Konew Capital International Ltd v. Tsang Shar Wing and Another
Read the full judgment text of DCMP 3893/2019 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment.
1. This is an application for a money judgment, an order for possession, and an order for sale.
Cites 6 cases
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DCMP 3893/2019 [2021] HKDC 286 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 3893 OF 2019 ________________
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________________ Coram: His Honour Judge Harold Leong in Court Date of Hearing: 3 December 2020 Date of Judgment 8 March 2021 ___________________ JUDGMENT ___________________ 1.This is an application for a money judgment, an order for possession, and an order for sale. Background 2.The plaintiff (“P”), a licensed money lender in Hong Kong, is a mortgagee of the second mortgage dated 12th July 2018 (the “Second Mortgage”) and third mortgage dated 20th December 2018 (the “Third Mortgage”) (collectively, the “Konew Mortgages”) voluntarily granted by 1st defendant (“D1”) over a property beneficially owned by D1 (and the 2nd defendant (“D2”)), namely Flat H, 48th Floor, Tower 2, Ocean Shores, No. 88 O King Road, Tseung Kwan O, Sai Kung, New Territories (the “Property”). 3.In a Loan Agreement dated 14th March 2019 (the “Loan Agreement”), D1 obtained a loan of HK$1,000,000 from P for the purpose of re-financing of existing loans. The said loan is secured by the Konew Mortgages (which secure altogether HK$1,200,000 plus interests and costs). 4.D1 has failed to repay the said loan (by instalment) and an event of default under the Konew Mortgages occurred. Notwithstanding P’s repeated requests and demands, D1 has failed and/or refused to remedy his breach. P has therefore exercised its power of sale under the Konew Mortgages and commenced these proceedings by way of an originating summons dated 2nd December 2019 (the “OS”) which was supported by the Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung dated 13th March 2020 (and filed on 17th June 2020) (the “Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung”). 5.P is therefore applying for a money judgment, order for possession, and order for sale. 6.D2 appeared in person in the 1st hearing before this Honourable Court, and has subsequently filed an Affirmation of Wong Hau Yin (黃巧燕的非宗教式誓詞) [Hearing Bundle page 147-1 to 147-2] in opposition (“D2’s Affirmation in Opposition”). 7.The court needs to consider whether all essential elements for money judgment, order for possession, and order for sale are established. Preliminary matters 8.As a preliminary point, the court is satisfied that P has complied with section 18 of the Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap 163) (“MLO”):
9.Further, the interest charged by P (i.e. 42%) does not exceed 48% (not to mention 60%) [Hearing Bundle page 102] and hence the Loan Agreement fully complies with sections 24 and 25 of the MLO. P’s entitlement to money judgment 10.The OS was duly issued under Order 83A and Order 88 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H). 11.Order 83A provides for the basis of a money lenders action, including an action for money judgment (see page 1 of the OS [Hearing Bundle page 1]). The requirements under Order 83A have all been complied and there was valid service of the relevant documents on D1 and D2. 12.P is therefore entitled to seek a money judgment against D1 in this substantive hearing. The amount was not stated in the OS since the amount has been accruing after the issuance of the OS up until payment. However, the latest figure was provided at the Draft Order annexed to P’s skeleton submissions. 13.P’s claim for a money judgment against D1 is based on D1’s non-payment of the instalments of principal and interest as required by the Loan Agreement. 14.Under the Loan Agreement, it was provided that:
15.The Konew Mortgages were executed in favour of P, which essentially provided that:
16.D1 obtained the Loan on 14th March 2019 but had been in default in paying the full or any monthly instalments in accordance with the LA since the 1st instalment due on 14th April 2019. 17.By a letter dated 15th July 2019 from P’s solicitors, P demanded D1 to pay off the outstanding instalment(s) of the Loan together with interest thereon within 7 days, failing which P would commence legal proceedings against D1 for the recovery of the entire balance of the Loan and interest as well as for enforcement of the Konew Mortgages. 18.A similar demand was repeated by a letter dated 3rd September 2019 from P’s solicitors. On this occasion, P demanded for repayment of the entire balance of the Loan with interests within 7 days, and indicated clearly its intention to apply for an order for sale of the Property in its entirety if D1 fails and/or refuses to comply with the said demand. 19.Nonetheless, D1 has failed and/or refused to comply with the repeated demands and requests. 20.As such, an EoD has occurred and P is entitled to possession of the Property (at least the share or part beneficially owned by D1). 21.P is also entitled to judgment of the following money sums (at paragraph 22 to 26 of the Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung [Hearing Bundle page 22 to 24]):
22.In these circumstances, the court would enter money judgment against D1 in terms of the Draft Order. P’s entitlement to an order for possession 23.Order 88 provides for the basis of a claim in possession (see paragraph 2 of the OS [Hearing Bundle page 3]): 24.This court finds that the requirements under Order 88 have all been complied with. The Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung [Hearing Bundle page 11 to 32] has provided details required by Order 88 rule 5(3) namely:
