Khan Nasir v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of CACV 344/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 February 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 28 July 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 March 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 May 2017 rejecting his non-refoulement cla
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CACV 344/2020 [2021] HKCA 164 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 344 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 489 of 2018) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon S T Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 28 July 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 March 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9 May 2017 rejecting his non-refoulement claim. 2.The applicant has consented to his appeal being heard by two judges of the Court of Appeal. 3.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong on 6 June 2014 illegally and was arrested by the police on 9 June 2014. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 11 June 2014. 4.The applicant’s claim was based on his fear of being harmed or killed by the supporters of a political party named Pakistan Muslim League(N) (“PML-N”) as he refused to join the party. His case was summarised by the Judge in [1-4] of the Form CALL-1[1]. 5.By his decision dated 9 May 2017 (“the Director’s decision”), the Director rejected the applicant’s claim having regard to the torture risk[2], persecution risk[3], BOR 2 risk[4] and BOR 3 risk[5] grounds. 6.By its decision dated 16 March 2018 (“the Board’s decision”), the Board dismissed the appeal having regard to all applicable grounds. Primarily, the Board held that it was not satisfied that was any real risk of harm to the applicant upon his return to Pakistan. The Board was also satisfied that there was nothing to suggest that the applicant would not receive state protection upon his return and that internal relocation would be viable. Application for leave to start judicial review 7.On 26 March 2018, the applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision. 8.In his affirmation in support of the leave application dated 26 March 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds for judicial review, as summarized by the judge at [9] of the CALL-1 Form:
The Judge’s Decision 9.The applicant did not request an oral hearing before the Judge, who accordingly dealt with the application on the papers. 10.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the director and the board, the Judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [10] to [14] of the CALL-1 Form:
Appeal to Court of Appeal 11.By a Notice of Appeal filed on 10 August 2020, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following grounds:
12.In Exhibit B entitled “Initial Grounds of Appeal” attached to his affirmation dated 10 August 2020, the applicant deposed that:
Skeleton Submissions 13.On 29 December 2020, the applicant lodged his written submission, by which the applicant expanded on his grounds of appeal and submitted that the pandemic has made it unsafe for him and his family in Hong Kong to return to Pakistan. Legal Principles 14.The position in law in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as established by a number of judicial precedents, is as follows. 15.The primary decision makers in relation to an applicant’s claim for non-refoulement are the Director and (in an unsuccessful claim) the Board. They assess the evidence and are the finders of fact, which may include findings not only in respect of the applicant’s credibility in respect of his/her individual allegations, but also in respect of the risk (or otherwise) of harm, the availability (or otherwise) of state protection, and the viability (or otherwise) of internal relocation, having regard to relevant matters including the applicant’s personal circumstances as found after the hearing, as well as relevant information regarding the applicant’s country of origin. 16.When the matter comes before a judge of the Court of First Instance on an application for leave to start judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Board, the judge’s position is not the same as that of the Director or the Board. Although the judge will adopt an enhanced standard when scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, he does not hear the claim afresh as if he was the Board. In keeping with established principles of judicial review, the judge cannot intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, or procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s decision. The relevant cases establishing this position have been conveniently set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[6] and we will not repeat them here. 17.Subsequently if the matter comes before the Court of Appeal, the focus is further refined to the scrutiny of the decision of the judge as challenged in the grounds of appeal. Again, in keeping with established principles governing appeals from a refusal of a judge to grant leave to start judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal would only interfere if the applicant can demonstrate that the judge had made errors of law, or had failed to take into account relevant matters, or was otherwise plainly wrong[7]. Generally fresh evidence would not be admitted unless the requirements in Ladd v Marshall[8] are satisfied. Nor would the Court of Appeal generally entertain new arguments based on facts, when those arguments should have been canvassed before coming to this court. 18.We heard the appeal on 1 February 2021. At the hearing, the applicant had nothing further to say. Discussion 19.Applying the legal principles set out above, it is clear that none of the circumstances permitting this court to interfere with the decision of the Judge is present in this case. 20.We are of the view that the matters stated in the notice of appeal and the applicant’s submissions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal. In an appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge of the Court of First Instance, the focus of the Court of Appeal is the correctness of the judge’s decision. It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to point to errors in the reasons and decision of the judge. In the present case, the applicant has not pointed to any error in the Judge’s reasons for decision. 21.As for the ground based on the lack of an oral hearing before the Judge, the applicant had never requested an oral hearing. The Judge may determine the leave application without a hearing if a hearing is not requested in the Form 86[9]. This ground is also without merit. 22.We have considered the CD-ROM exhibited as Exhibit (D) to his affirmation dated 26 March 2018 which contains the following files:
23.Apparently, the purpose of these videos was to invite the court to take a view on the corruption and lack of state protection in Pakistan. The videos had been put before the Judge and the applicant did not point out what error the Judge has committed in relation to these videos. This ground is also without merit. 24.In any event, we have reviewed the Board’s decisions and the Judge’s decision and the reasons they gave for their decisions. We see no errors of law, or mistake of fact, or procedural impropriety in reaching those decisions. The application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s decision was hopeless and rightly dismissed. There is no basis to disturb the Judge’s decision. 25.For the above reasons, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person. [2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [7] See cases cited in Nupur Mst, op cit, §14(2). [8] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. [9] Order 52, rule 2(4) of the Rules of High Court |
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