Ss v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 97/2016 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 October 2018.
1. The applicant is an Indian and a permanent resident in Hong Kong. Her father (“the Father”) and her younger sister (“the Sister”) respectively applied to the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) for a dependant visa to join the applicant in Hong Kong. The applicant was the sponsor for both applications.
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HCAL 97/2016 [2018] HKCFI 2357 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 97 OF 2016 _______________
_______________ Before: Hon Au J in Court Date of Hearing: 2 November 2016 Date of Judgment: 19 October 2018 _____________________ J U D G M E N T _____________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.The applicant is an Indian and a permanent resident in Hong Kong. Her father (“the Father”) and her younger sister (“the Sister”) respectively applied to the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) for a dependant visa to join the applicant in Hong Kong. The applicant was the sponsor for both applications. 2.At the time of those applications, the Father was aged about 70 and the Sister about 40. They were then the only immediate members of the applicant’s family in India, after the mother (“the Mother”) passed away in 2012. The Sister has been diagnosed to be suffering from the psychiatric illness Border Line Intellectual Function or Schizophrenia and is unable to live independently. She has all along been living together with and taken care of by the Mother and the Father in India. 3.On 26 February 2016, the Director approved the Father’s application for dependant visa, but refused the Sister’s. The Director refused the Sister’s dependant visa application on the basis that (a) she did not fall within the recognised categories of dependants under the dependant policy (“the Dependant Policy”) adopted by the Director, and (b) in any event, there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate grounds in her case to justify a departure from the policy. 4.The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the Director’s said decision made on 26 February 2016 (“the Director’s Decision”) to refuse the Sister’s dependant visa application. 5.Given that the parties have effectively filed all the relevant evidence, at the hearing, the court directed that it be treated as a rolled-up hearing of the leave application and the substantive hearing of the judicial review. 6.The applicant is represented by Mr Philip Dykes SC, and the Director by Ms Sara Tong. B. BACKGROUND 7.The background is largely not disputed. The relevant facts are as follows. B1. The dependant policy as adopted by the Director 8.Under the overall restrictive immigration policy, a person who does not have the right of abode and the right to land in Hong Kong cannot enter or stay in Hong Kong without the Director’s permission. Within the confines of that broad policy, the Government has formulated different more specific immigration policies to be given effect by the Director to deal with different categories of persons who wish to come to Hong Kong. Under these different policies, they allow a limited number of persons in different categories to come to Hong Kong for immigration purposes. These purposes include working, studying, establishing or joining in any business, taking up residence as residents or staying as visitors.[1] The Dependant Policy is one such specifically formulated policy. 9.An application for a dependant visa is made under the Dependant Policy as applied by the Director. One of the main purposes of the Dependant Policy is to ensure that Hong Kong will continue to attract people with the right talent and skills to come to Hong Kong by giving them the choice of bringing in their dependants within specified categories to live with them in Hong Kong, whilst minimizing the associated immigration and security risks. The scheme also aims to allow those who are already residing in Hong Kong and are able to provide care and financial support to their dependants to sponsor his or her dependants to come to settle in Hong Kong.[2] 10.In relation to an application for dependant visa, the Director’s position is that the Defendant Policy has been set out and is contained in the “Guidebook for Entry for Residence as Dependents in Hong Kong” (“the Guidebook”) published by the Immigration Department. The Guidebook has set out, among others, the relevant “Eligibility Criteria” at paragraphs 3 and 5 as follows:
11.Hence, under the Dependant Policy (as set out in paragraph 3 of the Guidebook), only a person who is the spouse, the unmarried child under the age of 18 or the parent above the age of the Hong Kong sponsor is eligible to apply for a defendant visa to come to Hong Kong. Further, even if the applicant falls within these eligible categories, he or she must also satisfy the three eligibility requirements set out in paragraph 5 of the Guidebook before his application would be favourably considered. 