Re Masum Madbar
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 188/2018 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 15 May 2019.
1. This is the applicant’s renewed application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Judge”) given on 12 June 2018 refusing him leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant’s previous application for leave to appeal out of time was refused by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“DHCJ Chan”) on 16 November 2018.
Cites 8 cases
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CAMP 188/2018 [2019] HKCA 473 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 188 OF 2018 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 762 of 2017) _____________________________
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________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Hon Chu JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s renewed application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Judge”) given on 12 June 2018 refusing him leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant’s previous application for leave to appeal out of time was refused by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“DHCJ Chan”) on 16 November 2018. 2.The applicant had filed an affirmation in support of his application. Despite the directions given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, he has not lodged any written submission. 3.Under Order 59 rule 14A(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A, this Court may determine an application for extension of time to appeal without an oral hearing. Having considered the summons and the affirmation filed by the applicant, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine the present application on paper without a hearing. 4.The applicant’s intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 5 September 2017 dismissing his appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 26 March 2015 and 26 May 2017 rejecting his non-refoulement claim. 5.The applicant’s claim was set out in detail in the decisions of the Director and the Board, and was summarized by the Judge at [1] to [10] of the Form CALL-1 dated 12 June 2018, [2018] HKCFI 1253. 6.Briefly stated, the applicant is a Bangladeshi national. He entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested by the police on 26 July 2009. On 28 July 2009, he raised a torture claim based on his fear of being harmed or killed by the supporters of the Awami League party (“AL”) because in 2008 he and other supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) threw bombs at the AL supporters during a political rally. Upon the commencement of the Unified Screening Mechanism, the applicant’s claim was assessed on all applicable grounds. 7.By his two decisions, the Director rejected the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds. The first decision covered the torture risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], and the persecution risk[3] grounds, and the further decision dealt with the BOR 2 risk[4] ground. 8.The applicant’s appeal to the Board was heard on 7 March 2016 and 11 August 2017. For the reasons set out at [45] to [139] of its decision dated 5 September 2017, the Board dismissed the appeal. In gist, the Board did not find the applicant’s case credible and did not accept he was targeted by the AL or was pursued by the Bangladesh police in connection with the bombing incident. The Board concluded that the applicant failed to make out a case under any of the applicable grounds. 9.On 12 October 2017, the applicant filed a Form 86 together with a supporting affirmation to apply for leave to judicially review the decision of the Board. At his request, an oral hearing was held on 4 May 2018. He appeared in person, having had his application for legal aid refused, and made oral submission to the Judge. By the CALL-1 From dated 12 June 2018, the Judge refused to grant him leave to apply for judicial review. 10.The 14-day period[5] for the applicant to appeal the decision of the Judge expired on 26 June 2018. On 16 October 2018, the applicant filed a summons together with an affirmation to apply for leave to appeal out of time. The summons was listed for hearing on 26 October 2018 before DHCJ Chan. The applicant was absent at the hearing. DHCJ Chan dismissed the application by his decision handed down on 16 November 2018. On 5 December 2018, the applicant filed a summons and an affirmation in this Court to renew his application for leave to appeal out of time. 11.In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court will have regard to: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the putative respondent if extension of time was granted: see: Chee Fei Ming v. Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene [2015] 4 HKC 134; and also Wong Yuk Man v. Ng Leung Sing & Anor [2016] HKCU 157 (HCMP 3217/2015, 22.01.2016). 12.By the time the applicant filed the summons in the lower court for leave to appeal out of time, he was already late for more than three months. The delay is serious. In addition to providing a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the applicant is required to demonstrate that his intended appeal has good prospect of success, which is a crucial factor in determining whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time for appeal (Secretary for Justice v Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Co Ltd [2001] 1 HKC 125, Re MK (unreported) HCMP 2609/2016, Islam Raja Rais v. Director of Immigration (unreported) HCMP 881/2017, Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226). 13.In the summons and affirmation filed in the court below, the applicant explained that he did not receive the decision and the order dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. He said he was still residing at the address he provided to the court, and he could not understand why he did not receive the court’s decision and order when he had on other occasions received letters sent by the court. Nothing was said about the reasons for the delay in the summons and affirmation filed in this application. We take it that the applicant is relying on the explanation he gave in the court below. DHCJ Chan was not impressed with the applicant’s explanation for the delay. We also find the explanation unsatisfactory. However, what is more important is the prospect of the applicant’s intended appeal. 14.The applicant relied on nine grounds in his application for leave to apply for judicial review, which the Judge summarised in [24] to [28] of the Form CALL-1. The Judge gave careful consideration to the grounds and explained in [35] to [52] of the Form CALL-1 why they were unarguable. 15.The applicant advanced two grounds of appeal in this application. They are: (1) DHCJ Chan was wrong in law in holding there was no state acquiescence or involvement; and (2) DHCJ Chan failed to provide detailed reason for his decision. 16.The two grounds are clearly unarguable. In the first place, the decision that the applicant seeks leave to appeal out of time is the decision of the Judge which refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The decision of DHCJ Chan dated 16 November 2018 only relates to the application for leave to appeal out of time. More importantly, other than making a mere assertion, the applicant has not provided any particulars to support his contention that the Judge was wrong in upholding the Board’s finding on the issue of state acquiescence. Thirdly, in light of the full reasons provided by the Judge, the complaint that he failed to give detailed reasons simply has no merit. 17.Given that the intended appeal is unarguable, it would be futile to give leave to appeal out of time. Accordingly, we dismiss the applicant’s summons filed on 5 December 2018. 18.Since the present application is totally without merit, we further make an order under Order 59 rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the High Court that the applicant may not request our determination to be reconsidered at an oral hearing.
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person. [1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115. [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] See Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CAMP 188/2018