Shashank v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1437/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 November 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the “Director’s Decision refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1567 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 1437/2021 [2021] HKCFI 3348 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1437 of 2021 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the “Director’s Decision refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1567 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. The procedural history 3.The applicant is an illegal immigrant from India. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written signification on 3 June 2014 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. 4.His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 10 January 2018. 5.He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 26 July 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal. 6.He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 14 March 2019 (the “Court’s Order”). 7.He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 September 2019. 8.His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 October 2019. 9.His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 30 October 2020. 10.He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 18 February 2021. 11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 12.The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by his girlfriend’s family due to his love relationship with his girlfriend, Manisha. 13.The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that there was no evidence for believing that he would be harmed or killed if he returned to India; that reasonable state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him. 14.The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board also found that his evidence on a number key matter, in particular, the events in the few years prior to his departure from India, was vastly inconsistent, confusing and implausible. The Board therefore had serious doubt about the credibility of his evidence because he was unable to give satisfactory explanation, taking into account of the totality of his evidence given to the immigration officer and the Board. The Board accepted the romantic relationship between him and Maisha, but rejected his evidence that Manisha’s family had threatened or harmed him. 15.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 16.He relies upon additional or new facts that the workers of the Bharatiya Janata Party wanted to expel all religious people except Hindus. They had set fire to his house because Manisha’s father sent them to do so. This happened before he left India, but he did not mention to the immigration officer or the Board. He explained that he was under tension, so he did not mention it. The immigration officer did not accept his explanation and considered that those facts should not be significant change of circumstances after the Board’s Decision, which, coupled with the facts of his original claim, would give the intended subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. The application for leave to apply for judicial review 17.The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application. He only attached the Director’s Decision without specifying any grounds in support of his application. 18.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA. §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 19.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant asked for more time for him to settle his problem. He has a broken knee and ankle pending operation. 20.It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. 21.The applicant has no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. 22.The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. 23.Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 24.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 25.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 26.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case. 27.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing. 28.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant had nothing to say. 29.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 30.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 31.RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant. Dated the 15th day of November 2021
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment