Re Tulachan Bam Prasad
Read the full judgment text of CACV 7/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 14 June 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 3 January 2019 (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”) [2018] HKCFI 2861 , refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 1 February 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the
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CACV 7/2019 [2019] HKCA 652 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 7 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 246 OF 2018) _______________
_______________ Before: Hon Chu, Barma and Au JJA in Court Date of Judgment: 14 June 2019 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ Hon Au JA (giving judgment of the court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) set out in the Form CALL-1 dated 3 January 2019 (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”) [2018] HKCFI 2861, refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 1 February 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) respectively dated 2 August 2016 (“the Director’s Frist Decision”) and 11 September 2017 (“the Director’s Second Decision”). 2.The appeal was listed to be heard on 14 May 2019. The applicant was directed to lodge three sets of skeleton argument by 12 April 2019 and was warned that if he failed to do so, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper. The direction and the warning were communicated to the applicant by the Notice of Hearing dated 19 March 2019. 3.The requirement for lodging skeleton argument in an appeal is set out in Practice Direction 4.1. Due compliance with such requirement on the part of litigants is important for the proper and effective functioning of our appeal process. Skeleton arguments are important for the preparation of an appeal, both for the judges and the litigants. Non-compliance with such requirement can substantially impair the exercise of case management power of the presiding judge in an appeal, including the effective management of the oral hearing. Such failure on the part of a litigant is often the hallmark of ill-preparation of an appeal. In view of the heavy demand on the court’s time due to the large volume of appeals, unfocused oral presentation of materials at an oral hearing is not to be permitted, and this Court has taken a firm stance on the requirement to lodge skeleton argument. Failure to comply with the requirement, despite being warned of the consequence of default, is treated as an abandonment of the right to an oral hearing. 4.As the applicant failed to lodge a skeleton argument by the stipulated time, the hearing date was vacated. 5.However, by a letter dated 14 May 2019 (received by the court on 15 May 2019), the applicant wrote to the court and stated that he “completed his Skeleton Submissions for the hearing on 10 April 2019 and submitted to Court.” He said he was only “informed today that the court hearing has been vacated because the Court did not receive any Skeleton Submissions.” He said he did not know for what reasons why the court did not receive it. In support, he attached to his letter a copy of the screenshot of a computer screen which “bears [his] Appeal file which proves that the Skeleton Submission was indeed created on 10 April 2019”. He therefore asked for another hearing to be arranged prior to the handing down of a judgment. To the letter, he also attached a copy of the skeleton submission. 6.We are unable to accept this explanation. For the following reasons, we do not find credible the applicant’s allegation that he indeed lodged his skeleton submissions on or about 10 April 2019. 7.First, the applicant has simply failed to provide any details as to how he had allegedly submitted his skeleton submission to court. 8.Second and more importantly, upon the applicant’s failure to file his skeleton submission as directed, the court by a letter dated 16 April 2019 (sent by post and registered post) informed the applicant that the hearing on 14 May 2019 was vacated as he had failed to lodge his skeleton submission. This letter was sent to the address provided by the applicant. This is also the same address to which various directions and the Notice of Hearing were sent by the court to the applicant, which he had duly received. In the premises, by the latest some time around 20 April 2019, the applicant must have had notice that the hearing date was vacated because of his failure to file his skeleton submission. If he had indeed already submitted his skeleton submission on 10 April 2019 as now alleged, there would be no reason at all why he did not immediately write to the court at that time to say that he had already submitted the skeleton submission. 9.We therefore reject his request for fixing another oral hearing of this appeal. We will proceed to consider this appeal on paper based on the available materials, including the skeleton submission now submitted by the applicant under the letter dated 14 May 2019. Background 10.The applicant is a national of Nepal. He entered Hong Kong on 22 September 2012 and was permitted to remain as a visitor until 29 September 2012. He overstayed and was arrested by the police on 15 March 2015. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 17 April 2015. 11.The details of the applicant’s claim and his personal background were set out in paragraphs 5 - 6 of the Director’s First Decision, and paragraphs 12 - 33 of the Board’s Decision. 12.Briefly stated, the applicant claimed that if he were to return to Nepal, he would be harmed or killed by Giri Sherchan (“GS”). The applicant claimed that he paid money to GS for employment opportunities in Japan in around 2004. In around 2005, GS informed the applicant that he failed to obtain a Japanese visa for the applicant and promised to refund the applicant. However, GS failed to refund the money and disappeared. Eventually, the applicant and his friends was able to locate GS and injured him. GS reported the assault to the police and started to threaten the applicant for revenge via telephone calls. He further claimed that GS seized the applicant’s family land and is still looking for him. He also feared that the local police will arrest him for the assault back in 2005. The Director’s Decisions and the Board’s Decision 13.By the Director’s First Decision and the Director’s Second Decision (collectively, “the Director’s Decisions”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim. The Director’s First Decision covered the BOR 3 risk[1], the persecution risk[2], and the torture risk[3]. The Director’s Second Decision assessed the BOR 2 risk[4]. 14.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Board. The appeal was heard on 22 December 2017, during which the applicant answered questions raised by the Board. After hearing the applicant and having considered the materials before it, the Board dismissed the applicant’s claim. 10. The Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds. The Board was of the view that the applicant’s claim lacked credibility. The fact that he could still seek repayment from GS after the assault and threats, together with the fact that he could still live in the same area for around 5 - 6 years, showed the fear was not credible (paragraph 40(b) of the Board’s Decision). The Board also found that internal relocation was available to the applicant (paragraphs 45 - 48 of the Board’s Decision). Thus, the Board dismissed his appeal based on the lack of credibility on the applicant’s account, as well as on the basis of internal relocation. The Deputy Judge’s Decision 11. The applicant filed a Form 86 on 14 February 2018 seeking leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. He also filed a supporting affirmation on the same date. The Deputy Judge had succinctly summarized the applicant’s grounds for judicial review at paragraph 11 of the Deputy Judge’s Decision:
12. The Deputy Judge heard the leave application on 19 September 2018. Having considered the documents and the applicant’s oral submissions, the Deputy Judge concluded that the intended judicial review had no reasonably arguable grounds, and refused to grant leave. He set out his detailed reasons in paragraphs 12 - 16 of the Deputy Judge’s Decision:
Grounds for appeal 13. The applicant filed the Notice of Appeal dated 9 January 2019 to appeal the Deputy Judge’s Decision. He has advanced his grounds of appeal as follows:
15.In his skeleton submission, the applicant merely repeats these grounds verbatim at paragraphs 4 - 8 and says at paragraph 9 that he seeks reconsideration of his case on the basis of procedural unfairness. 14. Effectively, the applicant complains that the oral hearing was unfair because the Deputy Judge failed on his own to solicit from the applicant the particulars in support of the grounds of judicial review. The applicant asserts that this was procedurally unfair as (1) he was not capable of providing elaboration in full in writing and had to speak in his first language; (2) he only later realised from the Deputy Judge’s Decision that the Deputy Judge found his grounds of judicial review were “broad and vague assertions” as the Deputy Judge did not ask him about that in the hearing. Discussion 15. Judicial review is not a rehearing or re-assessment of the merits of an applicant's non-refoulement claim. The function of the judge in judicial review is to review the legality and rationality of the decisions of the Board or the Director, who are the primary decision makers, and the propriety and fairness of the process by which the decisions are arrived. The burden is on the applicant in a judicial review to show there are proper grounds on which the Court may grant the relief he sought: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. 16.Bearing these principles in mind, the applicant’s complaint against the Deputy Judge for procedural unfairness is misconceived. 16. The Deputy Judge already held an oral hearing for the applicant. The applicant was free and had the full opportunity to explain or make submissions orally to the Deputy Judge at the hearing on whatever details he wished to say in support of his complaints about the Board’s Decision which he said he was unable to set out in writing. If he did not do so himself, it cannot be a legitimate complaint that the Deputy Judge should somehow take his own initiative to ask the applicant for details. 18.In any event, as to his alleged incapability to provide elaboration in full in writing, we note that the applicant had filed the Form 86 and the supporting affirmation in English and he was assisted in court by a Nepalese interpreter. He is therefore either reasonably proficient in English or has had access to language assistance. He also has not demonstrated what those alleged details or particulars which he somehow could not set out in writing are. In particular, even by now, he could not even describe what is the nature of these alleged details or particulars. There is clearly no substance in this complaint of procedural unfairness. 20.In any event, we have reviewed the Board’s Decision and the Deputy Judge’s Decision, and the reasons they gave for their decisions. We see no error of law, or mistake of fact, or procedural impropriety in reaching those decisions. It is plainly right for the Deputy Judge to hold that the Board had made no errors in law or procedure. There is no basis to disturb the Deputy Judge’s Decision. Disposition 21.For the reasons given above, the applicant’s appeal has no merits at all. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [2] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [3] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 7/2019