Gurung Bikash Kumar v. Director of Immigration and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1042/2017 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 January 2021.
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of (i) the decision (“ the 2015 Decision ”) of the Director of Immigration made on 21 January 2015 and conveyed to the Applicant by a letter dated 26 January 2015 refusing to grant to the Applicant an extension of stay, and (ii) the decision (“ the 2017 Decision ”) of the Chief Executive in Council made on 22 August 2017 and conveyed to the Applicant by a letter dated 1 September 2017 rejecting the Applicant’s objection to the 2015
Cites 6 cases
|
HCAL 1042/2017 [2021] HKCFI 171 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1042 OF 2017 ________________________
________________ Before: Hon Chow J in Court Date of Hearing: 19 January 2021 Date of Decision: 27 January 2021 ___________________ D E C I S I O N ___________________ INTRODUCTION 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of (i) the decision (“the 2015 Decision”) of the Director of Immigration made on 21 January 2015 and conveyed to the Applicant by a letter dated 26 January 2015 refusing to grant to the Applicant an extension of stay, and (ii) the decision (“the 2017 Decision”) of the Chief Executive in Council made on 22 August 2017 and conveyed to the Applicant by a letter dated 1 September 2017 rejecting the Applicant’s objection to the 2015 Decision and confirming the 2015 Decision. BASIC FACTS 2.The Applicant is a Nepalese national born in Nepal on 20 August 1976. On 14 August 2020, the Applicant married Ms Gurung Bal Kumari (“the Wife”), a Hong Kong permanent resident, in Nepal. The Applicant was at the time of that marriage a widower with two children born in 2004 and 2006 respectively, while the Wife was a divorced woman with two children (“the Step-Children”), who were also Hong Kong permanent residents, born in 1989 and 1994 respectively. 3.On 21 December 2010, the Applicant entered Hong Kong as a dependant of the Wife with permission to remain until 21 December 2011. On 28 November 2011, the Applicant applied for an extension of stay under the Director’s Dependant Policy, and was granted an extension of stay as a dependant of the Wife until 21 December 2014. 4.On 24 October 2014, the Wife passed away in Nepal. 5.On 2 December 2014, the Applicant applied for an extension of stay on his own merits without any sponsor (“the 2014 Application”). 6.By a letter dated 10 December 2014, the Director requested the Applicant to provide further information and documents in relation to the 2014 Application, which the Applicant did by a letter dated 18 December 2014. 7.By a letter to the Applicant dated 26 January 2015, the Director refused the 2014 Application. In that letter, the Director stated as follows:
8.The Immigration Department’s internal deliberation of the 2014 Application can be found in its File Minute (M.1), the relevant parts of which state as follows:
9.By letters dated 2 and 9 February 2015 and 9 March 2015, the Applicant’s solicitors provided some further information and documents, and requested the Director to reconsider the 2015 Decision. After consideration of the additional information and documents, by a letter to the Applicant’s solicitors dated 24 June 2015, the Director informed the Applicant that he could find no reason or justification for reversing the 2015 Decision, and the refusal decision previously conveyed to the Applicant on 26 January 2015 still stood. 10.By a letter to the Chief Secretary for Administration dated 7 July 2015, the Applicant lodged an objection (“the Section 53 Objection”) against the 2015 Decision and the Director’s further decision dated 24 June 2015[1] pursuant to s 53 of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“the Ordinance”). In that letter, the Applicant stated, for the first time, that his family members in Nepal had died and disappeared “due to recent earth quake”. 11.After a process of representations and responses from the Director and the Applicant which took place between 17 July 2015 and 17 February 2017, the details of which it is not necessary to set out in this decision, the Section 53 Objection was submitted to the Chief Executive in Council for consideration on 2 August 2017. 12.On 22 August 2017, the Chief Executive in Council considered the Section 53 Objection. The Council advised and the Acting Chief Executive ordered that the 2015 Decision refusing the Applicant’s application for extension of stay should be confirmed. By letter dated 1 September 2017, the Security Bureau conveyed the 2017 Decision to the Applicant. 13.On 8 December 2017, the Applicant made the present application for leave to apply for judicial review seeking, inter alia, an order of certiorari to quash the 2015 Decision and the 2017 Decision. The Applicant also requested for an oral hearing of the application if leave was not granted on paper. The following grounds on which relief was sought were advanced:
DISCUSSION 14.Leaving aside challenges based on constitutional grounds, generally speaking, in an application for judicial review, an immigration decision of the Director can only be challenged on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, or procedural unfairness. 15.The law confers upon the Director a wide discretion in immigration matters (MA v Director of Immigration, HCAL 10/2010 (6 January 2011), at §97 per Andrew Cheung J (as he then was)). While the exercise of such discretion by the Director is subject to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction in judicial review, a person seeking to challenge an immigration decision made by the Director on the irrationality ground has to overcome a very high threshold (Chan Heung Mui v Director of Immigration, CACV 168/1992 (24 March 1993), at §37). It is for the Director, not the court, to administer the scheme of immigration control in Hong Kong. 16.The Director is under no legal duty to consider humanitarian or compassionate grounds when making immigration decisions. To the extent that the Director decides to take into account such factors, the weight to be put on them is also a matter for the Director (Comilang Milagros Tecson v Director of Immigration [2018] 2 HKLRD 534 (CA), at §96; BI v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKLRD 520 (CA), at §105). 17.The above principles also apply to decisions made by the Chief Executive in Council upon review of immigration decisions of the Director under s 53 of the Ordinance. 18.In the present case, in view of the fact that the Applicant no longer had an eligible sponsor, his application for extension of stay fell outside the Director’s prevailing Dependant Policy. In this regard, it may be noted that neither the Applicant’s Step Children nor his brother in Hong Kong were eligible to act as the Applicant’s sponsor under the Director’s Dependant Policy. His application based on his own merits was subject to the Director’s well recognised overall restrictive immigration policy. It was a matter for the Director’s exercise of discretion whether to permit a person in the Applicant’s position to stay and remain in Hong Kong. Save in the most exceptional of circumstances, the court would generally not interfere with the Director’s exercise of discretion in immigration matters. The Director was entitled to take the view that there was no extenuating ground which would warrant exceptional consideration of the Applicant’s application for extension of stay. There is nothing in the materials before the court which could support the Applicant’s challenge to the 2015 Decision of the Director, or the 2017 Decision of the Chief Executive in Council. 19.Although the Applicant has alleged irrationality, fettering of discretion, procedural unfairness, bias and discrimination on the part of the Director or his officer, they are bare allegations not supported by evidence. 20.In so far as the Applicant complains about the absence of reasons:
21.In so far as the Applicant contends that the loss of his sponsor was an Act or God and beyond his control, the court is sympathetic to the Applicant’s position. However, as earlier mentioned, it is for the Director, not the court, to administer the scheme of immigration control in Hong Kong. The court cannot interfere with the Director’s immigration decision in any given case merely because it may have exercised a relevant discretion differently. The Applicant’s argument that the Director’s decision is contrary to natural justice is based on a misunderstanding of the principles of natural justice as applied by the court. The Applicant had been given full and proper opportunities to make representations to the Director and the Chief Executive in Council before the relevant decisions were made. 22.None of the matters raised by the Applicant in his Form 86 or Affirmation dated 8 December 2017 gives rise to any sufficient public law ground for the court to interfere with the decisions of the Director and Chief Executive in Council in the present case. 23.In short, the intended application for judicial review is not reasonably arguable, and has no realistic prospect of success. DISPOSITION 24.The application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 25.The principles for making an award of costs against an unsuccessful applicant in an application for judicial review are well established (see Leung Kwok Hung v President of Legislative Council (No 2) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 841). The Court of Final Appeal has made it clear that an award of costs against an applicant should not be made unless there are special or unusual circumstances which justify such an award, and the discretion of making an award of such costs should be sparingly exercised. The circumstances of the present case are not, I consider, special or unusual, or sufficiently special or unusual, as would justify an award of costs being made against the Applicant. Accordingly, I make no order as to costs.
The Applicant acting in person Mr Gilbert Mok, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice, for the Putative Respondents [1] In the Applicant’s letter dated 7 July 2015, the Director’s further decision was said to have been made on “07-06-2015”. | |||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment