HKSAR v. Tsui Tack Kong and Another
Read the full judgment text of FAMC 66/2019 on BabelCite. This FAMC judgment was delivered on 16 December 2020.
1. At the hearing, we dismissed these applications for leave to appeal for reasons which we now provide.
Cites 2 cases
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FAMC Nos. 66 and 67 of 2019 FAMC Nos. 6 and 16 of 2020 [2020] HKCFA 40 FAMC Nos. 66 of 2019 and 6 of 2020 IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NOS. 66 OF 2019 AND 6 OF 2020 (CRIMINAL) (ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM HCMA NO. 289 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ FAMC Nos. 67 of 2019 and 16 of 2020 IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NOS. 67 OF 2019 AND 16 OF 2020 (CRIMINAL) (ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM HCMA NO. 289 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ (HEARD TOGETHER)
________________________________ REASONS FOR DETERMINATION ________________________________ Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ: 1.At the hearing, we dismissed these applications for leave to appeal for reasons which we now provide. 2.On 17 November 2014, Mr Chan Shu-moon was walking on the pavement in Jardine’s Bazaar, Causeway Bay, when the ground beneath him suddenly caved in and he fell into a sinkhole which was some 3.7m deep, suffering multiple injuries, including three broken ribs. 3.The sinkhole was formed about 2.3m from an adjacent building site which was in the charge of the four applicants. They had authorised and were carrying out the works then in progress which involved excavation of the basement level of the building being constructed. As this was below ground water level, it was necessary to build an impermeable structure known as a “cofferdam” incorporating a “grout curtain” for the purpose of keeping ground water from seeping horizontally into the site. When officials of relevant government departments investigated the accident, they concluded that the cofferdam had not been properly built or maintained resulting in the ingress of excessive water into the site, leading to the sinkhole collapse. They decided that the four applicants should face prosecution. 4.They were charged under section 40(2B)(b) of the Buildings Ordinance[1] which relevantly provides:
5.There was no doubt that the four applicants were directly concerned with the relevant works and that a risk of injury had materialised in respect of the unfortunate Mr Chan. The only question was whether that risk of injury was causally related to the manner in which the works were carried out. 6.The trial before Mr Winston Leung, Deputy Magistrate,[2] lasted 29 days and resulted in the conviction of all four applicants, their sentences being fines ranging from $30,000 to $100,000. 7.There was no direct evidence as to the cause of the sinkhole. Thus, on the crucial question of causation, the issue was whether it was an irresistible inference that the manner of carrying out the works on the site was such that it was likely to cause the risk which occurred. The Magistrate found that such an irresistible inference could indeed be drawn so that the offence was proved beyond reasonable doubt. In reaching that conclusion, he accepted the evidence of an expert prosecution witness, Mr Pang Kwok-kay, and rejected contrary evidence from defence experts. 8.Mr Pang pointed out that the evidence showed that there had been an excessive ingress of water into the site for a considerable period which had necessitated four de-watering pumps to be used. The sinkhole was dry, indicating that there had been a drastic drop of the ground water level by 1.27 m to 1.82 m. He also noted that there had been two ground subsidence incidents in the pavement outside the site a few days before the relevant sinkhole collapse. He inferred that the cofferdam and grout curtain were defective and had cracks, resulting in a “piping effect” whereby the excessive ground water entering the site had carried with it particles of soil from the surrounding areas, leading to soil erosion and the formation of progressively enlarging cavities in the ground, ultimately causing the sinkhole to form. He also opined that observation of the flooding situation on the site and proper use of the equipment to monitor the ground water level and ground settlement at the site should have signalled the likely risk to the applicants and ought to have led to the taking of remedial steps. However, such indications were disregarded and no remedial measures were taken. 9.The Magistrate accepted this evidence and held that the following facts had been proved beyond reasonable doubt:
