Alan Chung Wah Tang and Another v. Lee Siu Fong and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 236/2017 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 15 June 2020 before Kwan VP, Cheung JA and Au JA.
Bankruptcy – private examination under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6) – whether trustees have shown reasonable requirement to examine sisters of bankrupt – nominee accounts – transfer of HK$11 million from BNP nominee account to Lee Siu Fong and onward to NHDA – whether examination amounts to 'dotting the i's and cross the t's of a fairly clear claim' – SFPH shareholding – 75% holding diluted by par value allotment of 3.2 million shares to Lee's Machinery Ltd (held by Sisters) – whether section 20(1)(b) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347) applies to time-bar trustee's claim – interest in BSW – limited involvement of Sisters in acquisition of Dubois Beijing – living expenses – Bankrupt alleged Sisters paid for his daily living despite Insider Dealing Tribunal finding he remained wealthy – stay of execution pending appeal – inordinate delay by appellants – application rendered moot by general adjournment of court proceedings for public health reasons – costs – indemnity costs awarded for hopeless appeal and unmeritorious renewed stay application. The Court of Appeal held that the judge did not err in any of his exercises of discretion in granting the private examination orders. The application for stay was dismissed as moot and on the merits. The appeal was dismissed with indemnity costs, as none of the arguments advanced were of any merit, and the renewed application for stay should not have been brought given that each ground of appeal had already been considered and rejected in the Stay Decision with detailed reasons.
Legal issues: Application for stay of execution of private examination orders pending appeal · Private examination regarding the Bankrupt's nominee accounts · Private examination regarding the Bankrupt's 75% holding in SFPH · Private examination regarding the Bankrupt's interest in BSW · Private examination regarding the Bankrupt's living expenses · Whether the trustees were given an unfair advantage · Whether the trustees' delay constituted oppression · Whether the trustees had ulterior motives · Costs of the appeal and stay application
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; application for stay of execution pending appeal dismissed; indemnity costs ordered against the Sisters (1st and 2nd Respondents/Appellants) for both the appeal and the stay application.
Cited by 8 cases · Cites 5 cases
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CACV 236 /2017 [2020] HKCA 482 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 236 OF 2017 (ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO 345 OF 2001) ________________________
________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Kwan VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.There are before us an appeal and an application of the appellants for stay of execution of the orders being the subject of the appeal pending appeal. As things turn out, the stay application has become pointless. We will deal with the stay application first. The application for stay pending appeal 2.The orders that are the subject of the appeal are for the private examination and production of documents of the elder sisters (“the Sisters”) of a discharged bankrupt, Lee Siu Fung Siegfried (“the Bankrupt”), made by G Lam J on 21 September 2017, at the same time when he made similar orders against the younger brother (“the Brother”) and the son (“the Son”) of the Bankrupt. The Sisters served a notice of appeal on 19 October 2017. 3.Nearly two years later, on 15 October 2019, the Sisters filed an application to fix a date for the hearing of their appeal. On 21 October 2019, a joint checklist of the Sisters and the trustees in bankruptcy (the respondents in the appeal; “the Trustees”) was filed. In answer to the question “Have all necessary interlocutory applications been taken out?”, it was written “No interlocutory applications have been taken out”. This is lacking in candour, as only two days later the Sisters issued a summons to stay the orders for private examination pending appeal. They filed a notice of setting down the appeal on 25 October. There was clearly inordinate delay in prosecuting the appeal and in issuing the application for stay pending appeal. 4.The notice of hearing of this appeal was issued on 6 November 2019, with a hearing date of 1 April 2020. Hearing dates were fixed for the private examination of the Sisters before a master on two dates. The first was to take place on 24 March 2020, the latter on 23 April. 5.The stay application was dealt with on paper by the judge, who handed down his decision on 13 January 2020 (“the Stay Decision”). The judge went through each of the grounds of appeal in seven pages of the notice of appeal. He came to the view that there are simply no sufficient prospects of success in the appeal to warrant a stay of execution and dismissed the application for this reason alone. He noted that the examination of one of the Sisters was scheduled to take place more than three weeks after the appeal and remarked that it is not apparent her appeal in relation to the oral examination would be rendered nugatory without a stay. As for the orders for production of documents and the making of an affirmation[1] that are also the subject of the appeal, the Sisters have just not complied with those orders, and it has not been established why the appeal against such orders would be rendered nugatory without a stay[2]. 6.The Sisters renewed their application for stay pending appeal by issuing a summons in this appeal on 24 January 2020. On the same day, the Registrar of Civil Appeals gave directions for the filing of evidence and lodging of submissions, taking the view as the tight time frame was “self-created”, it would be unfair to abridge the time for the Trustees to comply with the usual directions in Practice Direction 4.1 §36. The submission of the Sisters was served on 10 March and by the time the Trustees lodged their submission in answer on 24 March, that was just eight days before the scheduled hearing date of the appeal. 7.On 24 March 2020, this court gave directions to deal with the stay application on paper and requested the parties to respond by 27 March whether they would consent to the disposal of the appeal on paper. By then, the private examination of one of the Sisters on 24 March and the appeal had been adjourned due to the general adjournment of court proceedings (“GAP”) for public health reasons. 8.All parties consented to the disposal of the appeal on paper. On 27 March, we directed a paper disposal of the appeal and gave directions for the Sisters to lodge reply submissions in the stay application and in the appeal. 9.On 8 April, it was announced by the judiciary that GAP will continue from 14 April to 3 May 2020. The private examination of both Sisters have been adjourned due to GAP and the hearing dates would be re-fixed in due course. As the appeal is to be disposed of on paper ahead of the private examination, it cannot be argued that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if there is no stay of execution and the application for stay of execution pending appeal has become meaningless. As for the appeal regarding the production of documents and the making of an affirmation, notwithstanding the Stay Decision, no evidence has been adduced by the Sisters in their renewed application that without a stay such an appeal would be rendered nugatory. 10.For the above reasons, the application for stay pending appeal must be dismissed. Background 11.Before turning to the appeal, we will mention the relevant background matters. 12.The judge’s judgment on 21 September 2017 relating to the Sisters (“the Sisters Judgment”) must be read with his reasons for decision on 12 October 2016 ordering the private examination of the Bankrupt ([2017] 1 HKLRD 1155; “the Bankrupt Decision”) and his judgment on 21 September 2017 ordering the private examination of the Brother and the Son (“the Brother and Son Judgment”). There is no appeal from the Bankrupt Decision and the Brother and Son Judgment. 13.The background matters were set out in the Bankrupt Decision at §§2 to 6 and are as follows:
The Sisters Judgment 14.The judge granted the orders sought by the Trustees under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6 in respect of four areas of inquiry: (1) the Bankrupt’s nominee accounts (only as against one of the Sisters, Lee Siu Fong); (2) the Bankrupt’s 75% holding in Siu Fung Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd (“SFPH”); (3) the interest in Siu Fung Ceramics (Beijing) Sanitary Ware Co Ltd (“BSW”); and (4) the Bankrupt’s living expenses. The evidence and findings in respect of those areas of inquiry may be summarised as follows. (1) The Bankrupt’s nominee accounts 15.The relevant evidence was set out in the Bankrupt Decision at §§45 to 49 and §9 of the Sisters Judgment:
16.In light of the above evidence, the Trustees found that the Bankrupt had maintained offshore nominee accounts and they consider it “quite possible” there were other fund transfers involving Lee Siu Fong and it is therefore necessary to obtain information from her. She had given no explanation why the $11 million was transferred in 1996 in such a “tortuous” manner. There is no suggestion from her that was a one-off incident. The Trustees wish to ask her why $11 million was transferred from Account JN 519 to her account and then immediately from her account to NHDA, and whether there were other sums of money or property she received from the Bankrupt. 17.The judge considered that there is basis for suspicion that the Bankrupt had used Lee Siu Fong in connection with his offshore money and that the Trustees have demonstrated a reasonable requirement to inquire into whether Lee Siu Fong had been involved in other fund transfers[5]. He noted that in 2013, she managed to produce documents and details relating to the transfer and payment in 1996, and considered that the Trustees have shown, prima facie, that she will be able to provide the information sought[6]. 18.The judge took into account the complaint that an investigation unlimited in time or amount would be oppressive. He ordered that the inquiry be directed at sums equal to or over $100,000 (or its equivalent in other currencies) and to payments or transfers from 1996 onwards[7]. (2) The Bankrupt’s 75% holding in SFPH 19.The evidence and findings were set out in the Brother and Son Judgment at §§11 to 31 and the Sisters Judgment at §14 and the relevant parts read as follows:
20.The judge is satisfied that the Trustees have shown a reasonable requirement for information from the Sisters in this area and that prima facie they have information to provide[8]. But he did not allow the examination to extend to the origin of the general funding of Lee’s Machinery Ltd or its general operation, as that would be going too far. Although that company got involved in a number of transactions concerning SFPH, it was set up well before the Group faced acute financial difficulties[9]. 21.The judge made another qualification in respect of the transfer of 1.6 million shares by Triumph Leader Ltd to Dynamic Achieve Investments Ltd in July 2000. He considers that the Trustees already have a fair amount of information here and that the potential oppression in this regard outweighs the Trustees’ requirement for further information and the examination should not cover this transaction. But this consideration does not apply to the allotment of 3.2 million shares to Lee’s Machinery Ltd, of which relatively little is known[10]. (3) The interest in BSW 22.The evidence was set out in the Brother and Son Judgment at §§32 to 42 and the Sisters Judgment at §18. The relevant parts read as follows:
23.The judge is satisfied that within the apparently limited involvement of the Sisters in this area, the Trustees have shown they reasonably require information from the Sisters for the purpose of their further functions. He also considers that prima facie the Sisters are in possession of the information sought[16]. (4) The Bankrupt’s living expenses 24.The relevant evidence was set out at §20 of the Sisters Judgment:
25.The judge took the view it is relevant for the Trustees’ investigation to see whether the Bankrupt in fact had his own assets at his disposal. He found that a reasonable requirement is shown for the Trustees to inquire, and that prima facie the Sisters should be able to assist[17]. 26.In the balancing exercise, the judge remarked that the Sisters are not entirely independent, commercial third parties vis-à-vis the Bankrupt. They were closely involved in the transactions involving SFPH from which questions arise which the Trustees have shown a need to pursue. In relation to at least the $11 million transferred from Account JN 519, Lee Siu Fong was prepared to be used by the Bankrupt as a conduit. The Sisters’ role in relation to the interest in BSW appears limited but nonetheless they were involved in the way they accept. And they are said to have been the source of the Bankrupt’s financial support as regards how he made a living[18]. 27.The judge further had this to say:
The principles on appeal 28.The judge has correctly stated the relevant principles how this appeal should be approached in §5 of the Stay Decision:
29.As stated by Rogers VP in The Joint and Several Liquidators of B+B Construction Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v Ulrich Weinmann & Ors, CACV 196/2004, 25 May 2005, at §20, in the context of an appeal against an order for examination under section 221 of the old Companies Ordinance, Cap 32:
30.As regards the assessment of the evidence of various areas of inquiry being challenged in this appeal, we think it is pertinent to bear in mind these words of the judge in the Brother and Son Judgment:
31.As mentioned, the grounds of appeal covered seven pages in the notice of appeal. Instead of dealing with the grounds one by one in an orderly manner, as was the judge’s approach in the Stay Decision, Mr Cheung chose to set out his arguments under various topics where some of the grounds of appeal discussed under one topic would resurface under one or more of the subsequent topics. This is an unsatisfactory way to marshal his arguments, as there is little hint in his submission whether each of the grounds of appeal specified under one topic has been dealt with, not to mention it makes for burdensome reading. Another unsatisfactory feature is that Mr Cheung only stated in his reply submission those grounds of appeal he would abandon[20]. This should have been stated at the outset, as it is clear from the Stay Decision those grounds are untenable. 32.We will deal with this appeal under the various topics mentioned in Mr Cheung’s submission. The Bankrupt’s nominee accounts 33.Mr Cheung’s arguments may be summarised as follows:
34.It would appear from point (7) above that the arguments advanced on appeal under this topic are largely a repetition of those raised before the judge. There is nothing in Mr Cheung’s contention that the judge had failed to give reasons or sufficient reasons. There is no duty on a judge in his reasoned judgment to deal with every argument presented by counsel. Nor is he required to identify and explain every factor which weighed with him in his appraisal of the evidence. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he acted and how he resolved the issues that were vital to his conclusion (Tsit Wing (Hong Kong) Co Ltd v TWG Tea Co Pte Ltd [2013] 2 HKLRD 505 at §§26 to 28 and the cases there cited). 35.We would reject the contention in (7) without hesitation. There is nothing in the contention there is no difference in terms of oppressiveness between the curtailed examination and what was sought by the Trustees. As the judge has emphasised, ultimately whether private examination becomes unfair or oppressive because of potential or existing proceedings against the examinee is a question of degree depending on the circumstances of the case. For this reason, we reject also the contentions in (5) and (6). As the judge had noted in the Stay Decision at §6, Lee Siu Fong’s affirmation merely said they would be in a greatly difficult position in retrieving documents and that memories faded. It has not been shown there is any error in principle or that the judge was plainly wrong to warrant interference with his exercise of discretion. 36.We agree with the judge there is basis for the Trustees’ suspicions that the Bankrupt had used Lee Siu Fong as a conduit in connection with his offshore money[21]. The submission that there was suspicion but no evidential basis in respect of certain matters is misconceived. As the judge had mentioned[22], in an application of this nature, it is not for the court to come to any finding or concluded view on the matters canvassed. The issue is whether the Trustees should be enabled to probe or probe further in all the circumstances, and it is not necessary to establish a prima facie case to justify an order for examination. The contention in (1) is without merit. 37.As for HCA 779/2013, this was a simple action against Lee Siu Fong for the recovery of the known sum of $11 million. The explanation she gave in her defence regarding that transfer is limited. Further, there is no suggestion that the transfer of $11 million was a one-off incident. The judge took the view that the Trustees have demonstrated a reasonable requirement to inquire into whether Lee Siu Fong had been involved in other fund transfers. We agree also with the judge’s assessment that in relation to the nominee accounts, there is as yet no concrete reason to think that there is any potential claim against Lee Siu Fong. We are unable to see any error of principle, nor can it be said that the judge was plainly wrong. We do not think there is any substance in the contentions in (2) and (3). 38.The contention in (4) is a bad point. The duty of trustees in bankruptcy, and the purpose of a private examination, is not confined to the recovery of assets. The judge has already mentioned there is a strong public interest in ensuring that trustees are enabled to obtain relevant information to understand the bankrupt’s affairs and to report relevant misconduct to the authorities[23]. The Bankrupt’s 75% holding in SFPH 39.Mr Cheung’s arguments are along these lines:
40.There is no merit in any of the above contentions. 41.The arguments have all been considered by the judge and we agree with him. The judge has gone into the allotment of the 3.2 million shares in SFPH in some detail. He noted in particular that the allotment was at par, and that the Sisters thereby acquired 50% of SFPH, the business of which subsequently became the business of the listed vehicle, LPHL[24]. That the examination ordered did not extend to the source of funding from Lee’s Machinery Ltd or its general operation is immaterial. The Trustees’ concern was that on the face of the series of transactions, after the Group began to face financial difficulties, a pharmaceutical business which was held as to 75% by the Bankrupt as at 1996 became the business of a listed company in which he had ostensibly no interest, and all that he had apparently obtained in return was $2[25]. It cannot be disputed that the Sisters were closely involved in the Bankrupt’s disposal of his 75% interest in SFPH. There is no basis to interfere with the judge’s exercise of discretion in ordering an examination against the Sisters, as prima facie they have relevant information to provide. 42.As for the time bar argument, in an application for private examination the trustees need not formulate a cause of action and it would be premature to speculate at this stage what causes of action the Trustees may have against which persons[26]. Besides, the examination is sought not only for the purposes of claims against the Sisters but also for the purposes of the bankruptcy generally including investigating potential claims against other parties. It is quite unnecessary to deal with Mr Cheung’s convoluted arguments here, not to mention they beg the question if property was received in good faith, for value and without notice prior to the commencement of bankruptcy. In any event, we agree with the judge that where a bankrupt has, prior to bankruptcy, placed assets in others’ hands as nominees, an action by the trustee-in-bankruptcy, who steps into the shoes of the bankrupt, to recover such assets would be an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property from his trustee and such action is not subject to any statutory period of limitation by virtue of section 20(1)(b) of the Limitation Ordinance[27]. The interest in BSW 43.Mr Cheung ran these arguments:
44.We find nothing of substance in any of the above arguments. The judge was clearly aware that the Sisters’ involvement was limited and considers that prima facie the Sisters are in possession of the information sought. It is immaterial that the Trustees do not have evidence showing any direct involvement of the Sisters in the acquisition of the 36% shareholding in BSW by KBI or the acquisition of Dubois Beijing by the Brother. The Trustees’ concern was that the Brother apparently became owner, through Capital Ocean, of a substantial interest in BSW, which he allegedly gifted to the Son some years later, with the Bankrupt apparently running BSW all the while. They also have some basis to suspect that funding for the initial acquisition in 2001 came from parties closely related to the Bankrupt. There is nothing to warrant interference with the judge’s exercise of discretion. The Bankrupt’s living expenses 45.The complaint is that the decision is “overly arduous and harsh”, and is based on “suspicious findings” of the Insider Dealing Tribunal, with no evidence that the financial assistance provided by the Sisters to the Bankrupt came from the funds of the Bankrupt and was surmise at most. The Trustees fail to “pinpoint” any suspicious transaction in this regard. 46.We reject the above contentions. The inquiry was directed to address the Trustees’ suspicion, based on the conclusion of the Insider Dealing Tribunal, that the Bankrupt remained in control of substantial assets on which he relied for his living, contrary to his allegation that the Sisters paid for his living expenses. The Sisters were closely involved in some of the Bankrupt’s financial affairs, being the offshore nominee accounts, the SFPH shareholding, and the interest in BSW. They were said by the Bankrupt to be the source of his financial support. Prima facie they should be able to assist with the Trustees’ inquiry in this area. We disagree with Mr Cheung that the decision of the judge was plainly wrong. There is nothing to suggest that the judge had failed to conduct a proper balancing exercise. Unfair advantage given to the Trustees 47.We have dealt with the argument that the Trustees already have sufficient materials to commence action against Lee Siu Fong for knowingly assisting the Bankrupt to siphon off his assets in the nominee offshore bank accounts. A similar complaint was made in relation to the SFPH shareholding. It was alleged that the Trustees have already identified all the transactions for the SFPH shares and they have issued protective writs in this respect. The judge did not deal with this in the judgment. 48.The judge had considered the submissions in this respect regarding the SFPH shareholding and had dealt with them[28]. That he did not mention the protective writs is neither here nor there. He took the view that in relation to SFPH, it is not a situation where the Trustees are seeking merely to dot the i’s and cross the t’s of a fairly clear claim. He had taken this into account in the balancing exercise. There is no basis to interfere with his assessment or the exercise of his discretion. Trustees’ inordinate delay 49.The complaint is that the Trustees have been waiting for the past 16 years and using lack of funding as an excuse. The information relied on by them regarding the transfer of the SFPH shareholding has been revealed in the public domain (being the prospectus of LPHL) since 2002. The Trustees have identified the Sisters as the main targets of investigation in their report in August 2007. It was only in December 2015 that they raised query with the Sisters regarding the transfer of the SFPH shareholding. There was unexplained delay of eight years at least. The judge did not mention whether this inordinate delay would constitute prejudice and oppression to the Sisters. He had failed to factor in the Trustees’ delay in his balancing exercise. 50.Contrary to the above contentions, the judge had expressly considered the issue of the time elapsed in conducting the balancing exercise[29]. As rightly pointed out by the judge, the question of how much weight to give to this is not a ground of appeal against an exercise of discretion[30]. Trustees’ ulterior motives 51.The complaint is that the Trustees stand to benefit from remuneration of over $7 million by taking part in a series of litigation out of the costs that may be awarded by the court against the opposite parties. It was contended that the Trustees are not entitled to receive remuneration in this manner, and that they have pursued the application for private examination with such ulterior motive, not for the benefit of creditors. 52.This was considered by the judge who did not think it necessary to deal with the argument whether a trustee’s own fees can be recovered as part of the costs of a contested application[31]. The judge characterised the arguments in the grounds of appeal as nothing more than a repetition of the allegation of ulterior motive without identifying any relevant error[32]. We agree with him. Conclusion and costs 53.We dismiss the appeal as none of the arguments advanced are of any merit. 54.There is no reason why the costs of the application for stay pending appeal and the costs of the appeal should not follow the event. 55.The Trustees seek costs of the application and of the appeal against the Sisters on an indemnity basis as both matters are hopeless, to mark the disapproval of the court. 56.The renewed application for stay pending appeal should not have been brought. Each of the grounds of appeal have been considered and rejected by the judge in the Stay Decision with detailed reasons. The appeal against his exercise of discretion is quite hopeless. We think the circumstances are exceptional to justify indemnity costs and we so order in respect of both matters before us.
Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by ONC Lawyers, for the Applicants (Respondents) Mr Jeremy Cheung and Miss Karen Cheung, instructed by Liu, Chan & Lam, for the 1st and 2nd Respondents (Appellants) [1] By §§2 and 4 of the order of 21 September 2017, the Sisters were required to produce documents and file an affirmation within 21 days of the order. [2] See Re Ho Yuk Wah David (bankrupt) (No 4) [2019] 4 HKLRD 379 §§12 to 14. [3] An employee of SFCH, whom the Tribunal found to be the “trusted lieutenant” of the Bankrupt. [4] Beijing DBS Co Ltd [5] Sisters Judgment, §11 [6] Sisters Judgment, §13 [7] Sisters Judgment, §12 [8] Sisters Judgment, §16 [9] Sisters Judgment, §17 [10] Sisters Judgment, §26 [11] The Chinese name of KBI appeared to be “兆峰創建(北京海外)有限公司”. “兆峰” (Siu Fung) was both the name of the Bankrupt and the Group. [12] Lion Legend Holdings Ltd, according to the Bankrupt a subsidiary of a German company for which he works, Roy Ceramics SE. [13] Capital Ocean Enterprises Ltd [14] World Cheer Enterprise Ltd, of which the Bankrupt was appointed a director in May 2015 and the Son was a director. [15] Mr Jeremy Cheung, who appeared for the Sisters below and on appeal, with Ms Karen Cheung. [16] Sisters Judgment, §19 [17] Sisters Judgment, §20 [18] Sisters Judgment, §22 [19] Sisters Judgment, §25 [20] Grounds 1(iii), 1(iv), 2(ii) and 9 of the grounds of appeal [21] Stay Decision, §7 [22] Brother and Son Judgment, §22 [23] Brother and Son Judgment, §23 [24] Stay Decision, §10 [25] Brother and Son Judgment, §14 [26] Sisters Judgment, §28 [27] Stay Decision, §16 [28] Sisters Judgment, §§24, 25 [29] Stay Decision, §14; Sisters Judgment, §§13, 14, 19, 21; Brother and Son Judgment, §§49 to 54; Bankrupt Decision, §§64 to 67 [30] Stay Decision, §14 [31] Sisters Judgment, §29 [32] Stay Decision, §17 |
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