Soshila Keswani v. Motiram Keswani
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 579/2013 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 31 January 2019 before His Honour Judge Edmond Lee.
Civil law – family arrangement – Deed of Family Arrangement – Vesting Assignment – non est factum – misrepresentation – common mistake – limitation – costs – Dispute between siblings over rental income from inherited property – 2002 Deed divided property among 5 siblings despite Mother's will favoring 4 sons – Documents void on ground of non est factum due to defendant's mistaken belief they were probate documents – Misrepresentation claim failed due to insufficient evidence – Plaintiff's claim dismissed. Counterclaim allowed. Costs to Defendant.
Legal issues: Misrepresentation · Non est factum · Common mistake
Outcome: Plaintiff's claim dismissed. Defendant's counterclaim allowed.
Cites 3 cases
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DCCJ 579/2013 [2019] HKDC 135 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 579 OF 2013 -------------------------
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------------------------- JUDGMENT ------------------------- Background 1.This is a case of dispute between two siblings, both senior citizens[1], over certain rental income of property inherited from their parents. The plaintiff being the youngest sister claims against the defendant being the eldest brother for rental income of HK$599,820 plus her 20% share of the rental income generated from 2001 to 2006 and from 2016 to 2017[2]. On the other hand, the defendant contested the claim and at the same time, by way of a counterclaim, seeks a declaration that the Deed of Family Arrangement and the Vesting Assignment as between the plaintiff and the defendant are rescinded or alternatively void[3]. 2.There are 5 siblings in the family of the plaintiff and the defendant (“Family”): the eldest brother being the plaintiff, the 2nd to the 4th brothers being Hira, Viroo and Ramchand respectively, and the 5th and the youngest sister being the plaintiff (“5 Siblings”). 3.The father of the Family, Ratanchand Keswani, (the “Father”) owned a building at No 50C Wing Hong Street, Kowloon (the “Property”), which consisted of the ground floor (“G/F”) and the 1st to the 5th floors (the “1-5/F”). 4.The Father passed away on 4 July 1961. Pursuant to his will dated 17 November 1960[4], the G/F was given to the plaintiff whereas the 1-5/F to Wong Sui Yeung, mother of the Family (the “Mother”). It was stated in the Father’s will that “the property, or any portions of the property, must NOT be sold or mortgage[d] to anyone in any way[s], but could be transferred to their children on the same conditions” (“Restriction”)[5]. 5.The Mother passed away on 23 May 2001. Under her last will dated 27 September 1991[6], the defendant was appointed as the sole executor and trustee, and that all the Mother’s real and personal property, i.e. including 1-5/F, be given to the defendant and the 3 brothers in equal shares. 6.In summary, pursuant to, first, the Father’s will and subsequently, the Mother’s will, the 1-5/F were passed to the four sons of the Family, including the defendant, and the G/F was passed to the plaintiff. 7.In 2002, the 5 Siblings executed a Deed of Family Arrangement dated 13 June 2002 (“Deed”)[7] prepared by and in the presence of a solicitor, Chu Sau Fong Juliana (“Chu”)[8] of Messrs Ho and Wong, solicitors (“Ho and Wong”). The Deed provided that the defendant, as the executor of the Mother’s will, should upon the grant of probate assign the 1-5/F to the 5 Siblings, i.e. including the plaintiff, in equal shares[9]. In the recitals of the Deed, it was provided that:-
8.To carry out the arrangement of the Deed, the 5 Siblings subsequently executed a vesting assignment dated 3 September 2002 (the “Assignment”)[12], also prepared by and in the presence of Chu. 9.The plaintiff commenced these proceedings by a writ dated and filed on 15 February 2013[13], claiming against the defendant for all the rentals she was entitled to, i.e. 1/5 of the total rentals received by the defendant in respect of 1-5/F, from 2001 to now. The defendant contested the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that both the Deed and the Assignment are voidable or void and, by way of a counterclaim, seeks a declaration to that effect. The plaintiff’s case 10.The plaintiff’s case is straightforward. Both the Deed and the Assignment are valid legal documents and should be given full effect to. Therefore, she should be entitled to 1/5 of the rental income of the 1-5/F over the years. 11.She filed a witness’s statements[14] which was adopted by her in court and she also testified at the trial. 12.As to the background or the circumstances leading to the execution of the Deed and the Assignment, it is the plaintiff’s case that:-
The defendant’s case 13.The defence case, in summary, is that:-
14.The defence also argue that, in the event that the Deed and the Assignment are valid and that the plaintiff is entitled to any rental income, the portion accrued before 15 February 2007 is not recoverable as it is barred by s. 18 of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap. 347, which provides that “no action shall be brought, or distress made to recover arrears of rent, or damages thereof, after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the arrears became due”. The plaintiff issued the writ on 15 February 2013. As to quantum, it is also argued that there is no evidence to prove any rental income having been generated in respect of 1-5/F in the years of 2001/2002 and 2003 to 2007. 15.The defendant filed a witness statement[17] which was adopted as evidence in addition to his testimony in court. The nephew of the plaintiff and the defendant, Hiro Keswani, the Defence Witness, also filed a witness statement[18], which was adopted as evidence, and he testified in court for the defence. 16.As to the background or the circumstances leading to the execution of the Deed and the Assignment, it is the defence’s case that:-
The key issue 17.Apparently, the key issue of this case is the validity or otherwise of the Deed and the Assignment. To be more specific, if those documents are valid and should be given effect to, as contended by the plaintiff, the plaintiff would succeed in her claim and should be entitled to 1/5 of the rental income of 1-5/F over the relevant years. If, on the contrary, those documents are void on the grounds of misrepresentation and/or non est factum and/or common mistake, as contended by the defendant, the plaintiff’s claim would fail and the defendant should succeed in his counterclaim for a declaration to that effect. 18.To decide on that key issue, first of all, I have to consider and resolve 2 matters of dispute, namely (a) the credibility of the plaintiff and the defendant as well as the Defence Witness, and (b) the role and the conduct of Chu in this case. Analysis 19.Both parties attack the credibility of the opponent and accused the opponent of lying on various matters. Credibility of the plaintiff 20.I first deal with the credibility of the plaintiff and consider the following matters. 21.In an unrelated case, HCA No 918 of 1991, the plaintiff’s 2nd eldest brother, Hira, commenced legal action on 2 February 1991 to sue the plaintiff for recovery of a debt in the total sum of $1,582,615 with interest and costs, part of the debt arose from a total sum of $700,000 advanced to the plaintiff in 1987 for the purchase of a flat in Middle Road[21]. The plaintiff in her defence dated 8 March 1991 denied having received any advancement and in particular, averred that the flat was purchased by her “using her own money”[22]. 22.However, 20 years later in 2011, in the matrimonial action FCMC 9789 of 1996 where the plaintiff sought leave to apply for ancillary relief against her divorced husband, the plaintiff in her affirmation dated 27 April 2011, affirmed that the said flat was “largely paid by my late brother Dr Hira Keswani”[23]. The plaintiff was cross-examined on this during the trial. She said Hira gave her the deposit for the said flat and she paid for the mortgage instalments. She denied lying. Nevertheless, the discrepancies between these versions remain obvious and the explanation offered by the plaintiff is unreasonable. 23.Also in an unrelated case, in the said matrimonial action FCMC 9789 of 1996 where the plaintiff sought leave to apply for ancillary relief against her divorced husband in 2011, the plaintiff in her affirmation stated that when she filled in the Acknowledgement of Service (Form 4) back on 21 November 1996, she put down a handwritten word “Yes” next to the question 8(e) for secured periodical payments[24] and the plaintiff had that extract copy of the Form 4 exhibited to her affirmation[25]. 24.Nevertheless, it was found out in the copy of the said Form 4 which was originally sent by the Family Court to the plaintiff’s divorced husband that there was no such handwritten word “Yes” next to that question 8(e)[26]. 25.The plaintiff was cross-examined on this during the trial. It was suggested to the plaintiff that the handwritten word “Yes” for secured periodical payments was not put on the original court document back in 1996 but was only subsequently put on the copy exhibited to her affirmation to assist her application in 2011. The plaintiff denied all those allegations and said that the matter had been clarified by the judge in court and the CID of the police[27]. 26.There is no evidence as to what investigation, if any, had been done and how the matter was eventually resolved previously. In any event, I find the matter at least suspicious on paper in three aspects. 27.First, in the copy Form 4 where a handwritten “Yes” was there, next to it was the plaintiff’s signature/initial and a handwritten date “11-12-96”[28] which was different from the date of the document which was “21st Nov 96”[29]. The plaintiff’s explanations in court that she actually wanted to put down “21-11-96” (implying that she made a mistake), the document was filed by lawyer etc. are unreasonable and I found them hard to believe. 28.Second, if that handwritten word “Yes” was written in the original document filed in court (but not subsequently added on) as the plaintiff claimed, I found it strange to have the plaintiff’s signature/initial next to it but not to any other hand-written words (”Yes” , “No” and others) in the document[30]. It is a matter of common sense that ordinary people would sign or initial their amendments/corrections on a document. 29.Third, I noted that particular paragraph 8, just like the next paragraph 9, had been “crossed out”, and that there was nothing claimed for any items under paragraph 9[31]. If the plaintiff had in fact put down a handwritten word “Yes” next to paragraph 8(e) indicating her wish to be heard on secured periodical payments when the document was originally filed in court in 1996, it would be strange for her to have crossed out the whole paragraph (paragraph 8) at that time which, for ordinary people, would mean that the whole paragraph was inapplicable or irrelevant. 