Re Parminder Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 543/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 10 May 2021.
1. This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Parminder SINGH, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 23 September 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 1 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“
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CACV 543/2020 [2021] HKCA 649 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 543 OF 2020 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1018 OF 2018) ________________________
________________________ Before: Hon Yeung VP and Lisa Wong J in Court Date of Hearing: 3 May 2021 Date of Judgment: 10 May 2021 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Lisa Wong J (giving the Judgment of the Court): The appeal 1.This is an appeal by the abovenamed applicant, Mr Parminder SINGH, against the order made by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“Judge”) on 23 September 2020 (“Judge’s Decision”) refusing him leave to commence judicial review proceedings. The intended application for judicial review sought to quash the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 1 June 2018 (“Board’s Decision”), which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the rejection by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) of his non-refoulement claim (“NRF Claim”) by a notice of decision dated 8 September (“Director’s Decision”). Basis and allegations in support of NRF Claim 2.The basis of the NRF Claim made by the applicant, a national of India now aged about 33, is a fear of being harmed or even killed by his uncles, Manjit Singh (“Manjit”) who was a farmer and Jinda Singh (“Jinda”) who was a policeman and the junior in-charge of the Jalandhar police station, over a land dispute if he should return to India. 3.The circumstances giving rise to such fear have been set out in detail in paragraph 6 of the Director’s Decision and in gist in paragraphs 33 to 46 of the Board’s Decision and [2] to [4] of the Form CALL-1 dated 23 September 2020, [2020] HKCFI 2403 (“Form CALL-1”). Briefly:
Illegal entry into Hong Kong and lodgment of NRF Claim 4.The applicant entered Hong Kong illegally from Shenzhen on 30 July 2014. He was arrested by the police on 7 September 2014. 5.He lodged the NRF by written representation on 9 September 2014. The applicant further submitted a Non-Refoulement Claim Form dated 4 August 2017. In processing the NRF Claim, the Director’s representatives interviewed the applicant on 28 August 2017. The applicant then had legal assistance and representation from the Duty Lawyer Service. Director’s Decision 6.The Director Decision covered all possible grounds for non-refoulement protection: torture risk[1], persecution risk[2], “BOR 2” risk[3]and “BOR 3” risk[4]. The Director found the NRF Claim unsubstantiated under all these grounds.
Appeal to Board and Board’s Decision 7.The applicant appealed to the Board. The Board conducted a rehearing of the NRF Claim on 17 April 2018 at which the applicant, with the assistance of a suitable interpreter, testified before and answered questions by the Board. 8.The Board’s Decision covered all 4 applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection. 9.After considering the applicant’s evidence and hearing him at the hearing, the Board accepted the basic facts spoken to by the applicant and found that he was the victim of a land dispute with Manjit over a series of incidents, in some of which he was injured. However, the Board did not see any real chance that the applicant will be killed or otherwise harmed by Manjit or Jinda if he is refouled to India. The Board further reached the same conclusions as the Director on the availability of reasonable state protection and viable internal relocation options. Application for leave for judicial review and Judge’s Decision 10.By a Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review (“Form 86”) issued under HCAL 1018/2018 on 5 June 2018, supported by an affirmation filed on the same date, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision on the ground that he cannot go back to India where his life would not be safe. 11.In the absence of a request for an oral hearing, the Judge considered the application on the paper on the materials available to him and refused leave. His reasons can be found in [9] to [11] of the Form CALL-1:
Appeal to Court of Appeal - grounds of appeal and submission 12.By a notice of appeal filed herein on 6 October 2020, the applicant appealed against the Judge’s Decision and advanced the following as “ground of appeal”:
13.On 24 March 2021, the applicant lodged written submission, by which he asserted (sic):
14.The applicant appeared in person at the hearing of the appeal on 3 May 2021. He was provided with a Punjabi interpreter. He had nothing to add to his notice of appeal or written submission. Court of First Instance’s role in judicial review in non-refoulement claim 15.The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claim. The court will scrutinise the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. Court of Appeal’s approach in appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review in non-refoulement claim 16.An appeal against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for the Court of Appeal to examine the decision of the Board afresh. What the appellate court is concerned with is the decision of the judge at first instance which is considered in light of the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant. The Court of Appeal will generally not admit fresh evidence unless the 3 requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall[5]are met. Nor will it normally entertain any new arguments that are fact sensitive that should have been raised in the court below. In short, the Court of Appeal shall interfere only if the judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See again Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration at [14(2)] and [14(4)]. Discussion 17.As summarised in [6] and [9] above, the NRF Claim failed on the facts at both stages of the unified screening mechanism. The questions whether the applicant would be at risk of life or torture if he is refouled to India and, if so, whether the danger would be lowered or negated by the availability of state protection and/or reasonable internal relocation options are all questions of fact within the province of the Board (after the Director). The applicant has not advanced any ground of appeal, properly so called, that tackles the negative findings of fact against him. Indeed, the much-repeated bare assertion in the applicant’s written submission that his life would be in danger if he should return to India is inconsistent with the findings of both the Director and the Board. 18.The complaint of lack of transparency made in both the notice of appeal and written submission are utterly groundless given the lengths to which the Director, the Board and the Judge have given reasons for their decisions. As for the allegation that “facts”/”reality” has been ignored, the applicant has not identified a single relevant matter that is said to have been overlooked. 19.In short, the applicant did not in the Form 86 or the accompanying affirmation point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the findings by the Board. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was hopeless and rightly dismissed. Nor did he in the notice of appeal or the written or oral submission before us identify any error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was plainly wrong. We cannot discern any either. Disposition 20.For these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Judge’s Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, appeared in person [1] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. [2] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [3] This refers to a risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [4] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [5] [1954] 1 WLR 1489. |
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