Re Shashank
Read the full judgment text of CACV 134/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 September 2019.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr SHASHANK, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 14 March 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 26 July 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 10
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CACV 134/2019 [2019] HKCA 957 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 134 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1567 OF 2018) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr SHASHANK, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge K W Lung (“Judge”) on 14 March 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 26 July 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 10 January 2018 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of India now aged about 33, is a fear of being attacked or even killed by the family of his girlfriend (“Manisha”) if he should return to India. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following circumstances:
Arrival in Hong Kong and lodgment and processing of NRF Claim 3.The applicant arrived in Hong Kong on 21 December 2013 as a visitor with permission to stay for 14 days until 4 January 2014. 4.The applicant overstayed since 5 January 2014. He initially sought asylum from the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Hong Kong and was issued with an Asylum Seeker Certificate on 6 January 2014. He then surrendered to the Immigration Department on 13 January 2014. He lodged the NRF Claim by written representation on 3 June 2014. On 12 December 2017, he lodged his completed non-refoulement claim form (“NRF Claim Form”), which was prepared with the help of the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”). 5.In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representative(s) conducted a screening interview (“Interview”) on 5 January 2018 with the applicant who was assisted by a lawyer assigned by the DLS. Director’s Decision 6.The Director’s Decision covered all applicable grounds: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4]. 7.The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated. He gave very detailed reasons which can be summarised as follows:
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 8.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 23 January 2018. 9.After a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 17 May 2018 at which the applicant, with the assistance of a Hindi and English interpreter, testified and answered questions by the Board, the Board confirmed the Director’s Decision and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection. 10.More particularly, having noted “vastly inconsistent, confusing and implausible” claims made by the applicant in the NRF Claim Form, at the Interview and the hearing before the Board in respect of a number of key matters particularly the events after the applicant and Manisha moved to Indore (namely, the timing and details of the alleged visit by the police to the applicant’s office and the alleged telephone call by his office to the applicant; the alleged abduction and murder of Manisha by her family and the applicant’s subsequent actions; and the applicant’s return to Sonepat), the Board harboured serious doubt about the credibility of the applicant’s claims notwithstanding various mitigating factors raised by the applicant (such as mistakes due to nervousness, being not good with dates, memory loss etc). 11.In short, the Board found that while it is plausible that the applicant had a romantic relationship with Manisha while he was a student, it was not satisfied on the evidence that he had been harmed or threatened by any members of Manisha’s family. Even if the Board were to accept that Harish and his friends physically assaulted the applicant in 2006 due to his budding romance with Manisha, it did not accept any of the applicant’s evidence regarding subsequent events. In the end, there was not a real risk that the applicant would face any of the proscribed harms should he return to India. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued against the Director under HCAL 1567/2018 on 7 August 2018 (“Form 86”), the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision[5] and the Board’s Decision. 13.By the affirmation in support filed on the same date, the applicant set out the grounds upon which he sought relief, which the Judge summarised at [11] of the Form Call-1 dated 14 March 2019, [2019] HKCFI 612 (“Form Call-1”):
14.The Judge explained the refusal of leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision after an oral hearing at [15]-[19] of the Form Call-1 as follows:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 15.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 20 March 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following grounds:
16.On 10 May 2019, the applicant lodged written submission by which he simply reiterated his story and the danger that he would face from his girlfriend’s family if he should return to India while at the same time asserting that his girlfriend (whom he previously alleged was murdered by her family) was still waiting for him! 17.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 20 August 2019. He had nothing useful to add to the notice of appeal or written submission. Discussion 18.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. 19.The applicant’s first ground of appeal mentioned in the notice of appeal is therefore entirely misconceived. We have set out in paragraph 14 above [15]-[19] of the Form Call-1, which contains the Judge’s reasons for declining leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. It can be seen that the Judge did not make any finding as to the presence or otherwise of state involvement. He could not have done so. It was not within his province to do so. 20.The second ground appearing in the notice of appeal is likewise devoid of merits. The Judge did provide reasons for refusing leave. See against [15]-[19] of the Form Call-1. Those reasons were, in our view, sufficient in detail in light of the applicant’s confirmations to the Judge that he considered that he had had a fair interview with the immigration officer representing the Director and a fair hearing before the adjudicator of the Board; that he was able to understand English; that he read the Board’s Decision himself and that he understood it. 21.As for the matters reiterated by the applicant’s written submission, as stated in paragraphs 7, 10 and 11 above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the Unified Screening Mechanism in that both the Director and the Board have largely disbelieved the factual allegations upon which the NRF Claim was based. The applicant has not advanced any ground of appeal, properly so called, that tackles the negative findings of fact. Anyway, even if he had, an appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board (or that of the Director) afresh. The appellate court is concerned with whether the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong, which questions are to be considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. 22.In the premises, the applicant did not in the notice of appeal or written submission before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. Nor can we discern any. Disposition 23.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [5] The Judge rightly held that a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. |
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