Re Garcia Freddie Luzon

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1575/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 May 2021.

1. This is an application dated 29 September 2020 to appeal my decision of 23 June 2020 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision.  He did not do so.  He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order.  The applicant attended court with the benefit of an interpreter.

Cited by 3 cases · Cites 9 cases

Case No.HCAL 1575/2018[2021] HKCFI 1263
Court
High Court CFI
Date04 May 2021
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1575/2018

[2021] HKCFI 1263

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1575 OF 2018

____________________

RE: GARCIA FREDDIE LUZON Applicant

____________________

Before: Hon Campbell‑Moffat J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 4 May 2021
Date of Decision: 4 May 2021

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

Introduction

1.This is an application dated 29 September 2020 to appeal my decision of 23 June 2020 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision.  He did not do so.  He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order.  The applicant attended court with the benefit of an interpreter.

Procedural Background

2.The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  He entered Hong Kong lawfully on 5 November 2008 but thereafter overstayed.  He was arrested on 26 March 2009.  He submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim on 23 June 2014 and was interviewed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 11 September 2014.  The Director dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 31 October 2014 and by Notice of Further Decision on 19 April 2017.  He appealed those Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”).  The adjudicator of the TCAB, Mr Wesley Wong, heard his initial appeal on 3 July 2015 and refused it on 13 December 2016.

3.The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 8 August 2018 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers. His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 23 June 2020.  He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 7 July 2020.  By way of summons dated 29 September 2020, he seeks leave to appeal out of time.

4.An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)).  The applicant may appeal as of right.  However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days.  Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 2B(6).  The court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted[1].

5.In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired.  Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time.  The applicant accepted he was late and gave no reason within his Affidavit as to why that was the case other than to say that he did not receive the letter.  The Court file suggests that it was properly served upon the address given at that time, which is not the same address the applicant uses today.  He maintains that he moved suddenly in the middle of 2020 and accepts that he did not inform the court of his change of address. The applicant maintains that he only learnt of the refusal of leave in September 2020 when an officer from the Immigration Department contacted him to deal with his return to his home country.  It is the duty of a litigant to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner[2]. The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant[3].

6.Even if the Court does accept that the explanation given for the delay is a reasonable one, the Court is required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal [4].  Whether there is any such merit will depend upon well‑established legal principles[5] including the fact that the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying claim.  This was explained to the applicant and he was given time to consider his grounds of appeal.  He had none.

Conclusion

7.The applicant has now been in Hong Kong since 2008.  He has been interacting with various government agencies since that date.  The explanation he has offered to this court, as to why he did not receive the order is not acceptable.  He simply wants more time.

8.In any event, I have considered his underlying application.  It has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave. There were no grounds of review and none could be ascertained from the papers. There was no complaint within the papers before the Court as to the decision to refuse leave.  The applicant merely wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh.  Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case.

9.The applicant’s summons dated 29 September 2020 be dismissed.

(A P Campbell‑Moffat)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The applicant appeared in person


[1] Chee Fei Ming v Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene [2015] 4 HKC 134; Wong Yuk Man v Ng Leung Sing & Anor [2016] HKCU 157 (HCMP 3217/2015, 22 January 2016)

[2] Re Ahmed Zakar CAMP 17/2019, [2019] HKCA 566

[3] Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017

[4] Re Mehmood Ikhlas CAMP 28/2019, [2019] HKCA 567; Re MK HCMP 2609/2016; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226

[5] Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714