30.There was another matter arising during the trial. During cross-examination, the plaintiff agreed that she obtained a stock broker’s licence in around September 1980 and started a stock broker business both supported by her brother Hira. The plaintiff agreed that Hira helped her with the licence and the business by paying her $300,000. 31.That was however in stark contrast to her version in her defence to Hira’s action in 1991 for recovery of money including that for a stock broker’s licence and starting a business. The plaintiff in the Defence of that action averred in clear and unequivocal terms that she had never received any advancement as claimed by Hira[32]. The plaintiff denied having lied and tried to explain in this trial that her brother Hira had always given her money without specifying for what. If that is the case, it would be strange for Hira to commence legal proceedings against her in the first place. The plaintiff during re-examination raised that topic again by herself and claimed that Hira just filed that case to court to stop her from gambling in stock and securities and the case was not proceeded with. All these explanations of the plaintiff do not sound credible at all. 32.The plaintiff’s case was that, during the lunch meeting after the Mother’s funeral on 4 June 2001, it was the Defence Witness to recommend Ho and Wong to handle the Mother’s estate. The plaintiff did not instruct Ho and Wong. The Defence Witness denied. 33.During cross-examination, the plaintiff at one stage said that she did not know anyone in Ho and Wong except Chu, at another stage, she agreed that she had known the founder of Ho and Wong (Mr Ho Sun Kuen) and his wife for over 40 years and had been a close friend of Mrs Ho. Her explanation under cross-examination that she only knew Mr and Mrs Ho as personal friends but never knew they had a business firm of lawyers is unreasonable and unbelievable. 34.Further, it was stated unequivocally in the plaintiff’s witness statement, which had been adopted by her as evidence, that she “do not know “HO & WONG” firm and that I have my own lawyer’s executive clerk Mr Charles K. P. Yeung, (now with Katherine Y. W. Or & Co.[33]) whom that I have known and had been taken care of my account since the 1980’s”[34]. This is inconsistent or at least not supported by other evidence or documents disclosed in this case. When the plaintiff was defending the said action HCA 918 of 1991 brought by her brother Hira, she instructed Messrs. Hobson & Co.[35]. When the plaintiff was seeking legal advice on the Deed and the Assignment, she instructed Messrs. Pansy Leung Tang & Chua[36]. 35.There is also the Confirmation Note[37] which the plaintiff heavily relied on. It was originally a fax letter dated 5 January 2006 of Messrs Pansy Leung Tang & Chua where there was a quotation of fees for preparing certain legal documents. It is the plaintiff’s case that those documents were for lifting the Restriction in the Property[38]. 36.On that typewritten fax letter dated 5 January 2006, there were certain handwritten words at the bottom, i.e. “Confirmed to proceed the above:-”, a signature, and then “Motiram Keswani” “23-7-2007”. The plaintiff said that it was the defendant who wanted to sell the Property and asked her to obtain legal advice in 2005 to 2007 for removing the Restriction in the Property. The plaintiff said she did accordingly and first obtained an advice form Messrs. S. W. Wong & Associates[39] in 2005 and then this one from Messrs. Pansy Leung Tang & Chua in 2006. The plaintiff then asked the defendant to sign on that Confirmation Note to confirm and that document, the plaintiff claimed, proved that the defendant “all the time had recognised me [i.e. the plaintiff] as one of the beneficiaries”[40]. 37.The defendant, during cross-examination by the plaintiff, said that, first, he never wanted to sell the Property nor did he ask the plaintiff to help removing the Restriction and second, he never saw that Confirmation Note before and did not write those words on it. The defendant, however, said that it was his signature on the Confirmation Note but he repeatedly said he had no idea as to why it was there. He also said if he did sign, there was no need to put down his name as well. 38.Obviously there are two completely different versions between the plaintiff and the defendant as to how this Confirmation Note came into existence. I have carefully considered the matter and am prepared to accept the defendant’s version and reject the plaintiff’s, for two reasons. 