Re Nirmal Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 215/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 9 November 2020.
1. On 9 November 2020, we dismissed the appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Nirmal Singh, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 17 June 2020 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings (“Judge’s Decision”). We now give reasons.
Cited by 1 case · Cites 6 cases
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CACV 215/2020 [2020] HKCA 920 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 215 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 218 OF 2018) ________________________
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________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.On 9 November 2020, we dismissed the appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Nirmal Singh, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 17 June 2020 refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings (“Judge’s Decision”). We now give reasons. 2.The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 26 January 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”). Such rejection was embodied in, and communicated to the applicant by, a notice of decision dated 21 June 2016 and a notice of further decision dated 18 July 2017 (“1st Director’s Decision” and “2nd Director’s Decision” respectively and “Director’s Decisions” collectively). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 3.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of India now aged about 33, is a fear of being attacked or even killed by his uncle Baldev (“Baldev”) over a land dispute if he should return to India. Such alleged fear is said to arise out of the following circumstances:
Entry into Hong Kong, arrest and lodgment and processing of NRF Claim 4.The applicant arrived in Hong Kong on 15 April 2014 as a visitor on his own passport and was permitted to stay until 29 April 2014. He was arrested by the police in Hong Kong on 18 July 2014 after having overstayed for about 3 months. He lodged the NRF Claim by written representation with the Director on 20 July 2014. 5.The applicant submitted his Non-refoulement Claim Form dated 21 January 2016. In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representatives interviewed with the applicant on 15 April 2016. The applicant then had legal assistance and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. Director’s Decisions 6.The 1st Director’s Decision covered torture risk[1], persecution risk[2] and “BOR 3” risk[3]. The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under these grounds.
7.Following the 1st Director’s Decision, by a letter dated 22 June 2017, the applicant was invited to submit additional relevant facts on or before 6 July 2017 so that the Director could take them into account in considering the NRF Claim on any other applicable ground. The applicant did not respond to such invitation. In the absence of additional information, by the 2nd Director’s Decision, the Director also rejected the NRF Claim for failing to establish a “BOR 2” risk[4]. Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 8.The applicant appealed to the Board after the 1st Director’s Decision on 30 June 2016. 9.The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 29 November 2017 at which the applicant, with suitable interpretation, testified before and answered questions by the Board. 10.The Board’s Decision covered all 4 applicable grounds[5] for non-refoulement protection. 11.After considering the applicant’s evidence and hearing him at the hearing, the Board found the applicant’s account of the centerpiece of the NRF Claim to be inconsistent and exaggerated, if not incredible. The Board did not believe that Baldev is an influential SAD member; that the Alleged Assault occurred; or that the Indian police are seeking to arrest the applicant. 12.The Board also came to the same conclusions as the Director on the availability of state protection and reasonable internal relocation alternatives. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 13.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review issued against the Director and the Board under HCAL 218/2018 on 12 February 2018 (“Form 86”), the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review. 14.In the space “Judgment, order, decision or other proceedings in respect of which relief is sought”, the applicant wrote “Non-Refoulement claim has been By (sic) Rejected by immigration department HKSAR”, with “Dated 22 June 2017” written immediately below. 22 June 2017 was the date on which the Director sent a letter to the applicant to invite him to provide further information in support of his BOR 2 claim. There was really no indication by the applicant as to which decision(s) he wished to apply for judicial review. Nor did he provide any grounds for seeking relief in the Form 86 or in his accompanying affirmation. Nonetheless, the Judge proceeded to process the application as one for leave for judicial review of both of the Director’s Decisions as well as the Board’s Decision. 15.As the applicant did not request for an oral hearing, the Judge dealt with the application on the material before him. The Judge explained the refusal of leave at [11]-[16] of the Form Call-1 dated 17 June 2020, [2020] HKCFI 1185, as follows:
Appeal to Court of Appeal and grounds of appeal 16.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 24 April 2019, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following ground (sic): “I am not satisfied with the decision because its away form facts and reality which are related with my case. There is no any transparency in these dicision. please accept my application and allow me to process further my case” 17.On 13 September 2020, the applicant lodged written submission, by which the applicant repeatedly asserted that his life would be in danger if he were to return to India and that the authorities there could not protect him. He further accused the Board of ignoring “so many things” regarding his case, from which he then complained that all the decisions concerning his case were not “transparent”. The applicant has however not given any particulars of any aspect of the NRF Claim, whether legal or factual, that had been overlooked. The applicant requested for this court’s assistance so that he could extend his stay in Hong Kong. 18.The applicant did not appear at the hearing of the appeal on 9 November 2020. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 19.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 20.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[6]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2) & (4)]. Discussion 21.As summarised in [6], [7], [11] and [12] above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the unified screening mechanism. The questions whether the applicant would be at risk of life or torture if he is refouled to India and, if so, whether the danger would be lowered or negated by the availability of state protection and/or reasonable internal relocation options are all questions of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director). The applicant has not advanced any ground of appeal, properly so called, that tackles the negative findings of fact against him. 22.As for the “ground” in the notice of appeal, the applicant has failed to identify in what ways the Judge’s Decision took into account matters that are removed from reality. 23.Nor do we see any merit in the criticism of lack of transparency. The Director’s Decisions, the Board’s Decision and the Judge’s Decision all explained in great detail both the factual and legal bases upon which those determinations were reached. 24.The applicant did not in the Form 86 or the accompanying affirmation point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the findings by the Board. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was hopeless and rightly dismissed. 25.Nor did he in the notice of appeal or written submission before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. We cannot discern any either. Disposition 26.For these reasons, we saw no basis to interfere with the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal.
The applicant was unrepresented and absent [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] With the applicant’s consent, the Board also dealt with the 2nd Director’s Decision, which was issued after the filing of the Notice of Appeal/Petition on 30 June 2016. [6] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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