10.He also found that the monitoring systems had been disregarded during the whole period of construction; that the leakage was obvious at least on the dates mentioned above and that the applicants must have had first-hand knowledge thereof; but that nothing had been done to deal with the leakage except to de-water the site using four pumps.[4] 11.The Magistrate therefore found that section 40(2B)(b) had been violated in that two aspects of the manner in which the works were being carried out, namely with defects in the cofferdam leading to the flooding of the site and a failure properly to monitor the effects of the flooding and to remedy the situation, were likely, through a piping effect, to have caused the risk of injury that had been suffered by Mr Chan. 12.The applicants’ appeal came before Campbell-Moffat J.[5] After having reviewed the case put forward by each side and the Magistrate’s decision, her Ladyship observed that the appeal:
13.It was, in other words, an appeal purely on the facts which, somewhat to the Judge’s dismay, involved an appeal bundle running to over 12,000 pages and 17 pages of Grounds of Appeal.[7] Her Ladyship formulated the core issue as follows:
14.The Judge agreed with the Magistrate’s essential findings and agreed that the question was whether a violation of section 40(2B)(b) had been proved on the basis of the evidence regarding “the geology of the area; the nature of the Sinkhole; the nature of the building works; the amount of water on the Site; and the reliability of the GWL [ground water level] and GSL [ground settlement level] monitoring records”.[9] She noted the Magistrate’s rejection of the defence expert evidence and was not prepared to interfere with his view.[10] The Judge also upheld his finding as to the causative influence of the piping effect:
15.Her Ladyship also agreed with his findings as to inadequate monitoring and a failure to take remedial measures, concluding that the required irresistible inference ought to be drawn and that the guilt of each applicant was proved beyond reasonable doubt:
16.The present applications for leave to appeal are mounted by the applicants, separately represented by leading counsel,[13] in the wholly unpromising context of proceedings which have turned throughout on case-specific findings and inferences. Undaunted, the applicants sought certification and leave on the basis of the following question of law:
17.It is advanced on the basis that the Judge, in criticising the form in which the Grounds of Appeal were drawn up, stated:
18.The question proposed for certification leads nowhere in the present case. As discussed above, the Judge agreed with and upheld the central findings and conclusions of the Magistrate, holding that causation had been proved on the basis of a well-founded irresistible inference. She plainly did in fact consider and rejected criticisms levelled against the Magistrate regarding errors he was alleged to have made. In any event, even if she might have found that he had erred in some respects, or if she had made findings based on a slightly different approach to the facts, the outcome of the appeal by way of rehearing was the same. No basis for granting leave to appeal on such findings exists. Whether or not any issues of law might, in some other case, merit an airing in connection with how Magistrates’ appeals by way of rehearing should be conducted, such issues are quite academic in the present case. 19.Associated complaints, advanced as grounds for leave on the “substantial and grave injustice” basis, similarly lack any foundation in the light of the unassailable findings by the Magistrate and the Judge in the present case. 20.The applications for leave to appeal were also made on the substantial and grave injustice basis against the Judge’s costs order regarding the costs of the appeal. The Judge duly considered the applicable principles and exercised her discretion in the specific circumstances of the case in making the order.[15] No basis for granting leave to appeal is disclosed.
FAMC 66/2019 & FAMC 6/2020 Mr Peter Duncan, SC, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the 1st and 2nd Applicants Ms Alice Chan, DDPP (Ag) and Mr Pierre Lui, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent FAMC 67/2019 & FAMC 16/2020 Ms Maggie Wong, SC, Mr Eric Chung and Mr Lawrence Pang, instructed by Deacons, for the 3rd and 4th Applicants Ms Alice Chan, DDPP (Ag) and Mr Pierre Lui, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent [1] Cap 123. [2] ESS39227-ESS39230/2015 (10 April 2018). [3] Statement of Findings pp 91-92. [4] Statement of Findings p 93. [5] [2019] HKCFI 2925 (2 December 2019). [6] Judgment §16. [7] In a subsequent Decision on Costs [2020] HKCFI 327, §5. [8] Judgment §32. [9] Judgment §§37-51. [10] Judgment §59. [11] Judgment §60. [12] Judgment §66. [13] Mr Peter Duncan SC for the 1st and 2nd applicants and Ms Maggie Wong SC leading Mr Eric Chung and Mr Lawrence Pang for the 3rd and 4th applicants. [14] Judgment §22. [15] Decision on Costs [2020] HKCFI 327. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under FAMC 66/2019