Muhammad Bilal Alias Bilal Muhammad v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of CACV 451/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 15 March 2021.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 31 August 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 15 March 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 March 2017 rejecting his non-refouleme
Cited by 1 case · Cites 6 cases
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CACV 451/2020 [2021] HKCA 275 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 451 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 634 of 2018) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon S T Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 31 August 2020 dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office / Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 15 March 2018 dismissing his appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 27 March 2017 rejecting his non-refoulement claim. 2.The applicant has consented to his appeal being heard by two judges of the Court of Appeal. 3.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He entered Hong Kong on 24 October 2008 illegally and was arrested by the police on 26 October 2008. He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 29 October 2008. 4.The applicant’s claim was based on his fear of being harmed or killed by the family of his paternal cousin as he was blamed for his cousin’s death. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [2] to [4] of the Form CALL-1[1]. 5.By his decision dated 27 March 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director rejected the applicant’s claim having regard to the torture risk[2], persecution risk[3], BOR 2 risk[4] and BOR 3 risk[5] grounds. 6.By its decision dated 15 March 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed the appeal having regard to all applicable grounds. Primarily, the Board found that the family of the applicant’s cousin is unlikely to cause harm to the applicant upon his return because almost 12 years had passed since the incident. Further, the Board was satisfied that internal relocation would be viable. Application for leave to start judicial review 7.On 13 April 2018, the applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision which contained no ground for seeking the relief. 8.In his affirmation in support of the leave application the applicant deposed that:
The Judge’s Decision 9.After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the director and the board, the Judge refused to give leave for judicial review. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [9] to [13] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal 10.By a Notice of Appeal filed on 9 September 2020, the applicant appealed against the refusal of leave for judicial review on the following grounds (sic):
Skeleton Submissions 11.In his skeleton submissions dated 26 January 2021, the applicant gave a summary of the facts giving rise to his claim and submitted that:
Legal Principles 12.The position in law in an appeal to the Court of Appeal, as established by a number of judicial precedents, is as follows. 13.The primary decision makers in relation to an applicant’s claim for non-refoulement are the Director and (in an unsuccessful claim) the Board. They assess the evidence and are the finders of fact, which may include findings not only in respect of the applicant’s credibility in respect of his/her individual allegations, but also in respect of the risk (or otherwise) of harm, the availability (or otherwise) of state protection, and the viability (or otherwise) of internal relocation, having regard to relevant matters including the applicant’s personal circumstances as found after the hearing, as well as relevant information regarding the applicant’s country of origin. 14.When the matter comes before a judge of the Court of First Instance on an application for leave to start judicial review proceedings to quash the decision of the Board, the judge’s position is not the same as that of the Director or the Board. Although the judge will adopt an enhanced standard when scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, he does not hear the claim afresh as if he was the Board. In keeping with established principles of judicial review, the judge cannot intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, or procedural unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s decision. The relevant cases establishing this position have been conveniently set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[6] and we will not repeat them here. 15.Subsequently if the matter comes before the Court of Appeal, the focus is further refined to the scrutiny of the decision of the judge as challenged in the grounds of appeal. Again, in keeping with established principles governing appeals from a refusal of a judge to grant leave to start judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal would only interfere if the applicant can demonstrate that the judge had made errors of law, or had failed to take into account relevant matters, or was otherwise plainly wrong[7]. Generally fresh evidence would not be admitted unless the requirements in Ladd v Marshall[8] are satisfied. Nor would the Court of Appeal generally entertain new arguments based on facts, when those arguments should have been canvassed before coming to this court. Appeal Hearing 16.The applicant failed to appear at the hearing on 1 March 2021. Being satisfied that sufficient notice[9] has been given to the applicant of the hearing date, we proceeded to deal with the appeal on the basis of the Notice of Appeal, appeal bundle and written submission lodged by the applicant. Discussion 17.Applying the legal principles set out above, it is clear that none of the circumstances permitting this court to interfere with the decision of the Judge is present in this case. 18.In the Notice of Appeal and the written submission, the applicant advanced a number of new grounds (such as the lack of transparency and the allegation that he will be harmed if he becomes a witness in Pakistan), which were never given as grounds for judicial review. It is not open to the applicant to raise these matters on appeal for the first time, well outside the time limit for bringing judicial review proceedings. 19.Further, all of the grounds of appeal lacked particulars and are therefore not reasonably arguable. The applicant also did not identify the material on the internet that was said to be relevant to his case and in any event there was no application for leave to adduce it. 20.We are of the view that the matters stated in the notice of appeal and the applicant’s submissions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal. In an appeal against the refusal of leave by a judge of the Court of First Instance, the focus of the Court of Appeal is the correctness of the judge’s decision. It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to point to errors in the reasons and decision of the judge. In the present case, the applicant has not pointed to any error in the Judge’s reasons for decision. 21.In any event, we have reviewed the Board’s decisions and the Judge’s decision and the reasons they gave for their decisions. We see no errors of law, or mistake of fact, or procedural impropriety in reaching those decisions. Nor do we see any merit in the criticism of lack of transparency. The application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s decision was hopeless and rightly dismissed. There is no basis to disturb the Judge’s decision. 22.For the above reasons, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, absent. [2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [5] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [7] See cases cited in Nupur Mst, op cit, §14(2). [8] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. [9] A notice of hearing has been sent to the applicant on 18 January 2021. |
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