Bahadur v. Director of Immigration and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 243/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 June 2020.
1. Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“the Ordinance”) has made provisions for the making of a claim for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on the ground of a torture risk, starting with the requirement of the claimant to submit a torture claim form, or the later Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) upon the subsequent commencement of the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) for screening non-refoulement claimants on all applicable grounds, in which paragraph 24 of “The Practice
Cites 3 cases
|
HCAL 243/2018 [2020] HKCFI 1272 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LISTNo. 243 of 2018 BETWEEN
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
It is further directed that:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“the Ordinance”) has made provisions for the making of a claim for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on the ground of a torture risk, starting with the requirement of the claimant to submit a torture claim form, or the later Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) upon the subsequent commencement of the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) for screening non-refoulement claimants on all applicable grounds, in which paragraph 24 of “The Practice and Procedural Guide of the Administrative Non-refoulement Claims Petition Scheme” effectively mirrors Section 37Y of the Ordinance which stipulates as follows:
2.Section 37ZA also sets out the following duties required of a claimant in respect of his or her claim:
3.Any failure on the part of the claimant in respect of the above duties may result in the claim being treated as withdrawn, as stipulated by Section 37ZG as follows:
4.In the present case, the Applicant, a 29-year-old national of India, on 22 March 2014 raised a claim with the Immigration Department of his intention to seek non‑refoulement protection. 5.On 1 September 2016 while being detained at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre (“CIC”), the Applicant was served with a blank NCF with a written request to complete and return the completed NCF to an immigration officer on or before 29 September 2016 so that substantiation of his claim could be processed. 6.Shortly thereafter on 5 September 2016 the Applicant was granted legal representation by the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) in respect of his non-refoulement claim, and on 9 September 2016 he was released from CIC on recognizance. 7.By a letter dated 23 September 2016 the DLS informed the Department that they were unable to contact the Applicant and had no further instruction to act for him. 8.As by 29 September 2016 the Applicant still failed to return a completed NCF, by a written notice dated 4 October 2016 from an immigration officer, he was informed that his non-refoulement claim was treated as withdrawn under Section 37ZG(1) of the Ordinance. 9.On 20 February 2017 the Applicant in writing requested to re-open his non‑refoulement claim. By a letter dated 21 February 2017 from an immigration officer, the Applicant was required to provide detailed reason for his failure to return his completed NCF due to circumstances beyond his control with documentary proof. 10.On 28 February 2017 the Applicant replied that when he was released from CIC on 9 September 2016, he had left his blank NCF behind in CIC, and as he did not know where to obtain another NCF, he therefore did not return his completed NCF, and as he was afraid of being arrested again, he did not report to the Ma Tau Kok Recognizance Reporting Office. 11.By a Notice of Decision dated 1 March 2017 the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refused the Applicant’s request to re-open his claim upon not being satisfied that he had provided sufficient evidence to show that he had not been able to return the completed NCF as required due to circumstances beyond his control. 12.On 10 March 2017 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision, putting forward the following grounds for his appeal:
13.On 11 August 2017 his appeal was dismissed by the Board for the following reasons as stated in its decision:
14.On 14 February 2018 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of both the decisions of the Director and the Board, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he merely stated that he was not satisfied with their decisions for rejecting his claim without reasonable grounds, and that he cannot go back to India because he will lose his life without providing any particulars or elaborations as to what error of law or procedural unfairness may have been made in the decisions. Nor did he request any oral hearing for his application. 15.He was however also late with his application, Order 53 rule 4(1) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. 16.As the last day of the three-month period for the Applicant to file his Form 86 fell on 11 November 2017, he was therefore more than 3 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1; and AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393. 17.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 3 months must be considered as substantial or excessive, for which he did not provide any explanation, and as the record shows that the Board’s decision was sent to him on the same day at CIC where he had been detained up to the time when he filed his Form 86, I am unable to see any acceptable reason or justification for his such significant delay. 18.As for the merits of his application, as already noted the Applicant has also failed to put forward any proper or valid ground with any particulars or elaborations in support of his intended challenge, let alone any reasonably arguable one. 19.In my view, the Board was right to agree with the Director, even assuming the Applicant did in fact, as alleged, leave behind his blank NCF in CIC when he was released on 9 September 2016, a most unlikely event indeed in the circumstances of his case, that he would still have had ample time and opportunity of about 3 weeks either directly or through DLS to retrieve his NCF from CIC or to obtain another NCF from the Immigration Department, and that his reason for failing to report to Ma Tau Kok Recognizance Reporting Office or to seek assistance from them because he was afraid of being arrested was equally unacceptable as circumstances beyond his control. 20.Whilst it is noted from above that he did proffer a further explanation in his Notice of Appeal for his default because he did not have any money to travel to Ma Tau Kok Office after his “welfare had expired”, of which the Board did not appear to have dealt with in its decision, in my judgment it could not have advanced his case any further in the absence of any supporting evidence from him that that was indeed the case, and that in any event there is nothing to suggest that he could not have travelled, albeit on foot, to the Ma Tau Kok Office or any other office of the Immigration Department for assistance, as it has been held that an applicant who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in judicial review even though he may have a meritorious case: Law Chun Loy v Secretary for Justice, HCAL 13/2005, 26 October 2006, at §13, per Hartmann J (as he then was). 21.As such and in the circumstances I agree with both the Director and the Board that the Applicant had clearly failed his duty as a claimant under Section 37ZA(1) of the Ordinance, and that I am not satisfied that he has shown that there is any merit in his intended application. 22.In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their refusal to re-open the Applicant’s claim. 23.For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his significant delay, I refuse to extend time and accordingly dismiss his leave application. Dated the 30th day of June 2020.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
|
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 243/2018