Re Shariful Islam

Read the full judgment text of CACV 414/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 21 November 2018.

1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 17 August 2018 dismissing his application for leave to judicially review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 12 May 2017.

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Case No.CACV 414/2018[2018] HKCA 820
Court
Court of Appeal
Date21 Nov 2018
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 414/2018

[2018] HKCA 820

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 414 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 917 of 2017)

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RE SHARIFUL ISLAM Applicant

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Before: Hon Chu, Barma and Poon JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 21 November 2018

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 17 August 2018 dismissing his application for leave to judicially review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 12 May 2017.    

2.The applicant is a Bangladesh national.  He arrived in Hong Kong on 5 May 2006 and was given permission to remain as a visitor until 19 May 2006.  He overstayed and was arrested by the police on 18 December 2007.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim based on his fear of being harmed or killed by members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party due to his father’s refusal to quit the Awami League and join their party.  For the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary to set out the basis of the applicant’s claim in detail.   

3.By two decisions dated 13 March 2015 and 21 November 2016, the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejected the applicant’s claim having regard to all the applicable grounds, namely, torture risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], persecution risk[3] and BOR 2 risk[4] grounds.  The applicant appealed the Director’s decision to the Board.  By a decision dated 12 May 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal.    

4.On 30 June 2017, the applicant filed a Form 86 in HCAL 348/2017 to apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision.  The application was listed for hearing before Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock on 5 September 2017.  The applicant did not attend the hearing.  By a decision given on 13 October 2017, Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock refused to give leave to the applicant to bring judicial review.

5.On 20 November 2017, the applicant filed another Form 86 in HCAL 917/2017 to re-apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision, relying on grounds that were similar to those in HCAL 348/2017. As in the previous application, the applicant was absent at the hearing of the leave application.  On 17 August 2018, the Judge dismissed the application as an abuse of the court process: see [9] of the Form CALL-1, [2018] HKCFI 1567.

6.The applicant filed a notice of appeal on 23 August 2018, which said that he would face hardship if he were to return to his home country, and further complained that the news and cases relied on by the Board were not officially recognized, and were hearsay and outdated.     

7.Evidently, when the applicant made the second leave application by filing the Form 86 on 20 November 2017, more than three months had lapsed since the Board rendered its decision on 12 May 2017. The leave application was accordingly made out of time: see Order 53 rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A.  In dismissing the application, the Judge had not extended the time for bringing judicial review against the Board’s decision. 

8.As held in MI v. Permanent Secretary for Security [2018] HKCA 419, in judicial review cases brought outside the three-month time limit where extension of time was refused, the applicant must first obtain leave to appeal under section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 before he can appeal to the Court of Appeal.  Further, under Order 59 rule 2B(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application for leave to appeal should in the first place be made to the Court of First Instance. 

9.In the present case, the applicant had not obtained leave to appeal before filing the Notice of Appeal.  Accordingly, the Registrar of Civil Appeals directed on 23 August 2018 that the applicant should lodge written submission as to why the Notice of Appeal should not be dismissed.  In compliance with the direction, the applicant had lodged a written submission.

10.The applicant stated in the written submission that high standards of fairness was engaged because life and limb were in jeopardy, the fundamental right of not being subjected to torture was involved and the decision had a significant impact on the applicant.  He referred to passages in Secretary for Security v. Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, at [43] and [44] and asked that leave to appeal be granted.      

11.The matters stated in the written submission do not explain the delay.   As the Judge rightly held, this second application for leave to bring judicial review is an abuse of the court process.  The intended appeal against the Judge’s decision has no merit.  For these reasons, leave to appeal should not be given.  We therefore refuse to grant leave under section 14AA.

12.As there is no leave to appeal, the appeal is not properly constituted.  Accordingly, we order that the Notice of Appeal be struck out and the appeal be dismissed. 

 
 

(Carlye Chu) (Aarif Barma) (Jeremy Poon)
Justice of Appeal
Justice of Appeal
Justice of Appeal

The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.



[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383.

[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

[4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.

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