39.First, the defendant was honest enough to accept that it was his signature on the Confirmation Note (though he categorically denied having seen the Confirmation Note before or having given any instructions to the plaintiff). It would have been much easier for him to deny everything about that Confirmation Note but he did not. 40.Second, which is a matter of inference and I place more weight on it. It is unreasonable in the circumstances of this case for the defendant to instruct the plaintiff to seek legal advice on how to remove the Restriction on the Property in the first place. The defendant gave unequivocal evidence that he never wanted to remove the Restriction or to sell the Property. Even if he wanted to seek legal advice on that matter, it would have been most unlikely for him to seek assistance from the plaintiff. It is clear on evidence that the parties were all along on very bad terms. The defendant said he never talked to the plaintiff, he would not answer her phone calls and would throw her letters into rubbish bin if she wrote any. Similarly, it was also the plaintiff’s evidence that she had not communicated with the defendant ever since she had taken back the G/F in August 1991[41]. If the defendant did want to seek legal advice in 2005 to 2007, it would be more likely for him to seek assistance from the Defence Witness, as he did in 2001 when he asked the Defence Witness for recommendation of a lawyer to handle the Mothers’ estate. 41.Having carefully considered all the above, and taken into account the plaintiff’s demeanour when giving evidence, I do not find her an honest and credible witness. Credibility of the defendant and the Defence Witness 42.I now proceed to consider the credibility of the defendant and the Defence Witness. 43.As a preliminary observation, the evidence of the defendant and the Defence Witness is on the whole consistent and their respective evidence lends support to each other. Their evidence in court was clear, straightforward and unshaken during cross-examination. 44.I noted and carefully considered the plaintiff’s criticism that the defendant and the Defence Witness were unable to recollect various matters and were lying in their evidence. I do not find the fact that they failed to recollect certain matters affect their general credibility and, on the contrary, find it quite reasonable in the circumstances of the case. 45.First, the various matters raised by the plaintiff took place many years ago, for instance, the lunch meeting after the Mother’s funeral as early as on 4 June 2001, the signing of the Deed and the Assignment in 2002, etc. 46.Second, the defendant was about 72 or 73 years old in 2001/2002 and about 88 years old when giving evidence in this trial. It is understandable for persons of that senior age to be relatively forgetful. 47.Third, and more importantly, the version of the defendant and the Defence Witness in general is simple and uneventful. The defence version, put it simply, is: (a) there were no discussions over the Mother’s estate in that lunch meeting after the funeral[42] in 2001, (b) the defendant accompanied by the Defence Witness simply went over to Chu’s office to execute the Deed and the Assignment in 2002 believing that they were just routine documents for the probate of the Mother’s will, and (c) there were no discussions or arguments between the parties afterwards about the Property or any other matters at all prior to the commencement of these proceedings by the plaintiff in 2013. As such, there is no reason for them to pay any particular attention to, and then to remember specifically afterwards, for instance, the circumstances under which that lunch meeting was held in 2001, the execution of the Deed and the Assignment in 2002, etc. 48.I find both the defendant and the Defence Witness honest witnesses and am prepared to accept their evidence. I would therefore reject the plaintiff’s evidence if in any way contradicted by or being inconsistent with that of the defendant and the Defence Witness. 49.I move on to consider the role and the conduct of Chu with respect to the preparation and execution of the Deed and the Assignment. 50.Chu was never a witness and there was no evidence whatsoever from her in this case. It is common ground that Chu was responsible for the preparation of the Deed and the Assignment and witnessing the execution of those documents. What are in dispute are, (a) on whose instruction she was to prepare those documents and (b) whether she had made any misrepresentation to the defendant as to the nature of those documents. Role of Chu – was she acting on instructions of plaintiff or defendant? 51.As a background, there were initially two related applications by the plaintiff on the first day of the trial for a writ of subpoena and leave to include Chu as a new witness of the trial, though no witness statement had ever been obtained from her. After submissions by the parties, on the second day of the trial, the plaintiff withdrew both applications and the defendant asked for costs which were granted[43]. During submissions, the plaintiff claimed that she was “misguided” that Chu would either be called by the court or by the defendant. It was however disclosed in the documents that, in none of the defence pleadings, questionnaires or any other documents filed in court, that the defence had ever indicated calling Chu as a witness. On the other hand, there was an unsuccessful attempt at the interlocutory stage by the plaintiff to adduce 7 witness statements[44], but she had never included Chu as a witness. In none of the case management conferences did the plaintiff raise any issue as to whether Chu would be called, when she was all along fully aware that only herself, the defendant and the Defence Witness would be the witnesses for the trial. I do not lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff had never attempted to obtain any witness statement from Chu. I also bear in mind the defence submission that there is no reason for the defence to call Chu as a witness in view