Shamim Hossain v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 242/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 June 2020.
1. The Applicant is a 45-year-old national of Bangladesh who first came to Hong Kong in 2006 and subsequently made a torture claim under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which was rejected in March 2011 and was repatriated to Bangladesh in May 2011, but in August 2014 he re-entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested by police on 6 February 2015. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-re
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HCAL 242/2018 [2020] HKCFI 1271 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LISTNo. 242 of 2018 BETWEEN
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan: Leave to apply for judicial review refused. Observations for the Applicant: 1.The Applicant is a 45-year-old national of Bangladesh who first came to Hong Kong in 2006 and subsequently made a torture claim under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which was rejected in March 2011 and was repatriated to Bangladesh in May 2011, but in August 2014 he re-entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested by police on 6 February 2015. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be harmed or killed by supporters of local rival political party Awami League (“AL”) and/or by the police over a false charge against him for the death of a local villager. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim. 2.The Applicant was born and raised in Village Outshahi, District Munshiganj,Bangladesh. After leaving school, he worked as a mechanic, got married with two children,and became a supporter of the political party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”), but as AL was the ruling party, he and his fellow BNP supporters were often harassed by the AL people in his home village. 3.One day in January 2012 while the Applicant was attending a cricket match in the village with several of his friends, an argument broke out between some of the spectators which deteriorated into a fist fight during which one of the local villagers Monir was seriouslyinjured and later died in the hospital. 4.Several months later in May 2012 the Applicant heard that the police were looking for him and his friends as charges had been made against them for the death of Monir in that cricket match incident, of which he suspected that it was the local AL leader Ali Ahmed and his people who were behind the false charges in a plot against BNP, and as he believed that the local police were under AL’s influence, he therefore fled to Gazipur Singardighi District where he encountered no further incidents, but in August 2012 when he heard that the AL people and the police were looking for him everywhere and that his friends had allleft the country, he decided to follow suit by departing on 26 September 2013 for China, andfrom there he later sneaked into Hong Kong, and upon his arrest by the police he raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form on 31 May 2017 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. 5.By a Notice of Decision dated 11 July 2017 the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 risk”), risk of torture or cruel,inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”),and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”). 6.In his decision the Director took into account all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found no substantial grounds for believing that there will be real riskof being harmed or killed by the AL people or the police upon his return to Bangladesh due to absence of any past ill-treatment from them, that there was no reliable evidence that he was being pursued by the police as he was able to leave the country without any problem,that in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Bangladesh with a large population of 156 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 148,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with work experience to move to other part of Bangladesh away from his home district in large cities such as Dhaka where it would be difficult if not impossible for those AL people to locate him. 7.On 24 July 2017 the Applicant filed an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 25 October 2017 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions put to him by the adjudicator for the Board. On 29 January 2018 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the decision of the Director. 8.In its decision the Board found the Applicant’s claims in respect of his political activities and profile in BNP not credible and did not accept that he was ever a member of BNP or that he was involved in or was accused of the murder of Monir, that the credibility of his claim was further undermined by his failure to seek protection upon his arrival in Hong Kong despite previous knowledge of his right to seek protection until his arrest somesix months later, and concluded that he was not a witness of truth and that there was not anyreal risk that he will face under any of the applicable grounds upon his return to Bangladesh. 9.On 14 February 2018 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form,and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he simply stated that the decision was unreasonable in that it failed to consider all the matters raised in his claim and/or give adequate reason for its decision without providing any particulars or elaboration. 10.However, on 8 June 2018 the Applicant filed a further affirmation in support of his application, and amongst the attached documents he put forward further grounds for his intended challenge in a statement under the title “Grounds for Petition/Appeal in the High Court of the HK Special Administrative Region”, in which he first repeated his claim as before and cited various authorities and principles of the relevant law, and then in paragraph 7 he provided additional grounds or complaints of the Board’s decision as follows:
11.The Applicant then went on to give the following elaborations of his complaints which were at times confusing and contradictory:
12.The Applicant then concluded in his complaint that “the Adjudicator has done a shoddy job, inconsiderate and has failed miserably.” 13.Hence based on the above and notwithstanding the apparent confusion, it seems that the Applicant’s complaints of the Board’s decision can be summarized as follows:
14.The complaint under Ground (1) is plainly without basis as the adjudicator clearly did in paragraphs 44 – 60 of the Board’s decision properly set out her reasons for rejecting his claim and dismissing his appeal. The Applicant may not agree with her reasons, but it is clearly wrong for him to assert that the adjudicator did not give any or sufficient reasons,and hence this ground is not reasonably arguable. 15.The same can be said about his complaint under Ground (2), as even on his own case the Applicant had never been subjected to any ill-treatment let alone being tortured between May 2011 when he was repatriated from Hong Kong to Bangladesh and September2013 when he left Bangladesh for China, and on that basis and on her adverse findings as to his credibility, the adjudicator was clearly entitled to conclude that there was no real risk of him being tortured upon his return to Bangladesh. As such I do not find this ground reasonably arguable for his intended application. 16.As for Ground (3), the complaint is just a broad and vague assertion of the Applicantwithout any particulars or specifics or elaboration, and upon examining those COI available to the Board and referred to by the adjudicator, I do not find any basis or merit in this complaint of the Applicant, and that this ground is not reasonably arguable either. 17.For the remaining Ground (4) in which the Applicant argues that it was wrong for the adjudicator not to believe that he was a member of BNP on the basis that he was unable to produce any documentary evidence of his membership which COI show that since 2008 prospective members were required to complete membership documents, but as he first joined as a member back in 1990 when there was no such documentary requirement, he submits that the adjudicator therefore erred in her such finding. 18.Even assuming that it was true that the Applicant did join BNP well before 2008 when there was no such documentary requirement, that was not the only basis or reason for the adjudicator’s adverse finding on his credibility, as it was so amply set out in the decision as follows:
19.It is therefore plain that the adjudicator’s adverse finding on the Applicant’s credibility was clearly not just based on the lack of documentary evidence of his membership or association with BNP but on the combination of a variety reasons as stated above. In the premises I find this complaint of the Applicant also not reasonably arguable for his intended challenge. 20.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the applicant,as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. 21.In the present case and as noted above, the Board rejected the Applicant’s claim essentially on its adverse finding on his credibility for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in its decision, and in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness being shown by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the finding of the Board. 22.Furthermore, the fact that it has been established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Bangladesh, a decision also confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & anor [2013] 1 HKC 526. 23.In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim. 24.For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and I accordingly refuse his leave application. Dated the 30th day of June 2020.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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