12.However, even if the application does not meet these eligibility criteria, the Director may in the exercise of his residual discretion under the overall immigration policy to consider if there are exceptional humanitarian or compassionate circumstances to justify a departure from the Dependant Policy to grant a dependant visa to an applicant. Since the exercise of discretion in favour of a person who has no right of abode or right to land in Hong Kong will result in departure from overall immigration control policy and the different guidelines or policies, there must be very strong justifications before the Director would do so[3]. B2. The applicant, the Sister and the dependant visa applications B2.1 The applicant 13.The applicant was born in 1972 in Mumbai. The Sister is her only sibling. The applicant married her husband on 1 February 1998. 14.The applicant and her husband moved to Hong Kong in December 1998 and have lived here since. Since July 2006, the applicant and her husband have acquired permanent resident status and enjoyed right of abode in Hong Kong. 15.The applicant’s husband works as a hedge fund manager. His average monthly income for the period from 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015, including bonuses, was about HK$4 million. The applicant is a homemaker. 16.The applicant and her husband live in a rented house on the Peak. They have a son born in 2004. He attends school in Hong Kong. B2.2 The Sister 17.The Sister was born in 1974 in Mumbai. She graduated from university in 1994 with a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce. 18.In 1995, she started exhibiting symptoms of psychiatric illness, experiencing depressive moods, speaking incoherently, talking to herself and seeing things that were not there. She could not perform simple tasks and she began to neglect her personal hygiene. 19.Dr Barve, a psychiatrist in Mumbai who has been seeing the Sister since 1995, has diagnosed the Sister to have Border Line Intellectual Functioning, a cognitive impairment closely related to mental retardation. Dr Barve’s medical report dated 9 October 2014 (“Dr Barve’s Report”) contains the following observations:
20.The Sister was prescribed medication, and with some improvement in her condition, was able to qualify as an Early Child Care Teacher and took up a job. 21.In 2001, the Sister suffered a relapse and was prescribed medication again. Her condition has been stable since then with the help of drugs but she still requires constant care and supervision to ensure she does not stop taking her medication and continues to maintain her personal hygiene. 22.Further, Dr William Fan, a Hong Kong psychiatrist, also prepared a medical report on 9 November 2015 (“Dr Fan’s Report”) on the Sister. He said that she suffered from schizophrenia and was not capable of independent living. Furthermore, there was a risk of relapse and her exhibiting other negative symptoms if she was not provided with regular supervision in her day to day living. He believed that she would benefit medically if she could live in Hong Kong where the applicant’s family could provide daily care and support to her. B2.3 The applicant’s family in Mumbai 23.The applicant’s family consists only of the Father, the Mother and the Sister. The Father was born in 1944 in Mumbai and the Mother in 1952. 24.In January 2009, the Mother was diagnosed with bowel cancer. Between January and December 2009, she received medical treatment in Hong Kong. She died in Mumbai on 15 July 2012. As a result, the Father was left to care for the Sister on his own in Mumbai. 25.Since the Mother’s death, the applicant has frequently travelled between Hong Kong and Mumbai to care for the Father and Sister. They have also come to Hong Kong on numerous occasions to stay with the applicant and seek medical treatment for the Sister. 26.At the time of the dependant visa application, the Father was about 70 years old and starting to find it difficult to care for both himself and the Sister without help from others. 27.Both the Father and the Sister are entirely financially dependant on the applicant. B2.4 The dependent visa applications and the Director’s Decision 28.On 5 December 2014, the Hong Kong Visa Centre, on behalf of the Sister and the Father, submitted applications for them to take residence in Hong Kong as the applicant’s dependants (respectively “the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application” and “the Father’s Dependant Visa Application”). 29.By a letter dated 9 December 2014, the Director indicated to the Sister that she did not fall within the categories of dependants recognised under the Dependant Policy. The Director however asked the Sister to provide further information if she so wished “in support of this outside-policy application for our exceptional consideration” by the end of December 2014. 30.Thereafter, further correspondences ensued between the Director and the Hong Kong Visa Centre from January to September 2015, whereby further information relating to the Father’s and the Sister’s Dependant Visa Applications was submitted to the Director. 