of all the defence allegations against her. 52.Both the plaintiff and the defendant denied having instructed Chu to prepare the Deed and the Assignment. It is the plaintiff’s case that she was initially recommended by the Defence Witness to go to Chu for the application of the letter of administration of the Mother’s estate and subsequently, after the discovery of the Mother’s will, she was told by the Defence Witness to go to Chu’s office to execute the Deed and the Assignment. On the other hand, the defence case is that the defendant, on the Defence Witness’s recommendation, instructed Ho and Wong to apply for the probate of the Mother’s will and therefore, when he executed the Deed and the Assignment prepared by Chu, he believed, so as the Defence Witness, that they were routine documents for the probate. 53.In the absence of any evidence of Chu and, in view of the irreconcilable conflict between the parties, I have carefully considered the inherent probabilities and improbabilities of this matter of dispute. 54.First of all, I noted that, even on the plaintiff’s version, she never said that the defendant was agreeable to dividing the Mother’s estate (i.e. including 1-5/F) into 5 shares to include her. It was, according to the plaintiff, the idea of the other 3 brothers. The plaintiff in her witness statement, stated that “My 3 brothers, Hira, Viroo and Ramchand after knowing that there was a mother’s Will with Motiram [the defendant] without me in it, and they after looking into the whole matter had decided to divide the mother’s asset into 5 equal shares and to include me into it as well.”[45] As such, it would be strange for the defendant to instruct Chu to prepare the Deed and the Assignment in the first place when the whole purpose of which was to re-divide the 1-5/F to include the plaintiff. 55.Second, there is no evidence that any of the other brothers had instructed Chu to prepare the Deed and the Assignment. It is also unlikely that the other brothers would do so. It appears that the plaintiff was not on good terms with them. The 2nd brother, Hira, sued her as early as in 1996 for recovery of money advanced to her. The plaintiff never mentioned any dealings with the 3rd brother, Viroo, in her evidence except that she said the Defence Witness (Viroo’s son) had “close connections” with her[46] (but now has become the Defence Witness in this trial). The plaintiff also said in her witness statement that she had not communicated with the 4th brother, Ramchand, for over 30 years[47]. It is also unlikely that the Defence Witness would instruct Chu to prepare the Deed and the Assignment. Not only did the Defence Witness clearly deny that, but he also had no reason to do so as he had no interest at all in the 1-5/F. Theoretically, the Defence Witness’s interest would be prejudiced if those documents are signed and his father’s share is reduced as a result. 56.Third, as submitted by the defence, quite obviously, the plaintiff was the only one to benefit from the Deed and the Assignment which re-divide the 1-5/F to include the plaintiff who was not originally included in the Mother’s will. By execution of the Deed and the Assignment, all other brothers, including the defendant, would inevitably suffer a loss as their respective shares of the 1-5/F would be reduced. As such, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was the only person to have the motivation to instruct Chu to prepare the Deed and the Assignment. There is force in this argument. 57.Fourth, it is common ground that, prior to the Mother’s death and the grant of probate of her will in 2002, the plaintiff has already inherited the G/F of the Property in 1961 pursuant to the Father’s will in 1960[48]. If the brothers agreed to re-divide the 1-5/F to include the plaintiff as well, it would mean that the plaintiff would have the biggest share of the Property among the 5 Siblings. It is worth mentioning that, in fact, subsequent to the Father’s will in 1960, the Father made another will in 1961 deciding not to give the G/F to the plaintiff but to give the whole Property, i.e. G/F and 1-5/F to the Mother alone. That Father’s will in 1961 was void because it was only witnessed by one witness. That nevertheless showed the last testamentary intention of the Father[49]. The defendant and the other brothers must know that and it is unlikely that they would be prepared to give the biggest share of the Property to the plaintiff. 58.Finally, the defence, by relying on certain authorities[50], invited me to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiff for not calling Chu as a witness and failing to provide any satisfactory explanation. That certainly adds force to the argument or lends support to the inference that Chu was in fact acting on the plaintiff’s instructions for preparation of the Deed and the Assignment. 59.Having considered all the above, I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Deed and the Assignment were prepared by Chu on the instructions of the plaintiff. As I have already found Defence Witness an honest witness and his evidence credible, I find, as a matter of fact, that the plaintiff was not recommended by the Defence Witness to go to Ho and Wong to instruct Chu but she did all those on her own. Conduct of Chu – any misrepresentation by her to defendant? 60.I now proceed to consider the conduct of Chu at the time of execution of the Deed and the Assignment. 