Re Dil Islam Howlader
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 102/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 23 April 2020.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung given on 16 April 2019 refusing to grant an extension of time for his application for leave for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 5 October 2015.
Cites 9 cases
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CAMP 102/2019 [2020] HKCA 226 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 102 OF 2019 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 1185/2018) -----------------------------------
----------------------------------- Before: Hon Barma JA and Au JA in Court Date of Judgment: 23 April 2020 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung given on 16 April 2019 refusing to grant an extension of time for his application for leave for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 5 October 2015. Background 2.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong on 4 February 2007 illegally and was arrested by the police on 11 February 2007. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 2 March 2009. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on threats from his neighbours in his hometown, who had a land dispute with the applicant’s family. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [4] of the CALL-1 form. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 5 December 2014 (“the Director’s First Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. 5.By a Notice of Further Decision dated 26 January 2017, the Director also assessed the applicant’s claim based on the BOR 2 risk[4], and decided against him. 6.The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. After the hearings on 28 April 2015 and 13 May 2015, the Board dismissed the appeal on 5 October 2015 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision only covered the Director’s First Decision. There had been no appeal against the Further Decision to the Board. 7.At [39] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found that the applicant’s case was not supported by any other credible evidence and that little weight should be given to the applicant’s evidence. The judge’s decision 8.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 25 June 2018 which contained the following grounds for judicial review:
9.In his affirmation in support of the leave application dated 25 June 2018, the applicant advanced the following complaints:
10.The Form 86 was filed about 2 years and 8 months after the Board’s Decision and about 16 months from the Further Decision, which was well outside the 3-month time limit for applying for leave for judicial review. 11.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to extend time for applying for leave for judicial review. The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [12] to [20] of the CALL-1 form:
Application for leave to appeal and grounds for appeal 12.By a summons dated 24 April 2019, the applicant sought leave to appeal against the refusal to extend time to bring his judicial review proceedings. His application was dismissed by the judge on 24 May 2019. 13.By a summons dated 27 May 2019 and the affirmation of the same date, the applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal before this court. He stated in his summons that he did not receive the sealed order, CALL-1 form and judgment within 14 days from the day these were issued due to them being lost in post. He claimed that he only got the documents after searching the court file. 14.In his skeleton submissions dated 6 June 2019, the applicant submitted that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing the credibility of the applicant, and failed to meet the high standard of fairness. The applicant also referred to a number of cases and a section of the Immigration Ordinance without explaining how they are relevant to his intended appeal. Discussion 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. 16.As we have noted, in the summons and affirmation dated 27 May 2019, the applicant claimed that he did not receive the CALL-1 form by post. This is odd, as the CALL-1 form was mailed on 16 April 2019 to his address in Yuen Long and the applicant had in fact lodged his application for leave to appeal before the judge within time and he was able to obtain a copy of the relevant documents. Leave to appeal was needed not because the appeal was out of time, but because it was against an interlocutory decision not to extend time for bringing the judicial review. 17.In any event, the only ground of appeal set out in the skeleton submissions complains of errors on the part of the Board, but does not identify any error on the part of the judge. It is therefore not a viable ground of appeal. As we have often stated, in an appeal to this court, it is necessary to identify errors made by the judge, as an appeal is not simply to be treated as a further opportunity to make an application for judicial review. 18.We therefore do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal, and will not grant extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons of 27 May 2019 is dismissed accordingly. 19.We are also of the view that the application is totally without merit. Pursuant to Order 59 Rule 2A(8), we make an order that no party may request this determination be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
Cases cited in this judgment