Huen Cheong Lam v. J.V. Fitness Ltd (in Liquidation)
Read the full judgment text of DCEC 810/2016 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 28 January 2021.
1. This is an employees’ compensation claim arising out of an accident which happened on 6 March 2015, made pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282) ( “the Ordinance” ). Interlocutory Judgment on liability had been entered in favour of the applicant by consent on 22 November 2016.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 4 cases
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DCEC 810/2016 [2021] HKDC 101 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 810 OF 2016 --------------------------
------------------------- Before: His Honour Judge H. Au-Yeung in Court Dates of Hearing: 5, 6 and 20 January 2021 Date of Judgment: 28 January 2021 ---------------------- JUDGMENT ---------------------- INTRODUCTION 1.This is an employees’ compensation claim arising out of an accident which happened on 6 March 2015, made pursuant to the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282) (“the Ordinance”). Interlocutory Judgment on liability had been entered in favour of the applicant by consent on 22 November 2016. 2.This is the trial for the assessment of compensation payable to the applicant. 3.Before I proceed to consider the amount of compensation payable under sections 9, 10 and 10A respectively, I will resolve the following issues first.
HOW DID THE ACCIDENT HAPPEN? 4.At the trial, the respondent challenged the applicant’s evidence as to how exactly he got injured. As a result, CCTV footage was played during the trial and the applicant was cross-examined on this matter for quite a while for this purpose. 5.In his closing submissions, Mr Yip for the applicant submitted that it was doubtful whether it was open to the respondent to make such a challenge, as the respondent, by the acceptance of its liability, should be taken to have accepted that the accident had occurred in the way as described in paragraph 3(3) of the Amended Application. 6.With respect, I am surprised that this argument was made after so much time had been spent on this matter at the trial as aforesaid. If Mr Yip is right, the respondent should not have been allowed to waste such time during the trial. In my view, given the fact that the respondent had clearly indicated in its written opening submissions that the aforesaid challenge would be made, Mr Yip should have raised his objection before the applicant was called to give evidence, or no later than the time when Mr Ho started to cross-examine the applicant on this issue. 7.In any event, the applicant’s argument is a non-starter, because the respondent’s admission of liability should not prohibit it from making any point in relation to quantum. The position in the present case had been made even clearer because the consent order on liability dated 22 November 2016 provided that:-
8.The way the applicant got injured, in my view, would have an impact on the extent of the injury suffered as a result of the accident and in turn would have bearing on quantum. For this reason, it is clearly open to the respondent to raise this as an issue in the assessment of compensation. 9.I now turn to consider the question of how the applicant got injured. 10.The applicant was a personal trainer working at a gym run by the respondent at the material time. At the time of the injury, he was coaching a member of the gym (“the Member”), who was doing a set of weight-bearing squatting exercises. In these exercises, the Member was required to hold a barbell of around 130 – 140 pounds over his shoulders (and behind his neck) while he was squatting. To render assistance, the applicant had to stand behind the Member, put his hands under and through the Members’ underarms and hold the barbell, and squat together with the Member. 11.The applicant explained how he got injured in his witness statement as follows:-
12.According to various medical reports, the applicant had also described what happened to various doctors. He claimed that the Member “fell backwards towards him”, “sat on him”, and “fell backwards and leaned against him”. 13.Mr Ho for the respondent submitted that these were exaggerations. 14.Having watched the CCTV footage, I accept that the Member did lose balance while he was squatting and lean backwards towards the applicant. 15.Mr Ho submitted that as a matter of common sense, the Member could not have fallen backwards and sat on the applicant if the Member was (as accepted by the applicant) able to move forward “within the next second”. I do not agree with this submission. It can be seen from the CCTV footage (which, contrary to Mr Yip’s submission, is generally clear enough for our purpose) that as the respective bodies of the applicant and the Member were very close to each other when the Member lost his balance, the Member’s buttocks did come into contact with the applicant’s thighs while the Member was leaning backwards, and, with the applicant’s body support, the Member regained his balance quickly, and was able to move forward and stand up himself shortly thereafter. I can see nothing wrong for the applicant to say that the Member “sat” on him or “fell backwards and leaned against him”. 