61.As said, there is no evidence whatsoever from Chu. The plaintiff did not and could not give any evidence on the circumstances under which the defendant executed the Deed and the Assignment as she was not present. The only evidence comes from the defendant himself and, to a certain extent, supported by the Defence Witness. 62.In the defence pleadings, the defence averred that Chu “had represented to the Defendant” that the Deed and the Assignment were “formal documents for the purpose of the application for probate for the Mother’s estate, and would not affect or prejudice the defendant’s rights personally”[51]. As such, the defence case was one of positive misrepresentation by Chu to the defendant. It was never one of implied misrepresentation or misrepresentation by conduct. 63.This is however at variance with the evidence of the defendant and the Defence Witness. It is the defendant’s clear evidence that Chu “did not explain in detail[s] the nature and contents of the document[s] [referring to the Deed] and simply told me to sign”, “she did not explain the contents of the Vesting Assignment and simply asked me to sign”[52]. The defendant never alleged Chu of making any misrepresentation to him to the effect that those documents were for the probate of the Mother’s will; it was the defendant’s “understanding” and “impression” that the documents were “routine documents for the Mother’s Probate”, “standard and routine for the Probate and would not affect my rights” [53]. Similarly, the Defence Witness never alleged Chu of making any misrepresentation to the defendant or his father. He said that Chu simply called and told him that the documents were ready for signature by his father and uncles, that he was also under the belief that “the documents were standard and routine for the Probate and would not affect their rights”, and that Chu “did not explain in detail[s] the nature and contents of the documents, and simply told my father and Motiram [the defendant] to sign the documents”[54]. 64.As such, there is no or insufficient evidence from the defendant or the Defence Witness on the alleged misrepresentation and that I am not satisfied that Chu had made any misrepresentation to the defendant that the Deed and the Assignment were formal documents for the purpose of the application for the probate of the Mother’s estate. Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept the defendant’s evidence, which was supported by the Defence Witness, that Chu did not explain in detail the nature and the contents of those documents but simply asked the defendant to sign. Consideration of the defences 65.The first defence, in short, is that the defendant was induced by Chu’s misrepresentation to execute the Deed and the Assignment and as a result, he should be entitled to rescind the documents. As I am not satisfied on the evidence that Chu had made the alleged misrepresentation, this defence fails. 66.The second defence is one of non est factum, namely the defendant was under the mistaken belief that the Deed and the Assignment were formal documents for the purpose of application for probate of the Mother’s will and would not affect his rights. 67.The legal principle is that, if a party “has been misled into executing a deed or signing a document essentially different from that which he intended to execute or sign, he can plead non est factum in an action against him, the deed or writing is completely void in whosesoever hands it may come”: See Chitty on Contracts Volume I, 32nd Edition, at para. 3-049, p. 366. 68.It is also summarised in Burrows: Restatement of the English Law of Contract (2016), at p. 176 that, “A signed contract is void under the doctrine of non est factum if (a) the document signed was mistakenly signed by the party who is alleging that it is void; (b) that document is fundamentally different from what that party thought it to be; and (c) that party was not negligent in signing that document.” 69.In the leading case of Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004, the doctrine was described as follows:-
70.I understand that the defence of non est factum is not lightly to be allowed, bearing in mind it is after all a legal document having been signed by a person of full age and capacity who should normally be bound by his signature to a document. Nevertheless, each case is to be decided on its own facts. There are special and exceptional circumstances in this case. 71.As said, I have found that Chu was acting on the plaintiff’s instructions to prepare the Deed and the Assignment. Also, as said, I have accepted the defendant’s evidence, supported by that of the Defence Witness, that Chu did not explain in detail the nature and the contents of the documents but simply asked the defendant to sign. In the absence of evidence from Chu, it is unknown as to whether Chu was aware of the defendant’s mistaken belief of the nature and the contents of the documents. In any event, what is relevant and important for the purpose of this case is whether the defendant was under any mistaken belief but not whether Chu was aware of the defendant’s mistaken belief. 