Re Mohamed Cassim Jawfar
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 142/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 14 January 2020.
1. On 16 October 2019 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) or the Torture Claims Appeal Board(“the Board”) in rejecting/dismissing his non-refoulement claim upon finding there were no good reason for his two months’ delay with his application, that none of the grounds put forward by him were reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law o
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HCAL 142/2018 [2020] HKCFI 57 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 142 OF 2018 _____________
_____________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers Date of Hearing: 11 December 2019 Date of Decision: 14 January 2020 _____________ DECISION _____________ 1.On 16 October 2019 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) or the Torture Claims Appeal Board(“the Board”) in rejecting/dismissing his non-refoulement claim upon finding there were no good reason for his two months’ delay with his application, that none of the grounds put forward by him were reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application. 2.The Applicant now by a summons issued on 25 October 2019 seeks leave to appeal against that decision which was interlocutory in nature: see Kwok Cheuk Kin v Leung Chun Ying [2018] HKCA 419, and that section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 provides that no appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter unless leave to appeal has been granted. 3.In considering whether to grant leave to appeal, section 14AA(4) of the Ordinance provides that leave shall not be granted unless the Court hearing the application for leave is satisfied that:
4.The threshold test for reasonable prospect of success was stated by Hon Le Pichon JA in SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at [17]:
5.In the present case, the Applicant did not provide any draft or proposed grounds of appeal in his summons, or in his supporting affirmation in which he merely repeated his claim that he has problems in his home country and that he just wants to save his life in Hong Kong but he does not know why his claim was rejected by the Director. As such and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant with sufficient particulars or elaboration, I am not satisfied that his intended appeal has any reasonable prospect of success, or that there is any other reason in the interest of justice why his appeal should be heard. 6.In the premises and for the reasons given, I refuse to grant leave for the Applicant to appeal, and accordingly his summons is dismissed.
The applicant appeared in person |
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