Parklane Mortgage Services Ltd v. Li Ho Jacob
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1133/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 August 2020.
1. This is an application for summary judgment. At the hearing, I indicated preliminarily that one option I was considering was to grant the Defendant leave to defend on condition of him paying a sum into Court is one of the options.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 2 cases
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HCA 1133/2019 [2020] HKCFI 2079 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1133 OF 2019 ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ D E C I S I O N ________________________ Introduction 1.This is an application for summary judgment. At the hearing, I indicated preliminarily that one option I was considering was to grant the Defendant leave to defend on condition of him paying a sum into Court is one of the options. 2.In response, Mr Raymond W N Tsui, for the Defendant, requested for an opportunity to file evidence on his client’s financial means, as he had not come prepared with such evidence. I acceded, bearing in mind the reminder issued by the Court of Appeal in Liu Ke Mian Lorraine v De Xin Da Trading Co Ltd (HCMP 1481/2016, 30 September 2016) at §§25-26. I also gave the Plaintiff an opportunity to file responsive evidence if so advised. 3.I have now received and reviewed the additional materials[1] and give judgment. 4.Mr Tsui submitted that the present case is not appropriate for summary judgment because there is a material deviation between the Statement of Claim and the Plaintiff’s affirmation. It is said that on the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff is suing on a loan agreement dated 3 October 2018 (“Loan Agreement”) under which it advanced a sum of HK$4 million to the Defendant on the same day; but on the Plaintiff’s affirmation, the loan was first advanced in July 2018 under an earlier loan agreement and the repayment date was extended by a second loan agreement in August 2018 and further extended by the Loan Agreement. 5.Mr Edward M H Chan, for the Plaintiff, submitted, and I agree, that there is no deviation as the rolled over loan is treated at law as a new loan even though money did not change hands between the lender and the borrower at the time the new loan is said to be advanced. While it would have been more desirable if the earlier loan agreements and the loan being rolled over were pleaded, I do not regard there is any material deviation between the Statement of Claim and the Plaintiff’s affirmation. 6.Mr Tsui next submitted that the Defendant has a bona fide defence or raises triable issues. In summary:
7.Needless to say, the Plaintiff disputes all of these points. I have considered both side’s arguments carefully in light of all the evidence before me (including the additional materials mentioned at the outset) and remain of the view that I should grant the Defendant conditional leave to defend. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to go into the substance of the case save to point out that I regard there are good grounds to believe that the defence is shadowy or a sham and that I very nearly gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiff. 8.In terms of the condition to be imposed, as Mr Chan rightly observed, the burden is on the Defendant to adduce sufficient and proper evidence as to his means and he must make full and frank disclosure. Having considered the Defendant’s 2nd Affidavit, I am not satisfied that the Defendant has discharged that burden. In particular:
9.Accordingly, I make the following order:
Mr Edward M H Chan instructed by Matthew Ng & Co for the Plaintiff Mr Raymond W N Tsui instructed by Raymond Cheung & Chan for the Defendant [1] While nothing turns on it, I should mention the Plaintiff filed a submission (instead of an affirmation) in response to the Defendant’s evidence on his financial means. |
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