72.The defendant was already 73 years old in 2002 when the Deed and the Assignment were executed. Also, it was all along the defendant’s intention to instruct Chu, on Defence Witness’s recommendation of Chu’s law firm (Ho and Wong), to prepare the probate document of the Mother’s will. In the defendant’s mind, the only dealings he had with Chu, the lawyer, at the material time, were for that probate matter. It is therefore understandable for him to expect the documents to be signed in Chu’s office were all related to the probate application. Same for the Defence Witness, it is also understandable for him to expect that all the documents were for that purpose and that purpose alone. All these may explain why the defendant, on that understanding, simply signed as told without paying much attention to the documents. 73.No doubt the defendant considered the Defence Witness trustworthy, as he said, and he trusted him very much. It is therefore reasonable for the defendant, as he said, to expect the Defence Witness to inform him if any of the documents would be prejudicial to his rights. Unfortunately, the Defence Witness was also unaware of the nature of the documents and therefore not in a position to advise the defendant. 74.Lastly and more importantly, as analysed above, the only person to benefit from the Deed and the Assignment would be the plaintiff whereas the defendant, and all other brothers, would only suffer a loss after executing those documents as their share in the 1-5/F would be reduced. The Deed and the Assignment are voluntary dispositions which do not involve any monetary consideration. It is common ground that the plaintiff and the defendant have long been on very bad terms. It is unlikely that the defendant would voluntarily agree to a redistribution of the Mother’s estate to include the plaintiff, who was not supposed to benefit under the Mother’s will, out of natural love and affection for each other, as stated in Recital (6) of the Deed. In other words, on the face of it, there is no reason at all for the defendant to give up part of his entitlement of the 1-5/F to the plaintiff. 75.It is therefore likely, and I so accept, that the defendant would not have executed the Deed and the Assignment if he was aware of the genuine nature of those documents at the material time. I am prepared to accept the defendant’s version that he, at the time of execution, mistakenly believed that the Deed and the Assignment were standard and routine documents for the Mother’s probate. In other words, the Deed and the Assignment are essentially or fundamentally different from what the defendant intended to execute and that it was never his intention to execute them. Also, in view of the defendant’s old age, his only intention of instructing Chu to assist with the Mother’s probate and his trust in the Defence Witness, I do not consider him to be negligent when executing those documents. This defence of non est factum succeeds. I find both the Deed and the Assignment void on that basis. 76.There is also a third defence, which is pursued as an alternative to the primary defence of non est factum, that the Deed and the Assignment are void as the parties executed them on a common mistake, namely they signed the documents on the basis that there was doubt as to whether the Mother’s will violated the Restriction when there was in fact no such doubt as the Restriction was plainly void or if it was not, the Mother’s Will did not violate it. As I have already found that the defendant succeeds in the defence of non est factum in that he was under a mistaken belief that the Deed and the Assignment were probate documents as aforesaid, this defence of common mistake as pleaded in the above terms fails. Disposal Plaintiff’s claim 77.As I have found that the Deed and the Assignment are void on the ground of non est factum, the plaintiff’s claim for part of the rental income of 1-5/F, which is grounded on the validity of those documents, must fail. I dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under this action. Defendant’s counterclaim 78.The defendant, by way of a counterclaim, seeks a declaration that the Deed and the Assignment as between the plaintiff and the defendant are void. 79.Both the Deed and the Assignment were executed by the 5 Siblings including the plaintiff and the defendant. The other 3 brothers are not parties to these proceedings. Nevertheless, each of the Deed and the Assignment could properly be construed as severable into separate agreements, including one between the plaintiff and the defendant, see other examples like an insurance policy between the assured and a syndicate of underwriters where there are in reality a number of contracts between the assured and each of the underwriters[55], a composite insurance policy which insures two or more persons with separate interests generally be treated as containing separate contracts[56], a company’s articles be treated in law as a contract between the company and each member and a contract between a member and each other member[57]. 80.In view of my findings as above, I allow the defendant’s counterclaim and grant a declaration that the Deed and the Assignment as between the plaintiff and the defendant are void. Costs 81.As a matter of general principle, costs should follow the event. There is no reason why that general principle should not be followed in this case. I therefore made an order nisi, which shall become absolute in 14 days in the absence of any parties’ objection, that costs of this action, including those of the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s counterclaim, be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, with a certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.
