Re Islam Nurul
Read the full judgment text of CACV 255/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 25 September 2019.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Islam Nurul, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“Judge”) on 31 May 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 30 May 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 1
Cites 4 cases
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CACV255/2019 [2019] HKCA 1065 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 255 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1043 OF 2018) -----------------------------------
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Islam Nurul, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“Judge”) on 31 May 2019 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 30 May 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 13 June 2017 (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of Bangladesh now aged about 45, is a fear of being attacked or even killed by certain members of the Awami League (“AL”) namely, Isahaq, MD Azizul Haque, A Razzak and their associates who had harassed the applicant between 2003 and 2006 with a view to pressurising him into joining the AL. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following circumstances:
Entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 3.The applicant left Bangladesh, and arrived in Hong Kong as a visitor, on 29 September 2006. He had permission to stay for 14 days. On 12 October 2006, he left for China and re-entered Hong Kong on 14 October 2006, again with permission to stay for 14 days. He overstayed since 29 October 2006. He was arrested on 6 March 2008. 4.The applicant raised a torture claim under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Claim”), in respect of which he had (1) submitted a Torture Claim Form on 14 March 2013 (“TCF”), (2) provided written answers to the Director’s questionnaire dated 29 April 2013 and (3) attended a screening interview by the Director’s representative(s) on 28 May 2013. By a notice of decision dated 5 July 2013, the Director rejected the Torture Claim. The applicant’s appeal dated 18 July 2013 to the Board was dismissed on 25 November 2013. 5.The applicant then raised the NRF Claim by written representation dated 10 July 2013, which was later supplemented by a Supplementary Claim Form dated 15 May 2017. In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representative(s) conducted another screening interview on 29 May 2017 with the applicant who then had legal assistance and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. Director’s Decision 6.The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under any of the remaining grounds for non-refoulement protection[1]: persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3] and “BOR 3” risk[4].
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 7.The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 23 June 2017. 8.After a rehearing on 12 February 2018, at which the applicant testified and answered questions by the Board through a Bengali interpreter, the Board was not persuaded that the applicant would face any persecution risk, “BOR 2” risk or “BOR 3” risk in Bangladesh and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 30 May 2018. 9.First, the Board noted many inconsistencies and gaps in the applicant’s account. In particular, the Board spotted that the applicant had stated, and initialled 4 times, in the TCF that he was the president “in CHHATRA DAL Student wing of BNP party”, as opposed to the Jubodal which is the youth wing. The applicant’s unfamiliarity with the Jubodal and insensitivity to its difference from the Chhatra Dal as well as his inability to articulate any meaningful information about the BNP or its ideology cast grave doubt on his claimed position and importance in the BNP. And if he were not the BNP leader he claimed, the subsequent events underpinning the NRF Claim would have a weaker foundation. 10.In summary, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim that he faced ill-treatment, or any real risk of it, from A Razzak, Isahaq, MD Azuzil Haque or other AL supporters and found, inter alia, that that there was no or no reliable evidence that the applicant had suffered any physical or mental suffering of the requisite severity; that the assertion that AL supporters would pursue, and could find, the applicant wherever he went in Bangladesh was groundless and fanciful; and that there was no or no reliable evidence that the government of Bangladesh was unwilling or unable to afford protection to the applicant. 11.That being the case, it was unnecessary for the Board to consider the issue of internal relocation alternatives. Nevertheless, the Board agreed with the Director that, if necessary, it would not be unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate to another part of Dhaka or another large city such as Chittagong or Rajshahi to be free of harm (if any). Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 12.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued under HCAL 1043/2018 on 8 June 2018 (“Form 86”), supported by an affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision on grounds summarised by the Judge in [30]-[32] of the Form CALL-1 dated 31 May 2019, [2019] HKCFI 1393 (“Form CALL-1”) as follows:
13.After hearing the application in open court on 8 September 2018 at which the applicant was present and was assisted by a Bengali interpreter, the Judge refused leave. His reasons can be found in [36]-[49] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 14.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 13 June 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on 2 grounds:
15.In his skeleton submission dated 15 August 2019, the applicant referred to ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[5] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514 for the well known propositions (1) that high standards of fairness are required in the adjudication of non-refoulement claims (and the rationale for such requirement); (2) that the courts will on judicial review subject such adjudication to rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny to ensure that high standards of fairness have been met; and (3) that the necessary high standards of fairness require the claimant to be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim. However, the applicant did not suggest whether and, if so, how the high standards of fairness have not been met in the processing of his claim. 16.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 17 September 2019. Other than repeating his fear that his life would be in danger in Bangladesh and his hope to stay in Hong Kong for a further indefinite period of time, the applicant did not add to his notice of appeal or skeleton submission. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 17.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 18.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[6]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)]. Discussion 19.Applying these principles, first, as summarised in [6], [8]-[10] above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts and evidence at both tiers of the screening process. In particular, the Board had grave reservation about the applicant’s credibility and found primarily that he did not face any ill-treatment, or any real risk of it, from A Razzak, Isahaq, MD Azuzil Haque or any other AL supporters and that he would not be exposed to any persecution risk, “BOR 2” risk or “BOR 3” risk if he should return to Bangladesh. The applicant’s bare assertion under Ground 1 that he “will face hardship if he is to return back to his home country” goes against these findings by the Board. The question whether the applicant would be at risk if he is returned to Bangladesh is a question of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director): see [17] above. The Board heard the applicant. It provided detailed reasons in [43]-[53] of its decision for not believing the applicant’s testimony of the alleged circumstances giving rise to a risk of harm at the hands of the enemies named by him. It can be seen from [12] above that the applicant has not, by the proposed grounds for judicial review raised before the Judge, articulated any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in making such adverse findings against him. Nor has he done so before this court. Ground 1 is devoid of merit. 20.Ground 2 targets the Board’s Decision. As explained in [18] above, in dealing with an appeal against a refusal of leave for judicial review of a decision of the Board, what the Court of Appeal examines is the judge’s denial of leave for judicial review, and not the Board’s dismissal of the appeal against the Director’s rejection of the non-refoulement claim. The applicant has not, in either his notice of appeal or skeleton submission before us, stated in what way the Judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong in refusing leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Nor can we discern any. 21.Even insofar as the Board’s Decision is concerned, Ground 2 has not particularised the alleged unrecognised or hearsay source of news, outdated cases or incredible source of information that the Board allegedly referred to or relied on. Nor has he alluded to any specific part of the Board’s Decision that is allegedly speculative or groundless as a result of the Board having acted on such news, cases or information. Ground 2 is likewise unmeritorious. Disposition 22.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] The applicant had previously been informed that the rejection of the Torture Claim would not be reviewed under the Unified Screening Mechanism. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] The correct citation should be ST v Betty Kwan. [6] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
Cases cited in this judgment