16.What I do not accept is that the applicant had “托住該槓鈴” nor that he had “和該會員支撐著將該槓鈴放回深蹲架的安全線” as alleged in the applicant’s witness statement. As the applicant recognised in court, the barbell had already landed on the rack (深蹲架) while the Member was leaning backwards, as he was nearly at the full squat position when he leaned against the applicant. 17.It should also be noted that while I accept that the applicant did “hold” the barbell when the Member was doing his squatting exercises, the applicant, as he admitted in court, was not exerting any force, and the whole purpose of “holding” the barbell was to stabilise it and prevent it from slipping down from the palms of the Member. It was simply impossible for the applicant to “托住該槓鈴” while the Member was falling/leaning towards the applicant, as the applicant’s hands would be coming from a direction above the barbell. 18.I agree with Mr Ho that the reason why the applicant stated in his witness statement that he had “托住該槓鈴” and “和該會員支撐著將該槓鈴放回深蹲架的安全線” at the material time was because he was minded to exaggerate the amount of weight exerting onto him while the Member was leaning backwards so as to support his own case that he had suffered a serious injury. I do not accept the applicant’s explanation in court that these mistakes in his witness statement were caused by the fact that he had not watched the CCTV footage before he made that statement. I do not think he needed to be reminded about what had happened at all, because he should have been able to tell from his own experience that he could not be exerting any force on the barbell at the material time, and it was impossible for him to “托住該槓鈴” by reason of the position of his hands and the way he “held” the barbell. 19.Indeed, when the applicant was asked (after the CCTV footage was played in court) whether he was touching the barbell when the accident happened, the applicant told the court that while he could not see clearly from the CCTV footage, he probably was touching the barbell because that was what he normally did when he was coaching. Apparently, the applicant was able to recall how he had coached his students even without watching the CCTV footage. To say that he had made a mistake on whether he had “托住該槓鈴” because he had not watched the relevant footage was, in my view, just an excuse. THE APPLICANT’S LEFT KNEE INJURY 20.The next question is whether the applicant had injured his left knee as a result of the accident on 6 March 2015. 21.In my view, he did not, as it is plainly not supported by the contemporaneous medical records:-
22.Mr Yip submitted that “the incontrovertible fact was that the Applicant experienced left leg pain immediately after the Accident”[1]. With greatest respect, this is not accepted, because as far as his left leg was concerned, all the applicant complained right after the accident was numbness. The first time he complained about radiating pain over his left thigh was on 14 March 2015. Even then, the complaint was not about his left knee. He never complained having left knee pain before 12 June 2015. 23.The applicant explained that he had in fact told his treating doctors about his left knee pain. He said, however, the doctors told him that when his back was healed, the knee pain would also subside, and because of this assurance (“the Assurance”), he did not mention about his knee pain to other treating doctors anymore. He further stated that he mentioned about left knee pain to the doctors again in June 2015 because such pain remained despite the fact that he was feeling better with his back, and as a result he started to worry about his knee. 24.I do not accept the applicant’s explanation. 25.Assuming the applicant was telling the truth when he explained why he did not mention about his knee pain again, that would only be applicable to those occasions after he had been given the Assurance. It does not apply to the time when the applicant was asked by the ambulance officer and the triage nurse on 6 March 2015 to describe his condition. As aforesaid, it is evident that the applicant did not mention about knee pain at all on those occasions. I do not believe that both the ambulance officer and the triage nurse had omitted to record the applicant’s knee pain if he had indeed told them about it. 26.In any event, I reject the applicant’s evidence that because of the Assurance, he did not mention about his knee pain to the treating doctors any further. In my view, it is just natural for any patient to inform his/her doctors of all the pains/problems so that the doctors would have full knowledge about them and give the best treatment. The applicant’s explanation does not make any sense. Moreover, such an assertion could not explain why the applicant did not tell Dr Fu Wai Kee on 15 April 2015 about his knee pain. The applicant knew that Dr Fu was instructed by the insurer of the respondent to do the examination. There could be absolutely no reason why the applicant should refrain from mentioning about his left knee pain as it was against his own interest to do so. 27.Hence, even if the applicant had any left knee pain at any time, it is my finding that he did not have such pain before June 2015, and that such pain was not caused by the accident on 6 March 2015. 28.The above findings could also find support from the opinion of the medical experts. 29.In the Joint Expert Report dated 20 October 2017, Dr Wong See Hoi (who was instructed by the applicant) opined in paragraph 44 that:-
30.Dr Chun had arrived at the same conclusion. He stated in paragraph 54 of the Joint Expert Report that:
THE ALLEGED MALINGERING 31.On behalf of the respondent, Mr Ho had made extensive allegations against the applicant for malingering. In his cross-examination and final submissions, he had systematically categorised his allegations under various sub-headings, namely, “changing locations of pain”, “drastic changes of symptoms” and “deterioration of physical conditions over time”, and in respect of each of these matters, he had quoted and cross-examined the applicant on different examples and incidents. 32.The applicant had given various explanations to the challenges of the respondent. Mr Yip also made submissions accordingly. They had indeed successfully cast doubt on some of those challenges. 33.To find that an applicant had malingered is a very serious matter and I will not come to this conclusion lightly. I am of the view that I should only make such a finding if I am satisfied that there is clear evidence in support. 34.Is there any clear evidence in support of the respondent’s claim of malingering or exaggerating the extent of injury on the part of the applicant herein? I am afraid there is. 35.Firstly, it can be seen from the applicant’s performance in straight leg raising tests (“SLR”). 36.The SLR results are set out in the following table:-
37.During re-examination, the applicant did not admit that he had injured himself on another occasion after the accident in the period between March 2015 and June 2015. If that is the truth, then it is a mystery as to why the applicant’s performance in SLR would fluctuate in such the way as demonstrated in the above table. It can be seen that the applicant had been able to have full range of movement in the SLR on 21 March 2015, 26 March 2015 and 30 March 2015. There is no proper reason why he would have worse performance afterwards. 38.What is most unusual is the applicant’s performance of SLR on 23 March 2015. He had a normal range of motion on 21 March 2015. However, he could only raise both his legs for 40 degrees just 2 days later, even though he was “back to normal” on 26 March 2015. In cross-examination, he said he had forgotten about why he had performed so badly on 23 March 2015, though he confirmed that he had already tried his best. 39.Mr. Yip submitted that if the applicant was malingering or exaggerating, he would not have performed before various doctors in different ways, but should have persistently exaggerated his symptoms. I do not accept this submission. If the applicant was trying his best on every occasion when the SLR was done (as he claimed he had), his performance should have been much more consistent. Furthermore, there is no expert evidence in support of Mr Yip’s speculation that the applicant’s condition could be fluctuating. 40.In the Joint Expert Report, Dr Chun opined that:-
41.Such a view was not disputed by Dr Wong, the other expert who was instructed by the applicant. Indeed, Dr Wong did not address the fluctuating results of SLR in the Joint Expert Report at all, nor did he express any disagreement to Dr Chun’s view (which was repeated several times in the Joint Expert Report) that the applicant’s complaints were not compatible with objective evidence, and were just suggestion of “illness behaviour”. 42.Mr Yip for the applicant argued that the purpose of the straight leg raising test is to detect signs of his herniation but not whether the patient is experiencing pain in his leg. With respect, this is not the point. The question here is whether the applicant was exaggerating the extent of his injury at various consultation sessions. 43.The applicant was also questioned on why, according to the reports of the treating doctors, the performance of his right leg in SLR was worse than that of his left leg, and why he had severe pain in his right leg on 27 May 2015. The applicant could not give any answer other than saying that the medical records might be wrong. He insisted that his right leg had never had any problem. In my view, given his aforesaid confirmation, the most probable cause of there being records showing that the applicant’s right leg could not perform SLR to the full extent from time to time is that he had exaggerated his injury. It should be noted that there was not just a single occasion when the record shows that he had problems with his right leg, but many occasions. The treating doctors could not be wrong in recording the test results all the time. This is particularly so in respect of the medical record dated 27 May 2015, on which occasion the applicant claimed that he had severe pain in his right leg and had “fear avoidance”, and as a result he could only move for 30° in his right leg SLR. Given the seriousness of his complaint, the doctor must have been extra-cautious in recording the location of the applicant’s problem. 44.Secondly, it can be seen that the applicant had exaggerated his injury by taking a look at his complaints of pain generally. 45.While the applicant did complain about having back pain after the accident, he indicated that there was no rest pain or 24-hour pain on 13 March 2015. However, when he was examined by Dr Chun on 26 June 2015, he said that he had “low back pain, site: central low back to right side, dull ache, continuous and nonstop and of fluctuating intensity from grade 2 to grade 8 according to the Visual Analog Scale (VAS) [Grade 0 = no pain; Grade 10 = extreme unbearable pain], after medication, grade 2. Pain increases to grade 8 during sleep (grade 8)…”. As pointed out by Mr Ho, the applicant’s condition seems to have deteriorated for unknown reason, and there is no expert evidence proving that the pain would get worse 3 months after the accident. 46.Mr Yip submitted that the reason Dr Chun could give such a detailed description of the pain might be because he had asked detailed and specific questions during the examination, whereas doctors at public hospital might not have done or made such detailed note[2]. With respect, this is pure speculation. Moreover, the point raised is about the severity of the pain complained of, but not whether the description was detailed or not. 47.In fact, it is evident that even a doctor at the public sector had queried about the applicant’s complaint of pain. In the consultation note prepared by a Dr Wong (from the Orthopaedics and Traumatology Department of Prince of Wales Hospital) for the consultation session on 11 December 2015, it was stated, among other things: “tenderness generalised” and “clinical & MRI findings not compatible”. 48.Thirdly, I agree with Mr Ho that the applicant’s exaggeration behaviour can also be seen from the way he complained about his knee pain specifically:-
49.Dr Chun also expressed the following opinion in the Joint Expert Report which was not disputed by Dr Wong:
50.While the left knee injury, if any, had been found not to be related to the accident on 6 March 2015, I am of the view that the court may still take the applicant’s complaints on his knee pain into account when assessing his credibility. 51.Mr Yip submitted that if the applicant was really a malingerer, he would not have resumed working on 28 July 2016 which was around 3 weeks before his sick leave expired. While I agree that the court may take this matter into account, I do not think this is adequate in tilting the balance, because the above conclusion on malingering or exaggeration was arrived at in the light of objective evidence. 52.Neither do I think I should attach much weight to the evidence of the applicant’s wife who gave evidence in support of the applicant’s evidence, for the apparent reason that she is not an independent witness as such. 53.Without disrespect to counsel, the above are enough to deal with the allegation of malingering and exaggeration, and as a result I do not propose to go into details of the other allegations made by the respondent. SECTION 9 COMPENSATION 54.It is Mr Yip’s argument that as a result of the residual symptoms, the applicant is unable to resume working as a personal trainer. It had been submitted that in the light of the special circumstances in the present case, the court should invoke section 9(1A) of the Ordinance and apply the Hong Kong Paper Mills formula. The circumstances relied on are as follows:-
55.Hence, the first question which this court has to consider is whether the applicant is able to resume his pre-accident job as a personal trainer. 56.It is my finding that he is able to do so. 57.In this regard, it is Dr Chun’s opinion that the applicant is able to return to work as before without limitation or restriction despite the fact that he will have on and off recurrent mechanical low back pain. 58.Such an opinion is different from that of Dr Wong, who stated that:-
59.The applicant explained in his witness statement as to why he would not be able to return to his pre-accident job in paragraph 28(vii) thereof as follows:-
60.When the applicant was asked whether he could do his pre-accident job again during re-examination, he answered “No”, and explained that:-
61.It can be seen that according to the applicant’s own evidence, there are two reasons why he said he could not return to his pre-accident job. However, they do not relate to his ability to handle the physical demand of the job of personal trainer. Neither did the applicant say of his own accord that his pre-accident job required him to have “good build of muscle bulk”[6]. In other words, the bases relied on by Dr Wong to opine that the applicant cannot resume his pre-accident job actually do not exist at all as a matter of fact. 62.Furthermore, while it is understandable that the job of personal trainer may require him to demonstrate how to use certain equipment to his students, as accepted by Mr Yip, there is no evidence that it requires frequent heavy lifting. After all, he is not the one who is doing the training. Hence, the conclusion of Dr Wong was again arrived at without any factual basis. 63.It should also be noted that according to Dr Wong’s opinion, the applicant is able to do all kinds of sports except weight lifting which in his view is “not beneficial to his spine condition”. 64.I now come back to the reasons relied on by the applicant himself. 65.The first reason given by the applicant was that he could not concentrate. However, this is contradicted by the Joint Psychiatric Report dated 10 May 2018, in which it was stated that “He had no concentration problem”[7]. 66.According to the Joint Psychiatric Report, the examination and discussion session with the psychiatric experts on 25 October 2017 had taken 2 hours 15 minutes to complete (from 2:55pm to 5:10pm). Even though the session lasted for such a long time, the experts opined that “he had adequate attention and concentration”[8]. Dr Yu Wai Tak further opined that the applicant did not have concentration or memory problems while giving the doctors various accounts. 67.When commenting specifically on whether the applicant would be able to return to his pre-accident job, the psychiatric experts opined as follows:-
68.On the basis of the above, the first reason given by the applicant cannot stand. 69.The second reason given by the applicant is that he was subjectively worried that it would take a longer time for him to recover if he gets hurt again in future. Even assuming that he is truthful about this worry, this does not mean that he cannot as a matter of ability resume his pre-accident job. 70.As can be seen from the psychiatrists’ opinion quoted above, they have the consensus that the applicant is able to return to his pre-accident job from the psychiatric point of view. 71.The applicant has not placed before the court any psychological report in support of his present claim. 72.The second reason is therefore rejected as inadequate in justifying his claim that he cannot return to his pre-accident job. 73.By reasons of the above, I do not agree that we should adopt the Hong Kong Paper Mills formula as suggested by the applicant. 74.With the above conclusion, I now turn to consider the parties’ section 18 appeals against the assessment of the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board. 75.According to the Form 7 dated 10 May 2017, the applicant was assessed to suffer from 12% permanent loss of earning capacity (1% for back, 1% for knee and 10% for psychiatric impairment). Both the applicant and the respondent have lodged an appeal against the assessment. 76.As aforesaid, it was my finding that the applicant’s left knee injury, if any, was not caused by the accident on 6 March 2015. This court should therefore only consider the applicant’s permanent loss of earning capacity caused by his back problem and his psychiatric problem. Back problem 77.The relevant parts of the Joint Expert Report are as follows:-
78.In the case of the applicant, it cannot be disputed that there was no disc herniation and he had no definite radiculopathy symptom. I therefore hold the view that the applicant’s condition should not be categorised as falling within Class 1 as suggested by Dr Wong. 79.Mr Yip criticised Dr Chun’s assessment by saying that he had failed to refer to the AMA Guide. As can be seen from the excerpts of the Joint Expert Report quoted above, such a criticism is misconceived, for Dr Chun did refer to the Guide. 80.I agree with Dr Chun’s assessment that the injury is minor in nature. As a matter of fact, as mentioned above, Dr Wong also opined that the applicant is able to do all kinds of sports. Dr Wong only singled-out weight lifting, for he was of the view that it would not be beneficial to his spine condition. In these circumstances, I take the view that the permanent loss of earning capacity should be minimal. Having considered all the circumstances, I consider that Dr Chun’s assessment should be adopted, and I find that the applicant’s permanent loss of earning capacity in relation to his back problem is 1%. Psychiatric condition 81.In the Joint Psychiatric Report, Dr Yu opined that the applicant had overstated his depressed mood and irritability and he had provided exaggerated descriptions of mental symptoms with the intention of building up a case of severe mental illness. He also stated that as the severity of the physical symptoms had been exaggerated, the applicant would not have suffered mental distress as a consequence. By reference to the Sixth Edition (2008) of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Dr Yu took the view that the applicant has no impairment which affects current or future earning capacity due to mental symptoms at all. The percentage of loss was therefore assessed at 0%. 82.On the other hand, Dr Law took the view that the applicant suffered from adjustment disorder which was wholly caused by the accident on 6 March 2015. Having said that, he thought the mental impairment would be mild. He estimated the applicant’s loss of earning capacity due to the adjustment order to be 3%. 83.As pointed out by Mr Ho, it seems that the psychiatrists had come to different conclusions because Dr Law’s assessment was made on the basis that the complaints of the applicant were genuine, whereas Dr Yu had given his view on the premise that the applicant was exaggerating his problems. This analysis was not disputed by Mr Yip. On my part, I consider that Dr Yu’s premise is more reliable, because, as I have found above, the applicant had exaggerated the extent of his injury. 84.The applicant’s loss of earning capacity arising out of his psychiatric condition is therefore assessed at 0%. Conclusion on permanent loss of earning capacity 85.I therefore allow the section 18 appeal brought by the respondent, and dismiss the appeal of the applicant. The total permanent loss of earning capacity is assessed at 1%. Calculation of section 9 compensation 86.The applicant was 31 years old at the time of the accident (6 March 2015). The appropriate multiplier is therefore 96. 87.It is not disputed by the parties that the monthly earnings to be adopted for the calculation of section 9 compensation should be the amount provided by the Sixth Schedule of the Ordinance which was in force as at the time of the accident, which was $26,070. 88.Compensation under section 9 of the Ordinance is therefore assessed at $25,027.20 ($26,070.00 x 96 x 1%). SECTION 10 COMPENSATION 89.It is undisputed that the applicant had been given sick leave for a total of 533 days from 6 March 2015 to 19 August 2016 and that it had been certified in the Form 7 dated 10 May 2017 that those days of sick leave were necessary as a result of the applicant’s injury. Be that as it may, Mr Yip informed the court that the applicant would only claim for a total of 510 days in respect of compensation payable under section 10 of the Ordinance, because the applicant had started working again on 28 July 2016. 90.However, Mr Ho contended that only 5.5 months of sick leave should be allowed. 91.In Tse Tsz Chong v Law Sze Man [2015] 1 HKLRD 1120, it was held by Lam VP that:-