The plaintiff appeared in person Mr Thomas Wong, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant [1] The plaintiff was 70 years old, at the time of her witness statement dated 16 July 2016, see [77-85] of Bundle A, at para. 1; the defendant was 88 years old at the time of this hearing as he testified that he was born in 1929 [2] As confirmed in the plaintiff’s closing submission dated 18 September 2017, at para. 12 [3] See the Re-re-amended Defence and Counterclaim at [57-35] of Bundle A, at para. 22(1) [4] See [1] of Bundle B1 [5] See [1] of Bundle B1, para. 3 [6] See [26-27] of Bundle B1 [7] See [58-67] of Bundle B1 [8] Except the 4th brother who signed in the presence of a Notary Public in Australia [9] See para. 3 of the Deed at [62] of Bundle B1 [10] That is, the Restriction, see para. 4 herein [11] That is, the 5 Siblings including the plaintiff and the defendant [12] See [71-80] of Bundle B1 [13] See [1-6] of Bundle A [14] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [77-85] of Bundle A [15] Hiro Keswani is the son of Viroo Keswani, i.e. a nephew of the plaintiff and the defendant [16] See [95] of Bundle B1 [17] See defendant’s witness statements at [86-126] of Bundle A [18] Hiro Keswani’s (Defence Witness) witness statement at [127-132] of Bundle A [19] In HCA No. 918/1991, Hira (the 2nd brother) claimed against the defendant for a debt in the total sum of HK$1,582,615 with interest and costs, see Statement of Claim at [96-97] of Bundle A [20] In FCMC No. 9789/1996, the defendant in 2011 claimed against her divorced husband for ancillary relief, see relevant documents at [111-125] of Bundle A [21] See the Statement of Claim of HCA 918/1991 at [96], para.1, in particular para. 1(d) [22] See the Defence of HCA 918/1991 at [99], para. 2 and 4 [23] See the plaintiff’s affirmation at [108] of Bundle A, para. 19 [24] See copy of the plaintiff’s affirmation at [114] of Bundle A, para.7 [25] See [116] of Bundle A [26] See [123] of Bundle A [27] The plaintiff gave evidence in court that the solicitors for her divorced husband had reported the matter to the police, the plaintiff was called up by CID of the police, she went over to explain and was later told that the whole matter had been clarified and cleared [28] See [116] of Bundle A [29] See [117] of Bundle A [30] See the whole document at [115] to [118] of Bundle A [31] See [116] of Bundle A [32] See Statement of Claim at [96], para. 1(a) and (b), as well as Defence at [99], para. 2, Bundle A [33] The plaintiff in her witness statement also said that clerk Charles Yeung once worked in another law firm Messrs. S. W. Wong and Associates, at [81] of Bundle A, para. 16 [34] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [81] of Bundle A, para. 16 [35] See [100] of Bundle A [36] See [95] and [96] of Bundle B1, where the handling person on paper were “Kobe Lai’ and “K. K. Tang” respectively [37] See [23-1] of Bundle A or [95] of Bundle B1, same document [38] See para. 3 and 4 herein [39] See [93] of Bundle B1 [40] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [81] of Bundle A, para. 18 and 19 [41] See the plaintiff’s witness statement at [78] of Bundle A, para. 7 [42] The Defence Witness, during cross-examination by the plaintiff, said that, during that lunch meeting after funeral, he did not see the need to bring up the topic of the Mother’s will or the topic of money as everyone was so sad [43] My decision was given on 3 July 2017, where I ordered costs of these two applications be to the defendant on a party and party basis, but not on indemnity basis as applied by the defendant [44] All witness statements had been struck out, on defendant’s application, by Deputy District Judge L C Cheng for being irrelevant and inadmissible, by a decision handed down on 20 May 2015 [45] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [80] of Bundle A, para. 11 [46] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [78] of Bundle A, para. 7 [47] See plaintiff’s witness statement at [78] of Bundle A, para. 7 [48] See para. 4 herein [49] See defendant’s witness statement at [87-88] at para. 5 and 6, Bundle A [50] O’Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 921, McQueen v Great Western Railway Company (1874-75) LR 10 QB 569 at 574, Nina Kung v Wong Din Shin (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387 at para 367, Hua Tyan Development Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd (2014) 17 HKCFAR 493 at para 46, Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324 at 340 [51] See Re-re-amended Defence and Counterclaim at [57-29] at para. 8E(1) and [57-32] at para. 18D(1), Bundle A [52] See defendant’s witness statement at [89] at para. 14 and [90] at para. 17 of Bundle A [53] See defendant’s witness statement at [89] at para. 12 and 13, at [90] at para. 17 of Bundle A [54] See Defence Witness’s statement at [128-129] at para. 7 and 9; also [130] at para. 11 of Bundle A [55] See Touche Ross & Co & Others v Colin Baker [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Law reports 230 at 236, column 1 [56] See Arab Bank PLC v Zurich Insurance Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Report 262 at 277, column 2 [57] See s 86 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 622 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 579/2013