 6123/1995. 36.The Administrators had produced court orders but not the reasons for decision or transcript of proceedings. From the evidence before me, it appears that Yam J’s orders were made pursuant to a summons in HCA 6123/1995 taken out by Hiu Hung for interim payment of the 3rd son (D2)’s share of the Estate after the Derby Property was sold. At that time, she claimed that the 3rd son (D2) was entitled to 2/21 shares in the business and 2/17 over the real properties. 37.On the other hand, there was a letter from JSM (then acting for Hiu Hung) dated 23 February 2006 and 20 December 2006 chasing for interim payment of costs in HCA 6123/1995 under §14 of the order dated 27 October 2003 for “about HK$3.2 million” and another HK$150,000 whilst Hiu Hung engaged BC Chow & Co (later taken over by Or, Ng & Chan). 38.The Administrators’ Report stated as follows:
39.Taking such evidence together, I find that HK$1,470,600 was interim distribution to the 3rd son (D2) which should be put back to the pool of the Estate. The rest of the payments were all for Hiu Hung’s costs. It seems that HK$3,000,000 had not been paid to the 3rd son (D2); but if it had been, it should form part of the Estate. A2. Whether the Paris Apartment formed part of the Estate 40.There was no dispute that the Deceased had purchased the Paris Apartment in the joint names of himself and a person in 1953. 41.The 5th son (D3) claimed that he was the other joint owner. However, the name of that joint owner was not spelt in the same way as that of the 5th son (D3)’s. Moreover, the ownership record (obtained by Deloitte France) showed that the joint owner was born on 10 September 1934 and was aged 19 by the time of the acquisition of the Paris Apartment. However, the 5th son (D3) asserted that he was born on 10 October 1939 and was aged 14 at the time of the acquisition. The 5th son (D3) could not explain the discrepancies and why he could, as a minor, be a joint owner of a property. Hiu Hung disputed that he was the joint owner. 42.The Administrators were advised that the ground floor and cellar of the Paris Apartment were bought on terms that the title passed to the 5th son (D3) upon the death of the Deceased in 1955 under French law. 43.The 5th son (D3) claimed that the Deceased had told him on more than one occasion after the purchase that the Paris Apartment belonged to him, the 5th son (D3). The 5th son (D3) and siblings studying in France had lived there. Hiu Hung disputed these. 44.The 1st daughter admitted receiving rent for the Paris Apartment but it was on behalf of the 5th son (D3) (see Cheng, Yeung & Co’s letter dated 6 June 2012). However, the 5th son (D3) disputed ever receiving rental income. 45.The 5th son (D3) said that Chan Mui told him that the 1st daughter, had “taken” the Paris Apartment and told him not to run into dispute with her. He claimed to have engaged an agent in France to investigate the current status of the Paris Apartment and was told that he had been dispossessed for being “missing” for 30 years. He had no knowledge as to the present legal status of the Paris Apartment. 46.According to the Administrators’ land search in 2011, the Paris Apartment was no longer under the name of the 5th son (D3) or the 1st daughter. The Administrators had no idea how the Paris Apartment ended up with the present owner. 47.The Administrators raised the issue as to whether or not it is just to exclude the 5th son (D3) from further distribution of the Estate or to make the necessary adjustments to the shares he is entitled to under the Will. The court is also invited to draw adverse inference against the 5th son (D3) for failing to adduce evidence in the preceding paragraph. 48.The Paris Apartment was referred to in the 1956 Deed but not the Will. Hiu Hung submits that if the Paris Apartment had belonged to the 5th son (D3), that property would not have been included in the 1956 Deed. 49.There is dispute of facts. Neither the Administrators nor the 5th son (D3) have produced French legal opinions to assist the court. 50.There was no direct evidence as to the true intention of the Deceased at the time of the acquisition of the Paris Apartment. However, from the Will, it could be seen that the Deceased was a person who encouraged his children to go for higher education; a child who would take up higher education after the age of 20 could get monthly allowance double that of the minors. 51.The Deceased considered that the 5th son (D3) would have attained majority in 1955, so the year of 1934 could well be the year of birth of the 5th son (D3). The Deceased owned various properties. The Paris Apartment appeared to be the only one in joint names with a child. Since the 5th son (D3) was studying in Paris at the time of the purchase, it may be that the Deceased really wanted to make a gift (upon his death) of the Paris Apartment to the 5th son (D3); and I so find. 52.In any case, it is impossible now to place a value on the Paris Apartment or any rental collected thereunder. Hiu Hung agreed that at this stage there was not much to be gained from further investigating the Paris Apartment. 53.Taking all circumstances into account, I am not satisfied that the Paris Apartment should be regarded as part of the Estate or that further investigation is in the best interests of the Estate. I will come back to exclusion of the 5th son (D3)’s interests under Section C below. A3. How properties in Vietnam are to be dealt with 54.According to the 1956 Deed and 1957 Agreement, there should be 7 properties in Vietnam. Based on property searches carried out by the Administrators, it would appear that in relation to 3 of the properties, there would be difficulties for claims to be made if the purported owner was a foreigner. It would also be difficult to make a claim to the 4th property if the owner was a foreigner and the claim had not been filed before 1996. The 5th property could not be located. The 6th property was managed by Cinema Company but the operation had stopped since October 2003. No information could be obtained in relation to the 7th property. 55.The Administrators have been advised by a Vietnamese lawyer that in order to assess whether recovery of the properties was possible, documents evidencing ownership of the Deceased, such as title deeds, would be required. However, as the whereabouts of the 4th son was unknown, no information or title deeds could be obtained from him. The Administrators’ attempt to obtain further information from other beneficiaries of the Estate met with no success. 56.There is no legal opinion in support of §§54-55. 57.According to the 5th son (D3) and 8th daughter, the properties in Vietnam had not been distributed to the beneficiaries but were confiscated by the governments. That was why the properties are still registered in the name of the Deceased. 58.In my view, there should be a difference in treatment between the properties in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The former should be governed by the 2 Documents and the latter by the Will. Anyway, after lapse of 62 years, I consider that if any beneficiary still wants the Administrators to pursue investigation, he or she should inform the Administrators within 2 calendar months of the handing down of this judgment, provide further information regarding any or all of the Vietnamese properties and fund the investigation (or seek funding directions from the court). In the absence of such steps of the beneficiaries, the Administrators shall cease investigation of the properties in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, unless otherwise directed. A4. How the PRC properties should be dealt with 59.The 5 PRC properties had been demolished or redeveloped by third parties. PRC lawyers have, on behalf of the Estate, successfully taken possession of several domestic units and a shop in exchange for one of the 5 landed properties. The remaining 4 of the 5 landed properties are, after redevelopment, now being controlled and managed by the Chinese government. The PRC lawyers would only be able to advise on the merits on claims by the beneficiaries in those 4 properties and/or related compensation after further transaction history information could be obtained. That was the position in 2012. 60.According to the Administrators, they were unable to have the apartments and shops registered in their names because PRC did not recognize the legal status of administrators appointed by the Hong Kong court. The PRC lawyers advised that all the beneficiaries of an Estate should join together to carry out administration of and succession to an Estate in PRC. They should make a collective application to the PRC government. At present, it is beyond the powers of the Administrators to administer the properties in Mainland China. Again, there is no legal opinion in support. 61.The properties in Mainland China are not covered by the 2 Documents. I direct thatany beneficiary who is still interested in pursuing the administration of these properties should inform the Administrator within 2 calendar months of the handing down of this judgment. Any beneficiary who fails to do so should be regarded as giving up his rights and claims to those properties. The Administrators shall assist the beneficiaries who are interested to make a collective application to the PRC government to get back the properties in Mainland China as soon as possible. A5. Other properties to be taken into account 62.In the course of her submission, Hiu Hung suggests that a property in Hillwood Road and Happy Valley (presumably those bought by Lam Mui and Chan Mui in Blue Pool Road) should form part of the Estate. She asserts that the administrators have failed to carry out sufficient investigation into assets falling within the Estate. 63.I am unable to accept these new assertions by Hiu Hung. The address of the Hillwood Road property was not even identified in any of her affirmations. Even on her own case, the Blue Pool Road properties were purchased after the death of the Deceased and could well be part of the previous distribution to the relevant fong. These properties should not form part of the Estate. Subject to what I had said about the PRC properties, the North Vietnam and South Vietnam properties, there is nothing to warrant further enquiry by the court. B. Whether married daughters are entitled to a share in the real properties 64.The material parts of the Will are as follows:
65.I agree with the Administrators that the Deceased plainly intended that his real Estate be divided after his children had come of age and by allotting to his sons (except the 2nd son) 2 shares each, and his daughters and the 2nd son one share each. He was survived by 5 sons and 8 daughters, hence there should be 17 shares altogether. 66.Hiu Hung contends that once the daughters became married, their shares should be regarded as the common share. I am unable to agree. Reading the Chinese version in context, the phrase “share(s) belonging to her name” clearly referred to the shares (股) in the business entity operating the drugstores, not the shares (分) in the real Estate. 67.I find that married daughters are entitled to a share in the real properties under the Will. C. Whether there had been prior distribution of the Estate to the exclusion of the 3rd son (D2) 68.Hiu Hung contends that since there had been prior distribution to the exclusion of her father, the remaining Estate in hands of the Administrators should be paid out to her father’s Estate solely. The defendants denied receipt of any part of the estate directly or indirectly. They (except the 5th son (D3)) denied knowledge of the 2 Documents. 69.This is a factual dispute. Resolution of it depended on the validity of the 2 Documents and what happened after their execution. 70.The 2 Documents were signed by adults. It is not clear what the age of majority was in Vietnam. For Hong Kong, it would have been 21 then. If the 5th son (D3) was born in 1939, he was aged 17 at the time the 1956 Deed was executed. The Will stated that by 1 January 1955, Sin Kuen (5th son (D3)) would attain majority and that must have been the Deceased’s intention. The 5th son (D3) could vaguely remember being asked by his mother Chan Mui to sign a document in French. She told him that it was in relation to his brother (the 2nd son). The 5th son (D3) signed without reading through the contents. He disclaimed the Chinese characters 趙善權 as his signature but he did not say who signed on his behalf. In all probabilities, the 2 Documents were validly signed by the 5th son (D3). 71.There was prior allocation of specific assets to the wife and the 2nd son for which they acknowledged receipt in the 2 Documents. 72.The 2nd son received 1 million piastres (and Chiu So told the court at the hearing on 28 April 2016 before To J that it was after the death of the Deceased). The Administrators could no longer ascertain the value of this amount. However, a glimpse of the enormity of this amount could be made in the 2 Documents themselves:
73.Parties to the 2 Documents accepted the assets allocated to them, in return giving up the others. The arrangements were in full and final settlement of rights and claims to the Estate in Hong Kong, France and South Vietnam. 74.The parties to the 1956 Deed treated it seriously enough as to have it signed by the Vice President of the Court of First Instance of Saigon. 75.The 1956 Deed had stood for about 30 years before it was nullified. The nullity only extended to the wife’s interest in the Derby Property. All other appropriations under the 1956 Deed were not disturbed. The 2nd son did not return the 1 million piastres. Restitution is not possible now since it is not possible to convert into current value. The 2nd son is not claiming anything now. The 1957 Agreement was never declared void. None of the defendants or those who have filed affirmations disputed their mother’s authority to represent them in 1956/57. 76.Given such circumstances, the burden is on the defendants to show that the 2 Documents were of no effect and explain why they had not received distribution as alleged. 77.The defendants’ evidence can be summarized as follows:
78.When assessing such evidence, I had regard to the reality that the widows had to raise their young families. The children continued to receive education; some of them had lived in different countries (eg the 5th son (D3)). Where did the 3 fongs obtain financial support if not from the income of the businesses and other assets not distributed to the wife and the 2nd son? 79.The 5th son (D3) and 3rd daughter’s evidence in fact contradicted the defendants’ version. The 5th son (D3) confirmed that following the death of the Deceased, his livelihood was supported by monthly allowance derived from the profit of the family drugstore, pursuant to the terms of the Will. The 3rd daughter confirmed that it was Chan Mui who supported the 1st daughter who was studying in Paris, after the death of the Deceased. Such support would probably be appropriation, at least under the 1957 Agreement. 80.Some of the workers must have been hired after the death of the Deceased to be able to accrue 40-60 years of service. The business must have run on. 81.The defendants have not been specific about the dates of confiscation of properties by the North and South Vietnamese governments but the irresistible inference was that the confiscation had come after the execution of the 2 Documents. Otherwise, the family members would not have bothered to agree upon the terms therein. 82.On the other hand, Hiu Hung has put forth some evidence as to distribution:
83.Hiu Hung claims that her father had never received his share. The 3rd daughter however asserted that his mother Chan Mui had purchased a property in the name of Ho Shuet in Kowloon Man Ying Building for the benefit of the 3rd son (D2). She claimed that Ho Shuet had returned the property to the 3rd son (D2). Hiu Hung denied, explaining that the unit in Man Ying Building was where her father resided when he first came to Hong Kong. It never belonged to the 3rd son (D2) and he never received rent. The 3rd daughter has not produced independent proof to contradict Hiu Hung and I do not accept the 3rd daughter’s version. 84.In my view, even if I were to ignore the evidence from Hiu Hung (except the land search results), the evidence of the defendants could hardly rebut the fact of prior distribution. The fact that just the 5th son or just Chan Mui had appropriated assets of the Estate or each fong just appropriated some of the assets could not affect the validity of the 2 Documents or rebut the fact that there had been prior distribution. The position was consistent with their own intention stated in the 1956 Deed, ie that the beneficiaries would be free to maintain joint possession or divide among themselves. See §17(d) above. 85.The subsequent misfortune of confiscation could not have invalidated the 2 Documents and what was already distributed thereunder. Rhind J’s order only applied to the distribution to the wife and in any case not the 1957 Agreement. 86.The issue can be disposed of summarily without a trial. I find that there had been prior distribution under the 2 Documents to the exclusion of the 3rd son (D2). D. How the assets in the hands of the Administrators should be distributed 87.Given my findings in Section C, the various fongs (including the 5th son (D3)) have given up their rights and claims against the Estate insofar as assets in Hong Kong, France and South Vietnam were concerned. The only beneficiary remaining who can claim the funds in the hands of the Administrators would be the 3rd son (D2). 88.The assets in North Vietnam and Mainland China were not covered by the 2 Documents and they should be allocated in accordance with the Will. 89.The money in the Administrators’ hands comprised
90.Both items shall be distributed to the 3rd son (D2) solely. 91.For completeness sake, if I am wrong and paragraphs 3(c) and (d) should be adopted, I have taken into account the following. The 4th son is missing. He has not reimbursed the Estate for Hiu Hung’s costs under Yam J’s order dated 27 October 2003. Further, he had not kept proper accounts and records whilst he was an administrator. There had been possible misappropriation of rental income from the Derby Property to the tune of HK$13 million, which the 4th son used for his own purpose. The supporting documents did not support the entire amount claimed by the 4th son for legal and professional fees and entertainment expenses. 92.Therefore, I direct that anything that the 4th son can receive from the Estate (including properties in PRC, North Vietnam and South Vietnam) shall be applied in the following order of priority:
Conclusion 93.The amount of $1,470,600 but not the Paris Apartment should be put back into the pool of the Estate. I make an order that the cash (about HK$39 million) now in the hands of the Administrators should be distributed to the 3rd son (D2) solely (§90 above). 94.In respect of the properties in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Mainland China, I give directions in accordance with §§58 and 61 above. 95.I find that under the Will, married daughters are entitled to a share in the real properties. 96.The Administrators shall have their costs out of the Estate before distribution. The defendants have conducted themselves properly in putting forth facts for the court’s consideration. Their costs on common fund basis should be borne out of the Estate. Hiu Hung’s costs should be indemnified by the Estate as her pursuit of the claim was proper and assistance to the court useful. All costs should first be paid out of item (ii) in §89 and then item (i). The 4th son shall indemnify the Estate on costs as his abscondment without proper accounts has made administration of the Estate more difficult than it should be. I make an order nisi in accordance with this paragraph. 97.There shall be liberty to apply. Any further directions sought as regards the PRC properties, the North Vietnam and South Vietnam properties must be fixed for hearing no later than 31 December 2017. OTHER MATTERS 98.The preparation of this case was deficient due to the lack of legal opinions on the status of foreign properties. 99.Where there are many beneficiaries, those representing the Administrators should have prepared a dramatis personae setting out their names and relationships and in this case, the Vietnamese names as well (for easy reference to the 2 Documents). With so many affirmations filed, the lawyers should have summarized the competing versions, if anything, to assist the court in deciding whether to summarily dispose of the dispute or give directions, and to facilitate judgment writing. 100.On preparation of hearing bundles, an index of documents that only stated the exhibit numbers without description of documents is useless. It does not facilitate the finding of exhibits or verification of facts. 101.Bundles A to C should each start from page one. Pagination like page 101-83, etc is clumsy. Care must be taken to ensure that the bundles are well copied. Blur copies (especially handwritten ones) should be replaced or typed up. There are missing pages of important documents in the bundles and the court has to write to ask for them.
Mr Steven Kwan, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the plaintiffs Mr Leung Yan Wing of Cheng, Yeung & Co, for the 1st, 4th to 6th defendants The 2nd defendant appeared in person Mr Jeffrey Sze, instructed by Tai, Tang & Chong, for the 3rd defendant Trieu Tuyet Anh 趙雪瑛, present Table 1: Names of family members and their status as parties
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Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 1593/2014