25.In compliance with Order 88 r5(2), true copies of the Konew Mortgages are exhibited as Exhibit WKK-2 [Hearing Bundle page 41-63] and Exhibit WKK-3 [Hearing Bundle page 64-86], and the original versions of the same have also been provided to the Court for examination at the hearing. 26.In compliance with Order 88 r5(4), the court is satisfied that the Property remains to be in the use, possession and control of D1 and D2 as at the date of the Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung. 27.Finally, as set out above, P has effected valid service of the relevant documents on D1 and D2. Notice of P’s application for possession was also given to Hang Seng Bank, the first mortgagee. 28.In these circumstances, the Court finds that P is entitled to an order for possession of the Property. P’s entitlement to an order for sale Legal principles 29.According to sections 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Partition Ordinance (Cap 352) (“PO”), a tenant in common has the locus standi to apply for an order for sale:
30.There is authority suggesting that a legal chargee/mortgagee of a partial interest is entitled to apply for an order for sale or partition of the entire land: see Uplink Finance Ltd v Lee Sze Tai and Others (supra), paragraph 25. The underlying reason is that, upon an event of default, such chargee/mortgagee would be entitled to possession of the property, making itself a person interested within the meaning of the PO: see Law Chun Wai v Chu Suk Har (supra), paragraph 22 to 23. 31.The court has considered the following cases regarding its exercise of discretion under the PO. 32.In Wong Chun Kei v Poon Vai Chung [2007] 1 HKLRD 825, Mr Recorder Fok SC (as he then was) succinctly summarised the principles at paragraph 18 to 19 as follows:
33.The above principles were applied by DHCJ Kent Yee in Tsang Wai Fan v Hui Siu Kwong HCMP 1505/2014 (unreported, 26 January 2016) (at paragraph 22) and very recently by DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as he then was) in Chan Sing Fu v Chan Hoi Shing and Others HCMP 1713/2017 (unreported, 17 September 2018) (at paragraph 10 to 11). Considerations 34.First, this Court is interested in whether P, being a second mortgagee over a half interest in the Property, is a “person interested” within the meaning of the PO. The answer is yes. 35.In Fortis Bank Asia HK v Yu Kam Hoi & Another HCMP 134/2002 (unreported, 4 March 2004), Reyes J held at paragraph 56 that the words “any person interested in such property” in section 3(1) of the PO must be read restrictively as confined to persons holding an interest in possession. 36.In Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage (13th ed), the learned editors stated at paragraph 29.2 that a “second or subsequent mortgagee is similarly entitled to possession, except as against prior mortgagees”. As such, a second or subsequent mortgage can also be a “person interested” within the meaning of the PO. 37.Although P is only entitled to possession of half of the interests of the Property, and has lower priority than the mortgage held by Hang Seng Bank, P is still a “person interested” for the following reasons:
38.Second, the basis of P’s applications has been made beyond doubt to D1, D2 and Hang Seng Bank by Affirmation of Wong Kin Keung. D2’s Affirmation in Opposition has raised no valid legal defences to P’s claims. D2 stated that the Property was the main residence of herself and her two daughters. During the hearing, D2 further explained that her eldest daughter was now in university but the younger one, aged 12, required a helper to look after. 39.Whilst the court understands such difficulties, there is no evidence before the court that shows that there are special or unusual circumstances which may amount to “very great hardship” under the law. As such, the evidence before the court is not sufficient to defeat a mortgagee’s property rights and entitlement to apply for a sale under the PO. 40.Incidentally, D2 also questioned why the plaintiff would still loan to D1 given his bad track record. However, the court agrees with Mr. Cheung, counsel for the plaintiff, that this was a commercial decision and not a legal matter for the court to deal with. 41.Third, the discretionary factors are also in favour of the grant of an order for sale. 42.There is no evidence from D1 or D2 (nor Hang Seng Bank) suggesting that it is possible or desirable to physically partition the Property into two halves. 43.Since the Property is a residential unit in a multi-storey building with a saleable area of around 515 sq ft, it would be impracticable or not beneficial to the owners to make an order for its partition. Even if it is possible, doing so will no doubt greatly devalue the Property, and prejudice D2’s financial interests. 44.There is no evidence from D1 or D2 (nor Hang Seng Bank) suggesting that an order for sale would cause great hardship to one or some of them. As already canvassed above, D2’s Affirmation in Opposition has not demonstrated any valid legal defence, not to mention a defence of severe hardship. 45.There is no sign that D1 would or at least intends to defend P’s applications. 46.The first mortgagee, Hang Seng Bank, also had not made any objections as at the date hereof. Importantly, so long as the sale proceeds are applied towards the discharge of the first mortgage in favour of Hang Seng Bank, there could not be any conceivable injustice and/or prejudice on the part of Hang Seng Bank. 47.Given D1’s behaviour, P would not be able to recover (or recover fully) the outstanding sums without the Court’s order. P would clearly suffer prejudice by the late repayment of the outstanding sums, bearing in mind that the amount of loss and damage on P’s part will escalate and it is unclear whether later the value of the Property can fully cover P’s loss and damage. 48.In addition, since a reserve price at the market value would be set up by P, some surplus would be left for D1 and D2 after a sale of the Property. P’s entitlement to an order for indemnity costs 49.The Court note that entitlement to indemnity costs are provided by §17.01(ii) of the Konew Mortgages and Clause 13 of the Loan Agreement. 50.In this connection, it is trite that contractual agreement to pay costs on indemnity basis would be enforced by the Court: Kowloon Development Finance Ltd v Pendex Industries Ltd [2012] 5 HKLRD 11, paragraph 48 to 51. Conclusion 51.In the premises, the Court would give the following orders:-
Mr. Tommy Cheung, instructed by M/s Au Yeung, Lo & Chung, for the plaintiff The 1st defendant appears in person The 2nd defendant appears in person |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCMP 3893/2019