Golden Rich Finance Ltd v. Lam Sau Fa
Read the full judgment text of CACV 108/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 29 November 2018.
2. A mortgage action under Order 88 is commenced by originating summons and supported by affidavit evidence. The procedure is prescribed under Order 28, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). At the hearing of the originating summons, the matter may be disposed of summarily where the Court is satisfied that there are no triable issues. As pointed out by the authorities, this is akin to an application for summary judgment under Order 14, namely, once the plaintiff’s entitlement to
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CACV 108/2018 [2018] HKCA 952 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 108 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCMP NO. 84 OF 2017) ________________________
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________________________ Before : Hon Cheung, Yuen and Chu JJA in Court Date of Hearing : 29 November 2018 Date of Judgment : 29 November 2018 Date of Reasons for Judgment : 11 December 2018 ______________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ______________________________ Hon Cheung JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court) : I. Mortgage action 1.1In this mortgage action commenced under Order 88 of the Rules of the High Court, the plaintiff who is a registered money lender asked for payment of all monies due to it under a First Legal Charge dated 5 September 2016 (‘the Charge’) made between the defendant as the borrower and the plaintiff as the lender by which the defendant’s property situated at a development known as The Bellagio at No. 33, Castle Peak Road, New Territories, Hong Kong was charged by the defendant by way of legal charge to the plaintiff. The Charge was to secure repayment of all monies together with interest payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under a Mortgage Loan Agreement dated 5 September 2016 (‘the Loan Agreement’) whereby the plaintiff lent $4.5 million to the defendant. The interest rate of the loan was 30% per annum. The loan together with interest was to be repaid by 12 monthly instalments of which $112,500 was to be repaid for each of the 1st to 11th instalments. The 12th and last instalment was for $4,612,500. It is not disputed that the defendant had failed to pay the monthly instalments since 5 November 2016. 1.2Earlier, before the plaintiff commenced this mortgage action, the defendant commenced a High Court action in HCA 3248/2016 on 9 December 2016 in which she sought a declaration that the Charge be declared ‘null and void for illegality, fraudulent scam and fraudulent intention; and/or alternatively for mistake and fraudulent misrepresentation; and/or alternatively for unconscionable terms of contract.’ 1.3The defendant sought a consolidation of her action together with the mortgage action. Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee dismissed her application for consolidation and granted judgment to the plaintiff on its claim. The defendant appealed. We dismissed the appeal at the conclusion of the hearing. I now give the reasons of judgment of the Court. II. Originating summons and summary judgment 2.A mortgage action under Order 88 is commenced by originating summons and supported by affidavit evidence. The procedure is prescribed under Order 28, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). At the hearing of the originating summons, the matter may be disposed of summarily where the Court is satisfied that there are no triable issues. As pointed out by the authorities, this is akin to an application for summary judgment under Order 14, namely, once the plaintiff’s entitlement to summary judgment is demonstrated on the face of the evidence, the burden falls on the defendant to show that she has a credible defence to the claim. This is to be tested against the evidence adduced in the case such as whether the defence is inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents or the defendant’s previous admissions and stand. The Court should also consider the inherent probability of the defence. But what is not permitted is for the Court to conduct a mini‑trial of the case on the affidavit evidence. If the Court does not deal with the originating summons summarily, it may order the proceedings to continue as if the matter had begun by writ (Order 28, rule 8) or gave further directions for the conduct of the case (Order 28, rule 4(2)). III. The defendant’s case 3.1The Charge was executed by the defendant in front of a solicitor, Tse Kai Chung, Bobby of Bobby Tse & Co., Solicitors. In it was an acknowledgement by the defendant that :
3.2In the first affirmation of the defendant, she boldly asserted that she did not sign the Charge in front of Bobby Tse. She said she was brought by a fraud syndicate to Bobby Tse & Co. and met Bobby Tse there on 5 September 2016. Bobby Tse did not tell her that she was going to sign a mortgage. The defendant claimed that no one told her on or before 5 September 2016 that she would enter into a mortgage of her property. She claimed that Bobby Tse lied when he said he had interpreted and explained the Charge to her and he had invited her to seek independent legal advice. 3.3The defendant advanced a case of conspiracy which the Judge summarised as follows :
3.4The Judge then summarised the details of the defendant’s case on the conspiracy :
IV. Our view 1) The documents signed by the defendant 4.1Mr Tsang of the plaintiff denied that there was any fraud syndicate to defraud the defendant and he did not know any of the parties of the syndicate. He had never discussed any of the matters relating to the Free Advance Card as alleged by the defendant. In relation to the defendant’s allegation that Mr Tsang had asked her ‘to sign some documents, mostly in English, one of which was very fake’ and that she had signed the documents ‘without reading and knowing the contents thereof’, one can readily see that apart from the Charge which is in English, the defendant had also signed an Application Form (貸款申請書) which is in both English and Chinese. The loan type was described as 「樓宇按揭一按」(Translation: Property mortgage first mortgage). The address of the defendant’s mortgaged property was stated in both English and Chinese. 4.2The Loan Agreement signed by the defendant was also in both English and Chinese. The Chinese part expressly stated that it was a 「樓按貸款合約」(Translation: Mortgage loan agreement). The mortgaged property was mentioned in Chinese in the Loan Agreement. The clause in which the defendant warranted that she had the legal title to the property and that she had the right to mortgage the property was also in Chinese. 4.3Another document signed by the defendant was a Chinese document entitled 「法律意見聲明書」(Translation: Legal Advice Declaration) in which the defendant acknowledged and declared that :
4.4On the face of these documents, the defendant’s case that she did not know that she had signed a mortgage document by which she mortgaged her property to the plaintiff was clearly incredible. The starting point is that she must be taken to have known the content of the documents she signed. The defendant’s case on what Mr Tsang allegedly discussed with her about the Free Advance Card must also be tested against these documents. 2) The defendant’s explanation 4.5Mr Tsang had tape-recorded the meeting he had with the defendant on 5 September 2016. Mr Tsang referred to the material parts of the conversation as follows :
4.6Although the defendant said that it was not a complete recording of the meeting, it was not disputed by her that she did say to Mr Tsang that the loan was required by her to finance the purchase of property and that she had asked Mr Tsang questions on early redemption. She, however, attempted to explain these admissions away in her affirmation :
4.7The credibility of these explanations must again be judged by the documents she had signed in Chinese which clearly mentioned the mortgage of her property. Further, if Mr Tsang was indeed party to the conspiracy, one wonders why Kevin Ho and Szeto Ka Yiu should tell the defendant in advance that if the plaintiff asked her about the purpose of obtaining the card she should say that she might use the money to buy a flat? This explanation would be totally unnecessary in such a situation. The defendant’s explanation or her discussion on early redemption was also incredible when the provision for redemption was already mentioned in Chinese in the Loan Agreement. 4.8The defendant was also economical with the full background of the case. It was not disputed that on 5 September 2016, the plaintiff issued two cheques, namely, one for $4,487,000 to the defendant and another cheque of $13,000 to Bobby Tse & Co. The latter cheque was for the legal fees of Bobby Tse & Co. The defendant’s case was that Mr Tsang gave her the $4,487,000 cheque and told her to give it to Kevin Ho who was waiting downstairs to bring her to another firm of lawyers. The defendant then deposed to the events that followed :
4.9This again highlights the incredible nature of the defendant’s case. The cheque that was given to her was for $4,487,000. The Bank of China’s account was her own account but she chose not to explain how someone else could deposit the lesser sum of $4,467,000 into her personal account after deducting the alleged legal costs of $20,000. If the purpose of the loan was to obtain the card, the defendant never explained why the money was not paid to Wing Lung Bank in the first place which supposedly would issue the card to her. She had never produced her Bank of China account statements to support her case that she later withdrew a large sum of $4,467,000 in cash from her account. 4.10Ms Lai for the defendant repeatedly said in her submission that the plaintiff had knowledge of the claimed conspiracy but there really was no credible evidence linking the plaintiff to the conspiracy. The defendant then referred to a document which she said was given to her by Mr Tsang when she later attended the plaintiff’s office on 20 October 2016. The document reads :
4.11Mr Tsang denied giving this document to the defendant or that he had seen this document before. The content of this document made no sense because it was purportedly an authorisation by the defendant to the plaintiff to issue a cheque to itself for the amount of $4,467,000 lent by the plaintiff to the defendant, when the defendant admitted that the amount she had received from the plaintiff by way of a cheque was $4,487,000. It was for the defendant to identify the particulars of the conspiracy and specifically explain the relevance of this document in relation to the role of the plaintiff in the conspiracy. None was given. This cannot be the basis for the Court to direct that somehow further inquiry should be carried out in the light of this document. Ms Lai’s reliance on the authority of Miles v. Bull [1969] 1 QB 258 which held that the Court should not give summary judgment if there are matters which required further investigation even though the defendant may not be able to pinpoint any precise triable issue cannot assist the defendant because the issue in each case is fact‑specific and as Megarry V.‑C. said in Lady Anne Tennant v Associated Newspapers Group Ltd [1979] F.S.R. 298 :
4.12The modern practice in civil litigation shows that Miles v Bull is invoked more as an exception and the Court will usually impose conditions when leave to defend is given on that basis. 4.13Mr Tsang had produced messages from the defendant to him for the period 17 October 2016 to 24 October 2016. Mr Tsang said :
4.14The conduct of the defendant as revealed by her messages was inconsistent with someone who knew Mr Tsang was involved in the conspiracy because of what he had allegedly said on 5 September 2016. She also had never put forward an alternative case that she only realised that Mr Tsang was involved when she later received the document dated 14 September 2016. Either way, one would expect her to produce this document in her first affirmation filed in opposition to the plaintiff’s claim. Yet the defendant only chose to produce this document belatedly after Mr Tsang filed his affirmation refuting her allegations. 4.15There was also an allegation by the defendant that the plaintiff was in breach of trust and had assisted in the breach of trust. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was governed by contract. How a trust can arise in such a situation was never elaborated. 4.16Ms Lai also referred to the written instructions given by the plaintiff to Bobby Tse & Co. which stated the interest for the loan was 24%, and the 30% rate set out in the Loan Agreement. We just do not see how this could assist the defendant in showing that the plaintiff had knowledge of the fraud and was part of the conspiracy. 4.17In our view, the Judge was clearly right in rejecting the defendant’s case as being incredible and giving judgment to the plaintiff. 4.18The Judge had also dealt with the defendant’s allegation of the plaintiff’s breach of the Money Lenders Ordinance. However, the notice of appeal did not challenge this aspect of the Judge’s decision. In our view, there must be discipline on the part of the party presenting the appeal by fully identifying the grounds of appeal in the notice of appeal. We held the defendant was not entitled to rely on this point without identifying how the Judge’s discretion had been wrongly exercised. 4.19For these reasons, the appeal was dismissed together with costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis pursuant to the terms of the Loan Agreement.
Mr Victor Dawes SC and Mr Jason Lee, instructed by Tony Kan & Co., for the plaintiff Ms Annie Lai, instructed by Yu Sun Yau Mak & Lawyers, for the defendant | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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