Re Mohammed Faheem
Read the full judgment text of CACV 356/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 1 February 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J given on 27 July 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 29 September 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 May 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
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CACV 356/2018 [2019] HKCA 145 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 356 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 707/2017) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J given on 27 July 2018 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 29 September 2017 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 8 May 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India. He entered Hong Kong on 7 March 2014 as a visitor. He overstayed and surrendered to the authorities on 22 September 2014. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 29 October 2014. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from a creditor from whom he had borrowed money. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [4] of the CALL-1 Form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 8 May 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3], and the torture risk[4]. 5.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After a hearing on 19 September 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal on 29 September 2017 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision covered all four grounds for non-refoulement protection. At [30] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not credible. It did not go on to consider matters such as availability of state protection or availability of internal relocation, as it was unnecessary for it to do so in light of its rejection of the applicant’s case for lack of credibility The judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 3 October 2017 which contained no ground for seeking relief. 7.In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 3 October 2017, the applicant deposed that:
8.The applicant did not request an oral hearing before the judge, who thus dealt with the application on paper. 9.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [9] to [13] of the CALL-1 Form:
Grounds for appeal 10.The applicant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 July 2018, in which he contended that:
11.In his skeleton submissions dated 27 December 2018, the applicant stated that his business partner had vowed to kill him. He also submitted that the Indian authorities are corrupt and cannot protect him. 12.The applicant also complained about the fact that he was initially given to understand that his application had been allowed, as the sealed order dated 27 July 2018 so indicated, only to later be told in early November 2018 that it had in fact been dismissed (as was in fact apparent from the CALL-1 Form). It is unfortunate that the judge’s order was initially wrongly drawn up. However, we note that the applicant would appear to have understood from the outset that his application had failed, as he lodged his Notice of Appeal promptly on 31 July 2018, four days after the CALL-1 Form and Order were issued, and his appeal has proceeded in the normal way thereafter. 13.We heard the appeal on 29 January 2019. Discussion 14.We observe first that none of the arguments relied upon in the Notice of Appeal, or the skeleton submissions, were raised as grounds for judicial review before the court below. It is not open to the applicant to raise such grounds on appeal for the first time, well outside the time limit for bringing judicial review proceedings (see Re Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 504, CAMP 524/2018 at §14(4)). 15.Further, on appeal to this court, it is necessary for the applicant to identify some error on the part of the court below that would call for the intervention of the Court of Appeal. No such error has been identified in either the Notice of Appeal or the skeleton submissions. The only complaints in the skeleton submissions are:
16.None of these matters are valid grounds of appeal. The first is a disagreement with the assessment by the Director and the Board of the risk faced by the applicant. It is well-established that this assessment is one for the Director and the Board to make, and one with which the court hearing an application for judicial review will not interfere absent any procedural impropriety or error of law, neither of which has been shown here. The second point, regarding the availability of state protection, was not in fact an issue raised in the application for judicial review and thus did not need to be considered by the judge, as the Board had rejected the claim for lack of credibility and had not in fact gone on to consider the issue of state protection. As such, the Board did not have to consider COI relating to India, and nor did the judge. 17.The applicant also referred in his skeleton to the error in the initial order issued by the court below. However, as explained in paragraph 12 above, while unfortunate, this did not have any impact on this appeal. 18.There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. |
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