Re Dil Islam Howlader

HCAL 1185/2018

[2019] HKCFI 1292

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1185 OF 2018

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D E C I S I O N

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1.The applicant is a Bangladeshi national.  He came to Hong Kong illegally on 4 February 2007 and he was arrested by police on 11 February 2007.  On 15 February 2007, he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation. On 2 March 2009, he made the non‑refoulement claim.

2.He claimed that if he was repatriated back to Bangladesh, he would be extorted, ill‑treated or killed by Jalal, Jamal and Janghir (“JJJ”) because his family had a land dispute with them.

3.The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) considered his application in relation to the following risks:

a.   risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

b.   Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life) (“BOR 2 risk”).;

c.   risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

d.   reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk under RC”).

4.By Notices of Decision dated 5 December 2014 (“the Director’s Decision”) and Notice of Further Decision dated 26 January 2017 (“the Director’s Further Decision”), collectively called “the Director’s Decisions”, the Director refused his application.

5.The applicant appealed to the Board on the Director’s Decision.  He did not appeal to the Board on the Director’s Further Decision. On 28 April 2015 and 13 May 2015 respectively, he attended before the Adjudicator.

6.The Adjudicator had considered the applicant’s evidence.  He came to a conclusion on the facts of the case.  He disbelieved the story of the applicant that his brother was killed by the JJJ and their people, that his father had transferred the ownership of the land to him and his sister.

7.By Decision dated 5 October 2015 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Board refused his appeal and confirmed the Director’s Decision.

8.By Form 86 dated 25 June 2018, under Order 53, rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court, the applicant applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision, with the Director as the interested party.  However, his application was out of time because it was made beyond three months after the Board’s Decision.

9.The applicant had not taken out an application for extension of time for his application.  Nevertheless, I had considered whether time should be extended for his application.

10.Having considered the merit of his case, I found that his application was devoid of merit and I refused to grant him extension of time for his application.  I have set out my full reason in Form Call-1 dated 16 April 2019.

11.Since my decision was an interlocutory decision, I had given directions that if the applicant wished to appeal against my decision, he had to apply for leave to do so by making written submissions.  His application would then be considered whether it should be disposed of on paper.

12.The applicant now takes out this application for leave to appeal against my decision.  In his supporting affirmation, he did not set out any substantive ground in support of his application, in particular, on the merits of his intended judicial review application.

13.In the circumstances, I consider that he has no ground in support of this application.  Accordingly, I dismiss his application on paper.

The Applicant appeared in person