92.In deciding whether the respondent has discharged its burden in rebutting the presumption under section 10(2) of the Ordinance, I bear in mind the importance of giving due weight to the decision of the treating doctors who had decided to grant sick leave to the applicant because they had the advantages of seeing and assessing the applicant at the material time. It is also noted that the applicant had not “shopped around” for sick leave certificates, and all the sick leave had been granted by the Orthopaedics and Traumatology Department of Prince of Wales Hospital. 93.Despite the above matters, I still hold the view that the respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption under section 10(2) of the Ordinance, but my ruling is that the applicant should be granted sick leave up to 11 September 2015 rather than mid-August 2015 as advocated by Mr Ho. 94.In coming to the above conclusion, I have taken the following matters into account:-
95.As aforesaid, the respondent suggested that sick leave for only 5.5 months should be given. Since the 1st course of physiotherapy treatment was given up to 11 September 2015, I am prepared to accept that sick leave should be approved up to that date as well. In other words, I shall allow sick leave of 190 days. 96.Parties agreed that the monthly earnings to be adopted for the calculation of compensation under section 10 of the Ordinance should be taken to be $69,415.50. The amount of section 10 compensation is therefore assessed at $351,705.20 ($69,415.50 x 4/5 x 190/30). SECTION 10A COMPENSATION 97.Mr Ho for the respondent argued that medical expenses beyond the reasonable sick leave period should not be awarded. Mr Yip drew my attention to the case of Pak Sai Ming v J V Fitness Limited (DCEC 494/2014, unreported, 17 June 2016) in which it was held that:-
98.I agree that there should not be a hard and fast rule that an employee’s claim of medical expenses under section 10A of the Ordinance should be restricted to those incurred during the sick leave period which the court finds to be necessary under section 10. In my view, so long as the employee can satisfy the court that the medical expenses incurred are necessary and reasonable for medical treatment in respect of the injury which is caused to the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the employer should be liable to pay such expenses, even though such medical expenses are incurred after the expiry of sick leave. 99.In the present case, it is this court’s finding that the applicant had exaggerated his extent of injury. In my view, as far as his injury caused by the accident is concerned, any further medical expenses incurred after 11 September 2015 were unnecessary and unreasonable. I will therefore only make an award under section 10A for medical expenses incurred on or before 11 September 2015. 100.Taking into account the maximum amount of medical expenses per day which may be claimed pursuant to the Third Schedule of the Ordinance (in effect as at the date of the accident, i.e. $200 per day), section 10A compensation is assessed at$4,085.00. TOTAL AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION PAYABLE 101.It is undisputed that the applicant had received advance payment in the total sum of $276,794.84. 102.The total amount of compensation payable is therefore calculated as follows:
103.Interest should be awarded at half of the judgment rate from the date of the accident (6 March 2015) to the date of this judgment, and at judgment rate thereafter until full payment. COSTS 104.The respondent is largely successful in resisting the applicant’s claim. I therefore make a cost order nisi that the applicant shall bear the costs of the respondent (including all costs reserved, if any), with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. The applicant’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary within 14 days hereof.
Mr Richard Yip, instructed by Or & Partners, for the applicant Mr Leon Ho, instructed by Au & Associates, for the respondent [1] Paragraph 17 of the applicant’s Closing Submission and paragraph 12 of the applicant’s Reply Submission [2] Paragraph 35 of the applicant’s reply submissions [3] Page 6 of the Joint Expert Report [4] Paragraph 15 of the Joint Psychiatric Report [5] Paragraph 54 of the Joint Expert Report [6] I have not lost sight of the fact that the applicant did quote Dr Wong’s opinion on “good build of muscle bulk” in his witness statement, however, it was not his own evidence that “good build of muscle bulk” is a requirement of his pre-accident job. He simply referred to this part of the opinion in his summary of the expert evidence obtained. [7] Paragraph 24(d) of the Joint Psychiatric Report [8] Paragraph 44 of the Joint Psychiatric Report [9] Paragraph 57 of the Joint Expert Report [10] Paragraph 69 of the Joint Expert Report | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment