Vu Van Khanh v. Permanent Secretary for Security
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2179/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 August 2019.
1. In this application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Applicant seeks to challenge a deportation order (“the Deportation Order”) issued by the Permanent Secretary for Security (“the Permanent Security”) on 21 March 2019 requiring him to leave Hong Kong and prohibiting him from being in Hong Kong at any time thereafter. In his Form 86, the Applicant seeks the following relief: (i) a declaration that the Deportation Order is null and void and of no effect; and (ii) an order of mandamu
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HCAL 2179/2019 [2019] HKCFI 1955 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2179 OF 2019 ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers Date of Decision: 9 August 2019 ________________________ D E C I S I O N ________________________ 1.In this application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Applicant seeks to challenge a deportation order (“the Deportation Order”) issued by the Permanent Secretary for Security (“the Permanent Security”) on 21 March 2019 requiring him to leave Hong Kong and prohibiting him from being in Hong Kong at any time thereafter. In his Form 86, the Applicant seeks the following relief: (i) a declaration that the Deportation Order is null and void and of no effect; and (ii) an order of mandamus to compel the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) to consider the Applicant’s application for entry dependant visa in accordance with the law or his legitimate expectation. 2.The Applicant is a non-refoulement claimant, having entered Hong Kong illegally on or about 16 December 2014. His non-refoulement claims on all applicable grounds were rejected by the Director on 12 November 2015 and 24 October 2016. His appeal or petition against the Director’s rejection of his non-refoulement claims to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the TCAB”) was rejected on 9 February 2017. On 3 November 2017, the Applicant made an application for leave to apply for judicial review of an unidentified decision of the Director (HCAL 843/2017). That application was dismissed by this court on 24 January 2018. On 7 May 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Applicant’s appeal against this court’s decision of 24 January 2018 (CACV 22/2018). On 6 August 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 7 May 2018. 3.According to the Applicant, on 22 July 2018, he got married in Hong Kong with a Hong Kong permanent resident. On or about 10 October 2018, he applied to the Director for entry dependant visa to join his wife for residence in Hong Kong. However, he was informed by the Director on 4 April 2019 that his application for a dependant visa would not be considered due to the fact that he was subject to a deportation order which had been issued against him on 21 March 2019. 4.In his Form 86, the Applicant set out his proposed grounds of judicial review of the Deportation Order, as follows:
5.The Applicant’s affirmation filed in support of the leave application on 31 July 2019 merely exhibited a number of documents, but contained no elaboration of the various proposed grounds of judicial review. Significantly, there was nothing to suggest that the statutory conditions for the issuance of a deportation order under Section 20(1) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) against the Applicant were not satisfied in the present case. 6.In so far as the Applicant’s proposed grounds of judicial review of the Deportation Order are based on his alleged family, marriage or related rights under BL 37 and 39, HKBOR 14 and 19, ICCPR 17 and 23, and/or ICESCR 10, it is now clear from the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang v Director of Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10 that such grounds are unsustainable. 7.In so far as the Applicant’s proposed grounds of judicial review of the Deportation Order are based on the alleged risk of harm or injury to him upon his return to Vietnam, that matter was dealt with and concluded by the Director and TCAB when assessing his non-refoulement claims and by the courts when dealing with his previous application for leave to apply for judicial review. 8.In so far as it is said that the Deportation Order was issued after the Applicant had made an application for a dependant visa, I do not consider that the existence of a prior application for a dependant visa would preclude the Permanent Secretary from issuing the Deportation Order. The existence of an application for a dependant visa was a consideration which the Permanent Secretary might take into account and give it such weight as he considered to be appropriate in the circumstances, but was not an overriding consideration. 9.As a matter of law, so long as there is in force a deportation order issued against a person, the Director is precluded from granting a dependant visa to that person. See Sah Shiv Kumar v The Director of Immigration [2019] HKCFI 796:
10.The fact that the Deportation Order was issued after the Applicant had made the application for a dependant visa did not, in my view, preclude the Director from taking the Deportation Order into account when considering the dependant visa application. 11.It is no part of the court’s functions, in an application for judicial review, to re-examine the Permanent Secretary’s decision afresh. The court can only intervene where his decision is unlawful, Wednesbury unreasonable, or made in a procedurally unfair manner. At the leave stage, the court has to consider, on the basis of the materials before it, whether the Applicant has shown that his intended application for judicial review is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success. The burden is on the Applicant to put before the court sufficient materials for this purpose. The materials currently before the court do not show any reasonable grounds for contending that the Permanent Secretary’s decision is unlawful, Wednesbury unreasonable, or made in a procedurally unfair manner. 12.The intended application for judicial review is not reasonably arguable, and has no realistic prospect of success. Accordingly, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
The Applicant is represented by Messrs Wong & Co. | |||||||||||||||||||||
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