Re Tarek Mahamud
Read the full judgment text of CACV 284/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 8 October 2019.
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Deputy Judge”) dated 18 June 2019 (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”), [1] refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 18 May 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) and the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 January 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”
Cites 5 cases
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CACV 284/2019 [2019] HKCA 1116 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 284 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 912 OF 2018) ________________________
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________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Zervos JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Deputy Judge”) dated 18 June 2019 (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”),[1] refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 18 May 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) and the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 January 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 2.At the conclusion hearing of the applicant’s appeal, we dismissed the appeal and indicated we would hand down our reasons for doing so in due course. These are our reasons. Background 3.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He left Bangladesh for mainland China on 21 June 2014. He entered Hong Kong illegally on 23 June 2014 and was arrested by the police on the same day. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 27 June 2014. 4.The details of the applicant’s claim and his personal background were set out in the Deputy Judge’s Decision.[2] 5.Briefly stated, the applicant claimed that if he was to return to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by members of the Awami League (“AL”). The applicant said he joined and later became the General Secretary of the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal (“JCD”) in 2003, the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). Upon his graduation in 2005, he continued to support BNP by joining the Jatiobadi Jubo Dal (“JD”) in 2006, which was the youth wing of BNP, and participated in the party’s activities. BNP was the ruling party in Bangladesh until late 2006 when BNP handed over power to an interim government. In mid-2008, the applicant became the General Secretary of the local branch of JD, and part of his duties was to encourage people to vote in the coming election. Some AL members, including two persons by the names Kamal and Samad, who were the President and Secretary of the youth wing of AL, threatened to kill him if he remained in Bangladesh. From 2009 to 2013, the AL members constantly assaulted and threatened him and his family. He eventually fled the country. The Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision 6.By the Director’s Decision which covered the BOR 3 risk,[3] the persecution risk,[4] the torture risk[5] and the BOR 2 risk,[6] the Director refused the applicant’s claim. 7.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The appeal was heard on 6 December 2017, during which the applicant answered questions raised by the Board. After hearing the applicant and having considered the material before it, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds and dismissed his appeal. 8.The Board found that the applicant’s allegations were vague and unconvincing. Despite his claim to be the General Secretary of both JCD and JD of the BNP, he was unable to recall the political objectives of BNP or JCD’s activities and policies. His evidence on his participation in JD was also vague and unpersuasive. Further, the applicant was inconsistent with the alleged attack by his enemies which took place in January 2009 and whether he was harassed and threatened persistently between 2009 and 2013. As a result, the Board only accepted that the applicant was involved as an ordinary member of the JCD and refused to accept that the AL members would still looking for him after he had been away from Bangladesh for several years. The Board found the applicant embellished his claim and did not find him to be a truthful witness. Accordingly, the Board dismissed his appeal. The Deputy Judge’s Decision 9.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 24 May 2018 seeking leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision. The grounds of review were summarized by the Deputy Judge in his decision as follows:
10.The Deputy Judge heard the applicant’s leave application on 27 August 2018. After the hearing, the Deputy Judge concluded that the intended judicial review had no reasonably arguable grounds, and refused to grant leave. He set out his reasons for refusing leave in the following paragraphs of his decision (footnotes omitted):
Grounds of appeal 11.The applicant filed a proforma Notice of Appeal dated 25 June 2019 to appeal the Deputy Judge’s Decision. In his proforma grounds of appeal he complained (1) that he would face hardship if he is returned to his home country; (2) that the Board relied on a source of news which was not officially recognised, or hearsay, and on cases which were outdated; and (3) that the lack of credible sources of information had resulted in the Board making groundless speculations. 12.Apart from merely repeating his claim in the Notice of Appeal, the applicant did not identify any material error or irregularity in the Deputy Judge’s Decision. Discussion 13.At this hearing, the applicant repeated his claim and relied on what had previously been submitted by him. 14.This Court in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14, highlighted the general propositions for determining an appeal for non-refoulement cases. 15.First, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. 16.Secondly, an appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge in the Court of First Instance is not an occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge. In determining an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and we would only reverse that decision if an appellant can demonstrate that the judge has made errors of law or failed to take into account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong. 17.Thirdly, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review. Otherwise, an applicant could flagrantly disregard the time limit in Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A. 18.In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Deputy Judge in assessing the Board’s Decision. However, as mentioned above, the applicant failed to identify any error in the Deputy Judge’s Decision. The grounds advanced by the applicant in the Notice of Appeal are against the Board’s Decision, which were properly addressed by the Deputy Judge in his reasons. These are not viable grounds of appeal. 19.In his proforma skeleton submissions filed on 14 August 2019, the applicant referred to passages from ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 on the “high standards of fairness” required of a decision-maker in the determination of a non-refoulement claim. 20.These authorities however are related to complaints directed at the Director and the Board, which had been properly addressed by the Deputy Judge in his reasons. As mentioned above, the applicant has not identified anything in this appeal to demonstrate why the Deputy Judge was wrong in his reasons. These authorities therefore do not assist the applicant in this appeal. 21.In any event, we have reviewed the Board’s Decision and the Deputy Judge’s Decision and the reasons they gave for their decisions. We see no error of law, or mistake of fact, or procedural impropriety in reaching those decisions. There is no basis to disturb the Deputy Judge’s Decision. Disposition 22.For the foregoing reasons, we were of the view that the applicant’s appeal was devoid of merit. Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal.
The applicant acting in person [2] Deputy Judge’s Decision, paragraphs 3 – 13. [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [5] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [6] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 284/2019