31.By a letter dated 23 October 2015, the Director again stated that the Sister fell outside the Dependant Policy as she did not come within its recognised categories of dependants. The Director indicated that the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application would be treated as “cancelled” without further notice if she did not provide further information in support of exceptional consideration by 11 November 2015. 32.In a letter dated 11 November 2015, the applicant’s solicitors, Daly & Associates (“D&A”), wrote to the Director on her behalf requesting a reconsideration of the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application and a consideration of the Father’s Dependant Visa Application. The letter explained that the Father was growing old and could not carry on looking after his daughter (i.e., the Sister). While the father had three brothers in Mumbai, they were all elderly and could not take care of him and the Sister. This meant that eventually the Sister would have to be institutionalised and standards of care would then drop dramatically, involving a real risk of abuse and sexual molestation of the Sister. In support of this, D&A quoted certain observations from a report published by the Human Rights Watch. 33.Also in support of the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application, she had provided the Dr Barve’s Report and Dr Fan’s Report concerning her conditions and inability to live independently. 34.By a letter dated 26 February 2016, the Director approved the Father’s Dependant Visa Application. 35.However, by another letter of the same date, the Director refused the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application (i.e., the Director’s Decision”). The relevant part of the Director’s letter regarding the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application states:
36.As mentioned above, in summary, the Director refused the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application as (a) she did not come within the Dependant Policy since she did not fall within the recognised categories of dependants to apply for a dependant visa, and (b) in any event, there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate circumstances in her case to justify the Director to depart from the policy and grant her a dependant visa. C. THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW 37.Mr Dykes for the applicant has raised three grounds of judicial review. I will consider them in turn. C1. Ground 1 – the Director misapplied the Dependant Policy[4] 38.Under this ground, Mr Dykes submits that the Director in regarding the Sister as not a person eligible to apply for dependant visa had misapplied the Dependant Policy. This is so, says Mr Dykes, as the said policy should be the one as contained in the LegCo Brief dated 30 June 2003[5] (“the LegCo Brief”) but not as prescribed by the Guidebook. In this respect, in the LegCo Brief, it has been provided relevantly as follows:
39.Mr Dykes submits that as the LegCo Brief is the document that contains or reflects the Dependant Policy, its paragraph 3(b) shows that “other relatives” are also persons recognised to be eligible to apply for a dependant visa under the policy. The Director in saying that she did not fall within the recognised categories of dependants under the policy therefore had misapplied the Dependant Policy. 40.With respect, for two reasons, I do not think this ground is arguable. 41.First, it has now been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Comilang v Director of Immigration [2018] 2 HKLRD 534 (CA) at paragraphs 146 - 151 per Poon JA that the LegCo Brief is not the source of the Dependant Policy, and that the full terms of the Dependant Policy are to be found in the Guidebook but not in the LegCo Brief. 42.On this basis alone, this ground is not reasonably arguable and I would not grant leave to apply for judicial review on this basis. 43.Second, and in any event, even looking at paragraph 3(b) of the LegCo Brief itself, it is clear that what it says is, under the Dependant Policy, if there are “strong humanitarian or compassionate grounds”, special treatment may be given to categories of people (such as other relatives) other than the recognised categories of spouse, children and parents (see paragraph 2 of the LegCo Brief) for considering granting a dependant visa. This is precisely what the Director had done in the present case. The Director did not reject the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application solely on the basis that she was not an eligible person under the Dependant Policy to apply. The Director further considered and rejected the application on the basis that there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate grounds to justify granting her a dependant visa. There is therefore no question of misapplying the policy even if one were to have reference to the LegCo Brief. 44.On this basis, this ground is in my view also not reasonably arguable. I will refuse leave to apply for judicial review based on this. C2. Grounds 2 and 3[6] 45.These two grounds are, as submitted by Mr Dykes, related and can be conveniently considered together. They are targeted at the Director’s reasons in concluding that there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate grounds to justify granting the Sister a dependant visa. 46.The Director’s reasons are set out in paragraph 5.3 of the file minute M1 dated 19 February 2016. They are as follows:
47.In gist, under these two grounds, leading counsel submits that these reasons are tainted with Wednesbury unreasonableness and also procedural unfairness. 48.First, Mr Dykes submits that the reasons set out at paragraph 5.3 of the M1 were Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational since the Director simply failed to take into account the pertinent fact that the Father would not be able to take care of the Sister anymore in India, especially when the Father was going to come to Hong Kong and stay with the applicant given that the Director was to approve his dependant visa application. Effectively, the Sister would be left alone in India. The failure to take into account this highly relevant factor must render the Director’s reasons irrational in finding against exceptional humanitarian or compassionate circumstances. 49.Second, Mr Dykes says for the same reasons, before coming to those conclusions, it was procedurally unfair for the Director not to have first asked the Sister for her responses on what would be the impact on these matters considered by the Director when the Father was to come to stay in Hong Kong. This is particularly so when the Director sought to use Dr Barve’s and Dr Fan’s medical opinions stated in their reports against the Sister’s application. 50.On the other hand, opposing these grounds, Ms Tong for the Director has rightly reminded this court that it should and would not lightly interfere the Director’s exercise of discretion on exceptional humanitarian or compassionate considerations in a Wednesbury challenge. 51.As observed by the Court of Appeal at paragraph 92(8) in BI, if an applicant seeking to enter and stay in Hong Kong do not fall within any of the relevant immigration policy, it is up to the Director to decide whether to further consider exercising his discretion to grant the application on humanitarian or compassionate grounds on an individual basis. Insofar as if the Director is to consider this ground, it has been his policy and practice that he would only favourably exercise his discretion if there are exceptional circumstances to justify it. In this regard, it has also been firmly established by the Court of Final Appeal that the Director is not obliged to consider humanitarian or compassionate grounds, and if he decides not to so consider, that decision is generally not subject to judicial review.[7] However, if he does consider these grounds, subject to the challenge of any procedural unfairness, the court would not lightly interfere his decision under these grounds on Wednesbury unreasonableness basis as the court must have regard to his wide discretion under this aspect and the context of whether the applicant merits exceptional treatment against a stringent overall immigration control policy. See BI, paragraphs 102 ‑ 111. 52.Further, when it is alleged that a decision-maker failed to take into account a relevant consideration in the exercise of a statutory discretion, it is important to distinguish between:
53.Ms Tong then says the M1 shows clearly that the Director had considered comprehensively and carefully all the matters in the application before deciding that there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate circumstances in the present case to justify a departure from the policy and granting the Sister a dependant visa. 54.Further, Ms Tong emphasizes that the Director had no duty to ask the Sister to provide more information concerning those reasons, as the burden is on the Sister to provide all the information and materials which she sought to rely on which might be relevant to her application. This include matters and information which objectively she could reasonably contemplate that might be taken into account by the Director.[9] It is not for the Director to “teach” the Sister what evidence and material she would have to provide to convince the Director to exercise the discretion in her favour.[10] 55.In the premises, Ms Tong submits there are therefore no merits in the contentions that the Director’s Decision is irrational or that the decision is tainted with procedural unfairness. 56.Bearing firmly in mind the above careful and restrictive approach of the court to a Wednesbury challenge of the Director’s exercise of discretion in relation to humanitarian or compassionate considerations, I am however satisfied that in the present case, the Director’s Decision in this regard can be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable in failing to take into account relevant considerations. I will explain why. 57.From the reasons set out at paragraph 5.3 of M1, it shows that the Director was of the view that there were no exceptional humanitarian or compassionate circumstances concerning the Sister because as a whole (a) the Sister was likely to find it more difficult to settle in Hong Kong than in India, (b) the Sister was going to receive the same if not better medical care in India, and (c) in any event, it was open and up to the applicant and her family to decide whether to return to India to look after the Sister if they believed the Sister was unable to take care of herself there. 58.The Director came to these views because:
59.As far as I can see, there are three essential fundamental premises underlying these reasons:
60.In relation to all these fundamental bases, in formulating those reasons, it is clear from the M1 that the Director did not take into account the fact that the Father was going to be physically unable to continue to take care of the Sister, and would in any event come to stay in Hong Kong with the applicant on a dependant visa as granted. 61.In my view, this is obviously a relevant matter that the Director should take into account when considering the 1st Underlying Premise. 62.In this respect, it is pertinent to first look at Dr Barve’s report dated 9 October 2014, which states as follows:
63.It is therefore also part of Dr Barve’s view that the Sister’s mental conditions rendered it necessary for her to be dependent on the care by her family. It is in any event a fact that the Sister has been under the care of the family in India over the years. 64.Given these contexts, for the Director to conclude (based on Dr Barve’s Report) that the Sister was likely to face with more adjusting difficulties in Hong Kong (because Hong Kong has a more complex social conditions), as a matter of logic and by reference to Dr Barve’s Report as a whole, it must be relevant for him to take into account the fact that she was to remain in India alone without family care to see whether this conclusion was sound. It is also obviously unreasonable for the Director to take into account one part of Dr Barve’s opinion (ie, that the Sister had limited capacity to handle complex social situations and cannot cope with demanding tasks), without considering also the other related part of the opinion (ie, she was dependent upon family care). 65.To put in another way, by any account, under this question, it must be a relevant consideration in the particular circumstances of the Sister for the Director to consider whether she would have more difficulty to handle the social conditions when she was left alone without family care in India than if she was to come to Hong Kong and stay with all the family members. 66.The same must similarly apply to the 2nd Underlying Premise, which is also based on the medical opinions expressed in Dr Barve’s and Dr Fan’s Reports. 67.In relation to this, it is also helpful to look at Dr Fan’s Report in full, which states as follows:
68.It is clear from both Dr Barve’s Report and Dr Fan’s Report that, given her psychiatric conditions, the Sister’s well-being is dependent on having family care. Thus, when the Director considered where the Sister would receive a better or worse care for her psychiatric conditions, it must also be relevant by any account to see whether and where she would receive family care. Hence, the fact that the Sister would be left in India without any family members to take care of her when the Father went to stay in Hong Kong with the applicant must be a relevant factor that the Director should take into account. 69.Ms Tong on the other hand submits that the Director in exercising his discretion is not concerned with or to act in the best interests of the Sister. Hence this fact is not relevant for the Director’s consideration. 70.In relation to this, Mr Dykes fairly confirms that he is not saying that the Director has to act in the Sister’s best interests. Indeed, Mr Dykes emphasizes he disavows that proposition. However, leading counsel submits that the Sister’s interests must be a relevant factor to the consideration whether the Sister has shown strong humanitarian or compassionate grounds in support of her dependant visa application. 71.I agree with Mr Dykes. By definition, humanitarian or compassionate considerations in relation the Sister’s position must include the consideration as to whether her interests concerning her care (being a person suffering from psychiatric illness, requiring the regular family care) would be so adversely affected by not granting her a dependant visa to come to live with her family in Hong Kong. 72.In the premises, in coming to the above two underlying premises to reject the Sister’s Dependant Visa Application, I regard it as Wednesbury unreasonable for the Director not to take into account the fact that the Father would leave India and the Sister would be effectively left in India without any family care if her dependant visa application was not granted[16]. 73.As to the 3rd Underlying Premise, given the above conclusion, I also find it Wednesbury unreasonable for the Director to regard this as a basis to reject the humanitarian or compassionate ground in the present case. This is so because:
74.For all the above reasons, I agree that the Director’s reasons in finding against the existence of exceptional humanitarian or compassionate grounds are tainted with Wednesbury unreasonableness in failing to take into account a relevant consideration. The Director’s Decision should therefore be quashed. 75.Further, for the same reasons I have set out at paragraphs 59-69 above, I also accept that the Director’s Decision is tainted with procedural unfairness. It could not have been reasonably contemplated by the Sister that, when relying on those parts of Dr Barve’s and Dr Fan’s Reports, the Director would not take into account the pertinent and relevant fact that the Father would no longer stay with the Sister and she would be left without family care in India. Therefore, the Sister would not have reasonably contemplated that she should put in information or materials (for example, further medical reports) to show that, if she was to be left alone in India when the Father joined the applicant in Hong Kong, she would have greater difficulty to live in India than in Hong Kong and that her psychiatric conditions would be worse in India than in Hong Kong notwithstanding the medical treatments. 76.The procedural unfairness is also related to the Director’s view (see paragraph 5.3(e) of M1) that the Sister’s family should be able to put her in private care centre or to hire a carer to look after her. It must be remembered that the Sister is suffering from psychiatric illness and whose “entire emotional and physical well-being” is said by her attending psychiatrist to be dependent on her family. In the premises, the correctness and pertinence of this consideration as to whether it is inhuman or uncompassionate (even on an exceptional basis) to ask her to be left in a private institutional care or by private carer must reasonably be considered in and dependent upon the context of the absence of regular care by family members. This again is the very factor that the Director however had not taken into account. 77.It is in these special circumstances of the present case that, in my view, it was necessary as a matter of procedural fairness for the Director to ask the Sister follow up questions before he could arrive at the above conclusions as set out in paragraphs 5.3(a), (b), (d) and (e) of the M1. 78.In the premises, I would also quash the Director’s Decision on the procedural unfairness ground. D. CONCLUSION 79.For all the above reasons:
80.I would quash the Director’s Decision and remit it back to the Director for reconsideration, taking into account the matters I have set out above. 81.There are no reasons why costs should not follow the event. I will make an order nisi that costs of this application be to the applicant, to be taxed if not agreed. 82.I thank counsel for their assistance in this matter.
Mr Philip Dykes, SC, instructed by Daly, Ho & Associates, for the applicant Ms Sara Tong, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent [1] See Affirmation of Wong Kin Man, paragraphs 6 - 9. [2] See Affirmation of Wong Kin Man, paragraphs 11-16. [3] See paragraph 17 of the Affirmation of Wong Kin Man [4] See draft Amended Form 86, paragraphs 60-64 [5] File Ref: SBCR 1/10/2091/98, entitled “IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ENTRY OF DEPENDANTS” prepared by the Security Bureau. [6] See draft Amended Form 86, paragraphs 4(2), (3) and 65-69 [7] See Lau Kong Yung v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300 at 332, 339 and 347. [8] See: Wing on Co Ltd v Building Authority (1996) 6 HKPLR 432 at 439, perGodfrey JA, citing with approval the judgment of Simon Brown LJ in R v Somerset County Council, ex parte Fewings [1995] 1 WLR 1037; recently referred to in BH v Director of Immigration (HCAL 105/2014, unreported, 14 April 2015,Chow J) at paragraph 64 (as approved by the Court of Appeal in BI, at paragraph 124). [9] See Pagtama v Director of Immigration (HCAL 13, 45 & 56/2014, 12 January 2016, Au J) at paragraph 214. [10] See: Dembele v Director of Immigration (HCAL 44/2014, 22 April 2016, Au J) at paragraph 102. [11] See paragraph 5.3(a) of M1. [12] See paragraph 5.3(b) of M1. [13] See paragraph 5.3(c) of M1. [14] See paragraph 5.3(e) of M1. [15] See paragraph 5.3(f) of M1. [16] It is noted that Mr Dykes has at paragraphs 62-73 of his skeleton asked the court to adopt what he describes as the modern approach to the standard of review of Wednesbury unreasonableness in public law (which is more akin to proportionality tests). However, he has also submitted at the hearing that the applicant should in any event succeed on these grounds even on the conventional standard of review, as no reasonable person in the position of the Director in the circumstances of this case would have regarded this factor as irrelevant. For the present purposes, I have adopted the conventional test in allowing these grounds. It is therefore unnecessary for me to deal with Mr Dykes’ others submissions relating to the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness. [17] See paragraph 9 above | ||||||||||||||||
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